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Abstract 
The introduction of an internal market into New Zealand’s publicly financed 
health system based on a purchaser-provider separation was highly 
controversial.  From four Regional Health Authorities, the purchasing side of 
the internal market was subsequently reconfigured into a single national 
purchasing agency, the Health Funding Authority, in 1997. 
This Working Paper reviews the original rationale for the separation of 
purchase from provision, discusses the recent experience of the separation in 
New Zealand and reviews options for the possible evolution of the purchasing 
function.  The options reviewed include vertical integration (ie, the abolition of 
the purchaser-provider split). 
It is argued that there are benefits associated with the separation of purchaser 
and provider, and that, on balance, it was a good thing, although its 
application to all services was probably inadvisable.  However, no one model of 
purchaser organisation can fulfil all the requirements described by proponents 
of system change.  Health services’ purchasers are inescapably in a weak 
position vis-à-vis their providers.  Whichever model of purchasing/planning 
services is implemented, purchasers will need to develop a new set of 
relationships with primary care providers, especially general practitioners, 
since primary care services are important for the functioning of the remainder 
of the health system.  There are currently few incentives on primary care 
providers to consider the wider implications of their decisions for the rest of 
the sector and the delivery of primary care is imperfectly coordinated with 
other services. 
This paper is a background paper and does not provide policy advice, nor does 
it propose any particular course of action.  The Treasury has chosen to publish 
it (or make it available) in order to encourage peer comment with a view to 
ensuring that it is of good quality.  The views expressed in the paper is/are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the New 
Zealand Treasury.  The Treasury takes no responsibility for any errors or 
omissions in, or for the correctness of, the information contained in this paper.  
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Explanatory Note on the Purpose and 
Context of the Review 
This analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to the 
planning and procurement of publicly financed health and disability support 
services was prepared in 1999, before the November General Election which 
brought a Labour-Alliance coalition Government to power (the references, but 
not the original analysis, were subsequently updated in 2000).   
The incentives facing the agencies which plan or procure services and their 
relationships with providers are crucial to the ability of the publicly financed 
health and disability support system to manage within its allocated 
resources.  All publicly financed systems face similar difficulties in managing 
their financial risks.  It is the responsibility of the Treasury to advise the 
Minister of Finance on such issues. 
The aim of the project was to review recent experience with the separation 
between purchase and provision functions in the sector as it existed at the 
time and to conduct an impartial assessment of the pros and cons of 
alternative options for organising the relations between purchase and 
provision in order to contribute to the Treasury’s capacity to advise any 
incoming government.   
Since the report was prepared, the Government has decided to abolish the 
separation between purchaser and provider in respect of public hospital and 
related services.  The separation between purchaser and provider remains for 
many other health services (e.g. general practitioner services) and for all 
disability support services.  The Government has also decided to introduce 
majority elected District Health Boards to be responsible for both planning 
and delivering public hospital and related health services.  Although a generic 
option based on the integration of purchase and provision of services is 
discussed in the current analysis, the specifics of the Government’s policy 
were not known at the time of writing and are, therefore, not discussed. 
Although the Government has taken a number of decisions which could not 
have been anticipated when the paper was written, the analysis is still 
relevant to the sector since it discusses a number of important issues which 
the new District Health Boards will face in order to manage their budgetary 
responsibilities.  In particular, the paper identifies the significance for risk 
management of developing strong relationships with the primary care sector. 
The paper is published in line with the Treasury’s policy of undertaking 
rigorous, forward-looking analyses of important issues in public policy in 
order to improve its ability to advise the government of the day and making 
these publicly available so that the quality of its analysis can be tested 
through open debate. 
 
The paper was released under the Official Information Act in 
October 2000. 
 Summary 
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Summary 
This report sets out the rationale for a separation between purchase and 
provision of publicly funded health and disability support services, discusses 
the recent experience of the purchaser – provider split in New Zealand and 
elsewhere and then reviews six potential options for the possible evolution of 
the purchasing function in the New Zealand publicly funded health and 
disability support system.  The models discussed are: 
• a single national public purchasing agency (ie, the current arrangements 
with possible modifications); 
• sub-national, monopoly purchasing agencies;  
• primary care-based, sub-national, monopoly purchasing agencies; 
• national or sub-national, competing purchasers; 
• specialist purchasers; 
• vertical integration (ie, abolition of the current purchaser – provider split). 
The models cover the three basic types of publicly financed system: 
• vertical integration in which purchase and provision occurs through the 
same organisations; 
• quasi-market or internal market in which purchase is separated from 
provision, purchasers are appointed to act on behalf of groups of patients 
and competition is largely confined to the supply of health services; 
• regulated competition in which ‘health plans’ (ie, integrated purchaser-
provider organisations) compete for patient enrolments and, in turn, decide 
which health and disability support services they will provide themselves 
and which they will purchase from provider organisations, thereby bringing 
about both demand and supply side competition (Reinhardt, 1998). 
The review has demonstrated that there are benefits associated with the 
separation of purchaser and provider within the New Zealand publicly financed 
system.  The principal benefits appear to relate, firstly, to the entry into the 
system of a wider range of non-government providers, particularly those 
offering services to deprived populations from Maori and Pacific Island 
backgrounds.  These have allowed a flexible range of culturally appropriate 
services to be provided and widened patient choice.  However, evidence is not 
available on their relative efficiency versus conventional service providers and 
there has been little sign of such developments in the hospital sector.  
Secondly, breaking the automatic link between the decision to provide a 
service and the precise institutional form of provision of that service allows 
government, at least in principle, to take strategic decisions on resource 
allocation which would otherwise be extremely difficult.  In practice, issues 
such as hospital closures or re-locations have remained politically contentious.  
Finally, the separation has produced greater clarity and better information 
about what is being provided at tax payers’ expense.  However, it is virtually Summary 
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impossible to determine the specific contribution of particular purchasing 
arrangements to trends in productivity, quality and outcomes in the health 
system.  This is because many of the trends in system performance are long 
established (eg, shorter lengths of stay) and have little to do directly with 
institutional arrangements. 
Although purchaser – provider contracting was introduced for all Personal 
Health and Disability Support Services, there are theoretical and practical 
grounds for concluding that the strict separation of the two roles as in the New 
Zealand version of the quasi-market in health services works better for some 
services than others.  Instead, under the 1993 reforms of the health care 
system, it was assumed that all services would be improved by purchaser-
provider contracting, rather than regarding this as an empirical matter.  In 
general, the purchaser is in a better position to specify and monitor the nature, 
quality and reasonable cost of the Disability Support Services (eg, residential 
care in rest homes) than of many acute hospital services.  The market for 
Disability Support Services is also considerably more contestable than that for 
acute hospital services.  The position of public purchasers is currently further 
weakened in relation to acute hospital services by the fact that the Hospital 
and Health Services (HHSs), formerly Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs), are 
generally local monopoly providers of acute hospital services with very strong 
motivations to put pressure on the purchaser for additional funding.  It is less 
clear what incentives the purchaser faces to take decisions which might be 
unpopular with influential hospital providers.  It is argued that purchasers are 
further handicapped by the fact that the public hospitals are Crown-owned 
companies, thereby placing the Crown on both sides of the quasi-market and 
reducing the willingness of the Crown to allow the purchaser to threaten their 
viability even if this leads to more efficient health services overall.  However, 
private ownership of hospitals per se is unlikely to make a major difference to 
the leverage of public purchasers.  Purchasers are further handicapped by the 
inevitable tendency of politicians in publicly financed systems to wish to 
pursue multiple, complex and frequently incompatible health system goals on 
behalf of the public. 
Whichever model of purchasing, including its abolition, is adopted in New 
Zealand, purchasers/planning organisations will need to develop a new set of 
relationships with primary care, particularly general practitioners, since 
primary care services are important determinants of the functioning of the rest 
of the health system, but weakly co-ordinated with the delivery of other health 
services.  There are currently few incentives on primary care providers to 
consider the wider implications of their decisions for the rest of the sector.  
Where primary care does attract public subsidy, the objectives of the subsidy 
are not clearly specified, except to facilitate access in the broadest sense. 
Current ownership arrangements incur many of the transactions costs of a 
contestable market, while continuing to provide HHSs with implicit Crown 
guarantees of their future incomes.  One possible way of mitigating this 
difficulty would be to separate contracts for services from contracts for the use 
of particular facilities, thereby increasing the degree of contestability. Summary 
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No single model of purchaser organisation is likely to offer all the attributes 
described by proponents of system change.  This is because the goals of the 
publicly funded health system tend to be multiple and frequently conflicting.  
For example, there are concerns both to extend life and to improve its quality.  
Equally, there are concerns simultaneously to respond to ‘need’ (eg, severity of 
illness and suffering) and to treat only those who are likely to benefit the most 
within available resources.  These are not necessarily the same groups of 
people.  There are obvious conflicts between system goals which focus on 
improving the average health of the population and those which emphasise the 
importance of improving the health of particular social groups or people with 
particular conditions.  Targeting the latter may not always improve overall 
health.   
The option of moving directly to a system based on competition between 
purchasers for the capitation fee of individual patients, while conceptually 
attractive, would require fundamental system-wide change and would be hard 
to introduce on an experimental basis.  Furthermore it would require solutions 
to be found to thorny issues relating to preventing risk selection and enhancing 
the effectiveness of individual user choice of health plan.  The model is further 
handicapped by the likelihood that a choice of purchaser would only be 
feasible for about half the population, based in the larger centres.  However, 
there is nothing, in principle, to prevent one model eventually being introduced 
in the main centres and a different model elsewhere.  For example, in the main 
centres, in theory, there could be competition in the market and elsewhere, 
competition for the market. 
By contrast, the case for devolving purchasing responsibility to fully or partially 
risk-bearing sub-purchasing organisations with fully integrated, capitated 
budgets for Personal Health (including General Medical Services) and Disability 
Support Services is strong, particularly if they are based on primary care, in 
both the health and disability spheres, and can offer more horizontally and 
vertically integrated services.  This option would not allow the individual user 
to choose his/her purchaser, but would permit a range of different forms of 
purchasing organisation to take responsibility for all or part of the purchasing 
currently undertaken by the Health Funding Authority. 
Primary care health professionals (not just general practitioners) may be able 
to exert a stronger influence over providers than previous public purchasing 
agencies, given their relatively greater clinical knowledge and the fact that their 
decisions frequently influence their patients’ use of other health and social 
care services.  They also have relationships with individual patients, usually 
over a considerable period of time which give them insights into patients’ 
needs.  By giving all or most of the health budget to primary care-based 
organisations with the ability to make ‘savings’ by better use of these budgets, 
they will face novel incentives to manage their enrolled patients’ use of hospital 
and other resources.  Although this option would require significant change, 
particularly to the way in which primary care, especially General Medical 
Services are subsidised, its implementation would not require system–wide 
upheaval.  This option also builds on a number of current trends since a variety 
of capitated primary care organisations is already emerging, including Maori 
organisations.  If these organisations competed periodically for the market Summary 
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rather than continuously in the market, it should be possible to retain some 
contestability while reducing the likelihood of risk selection.  Fully integrated, 
capitated budgets would allow the primary care-based purchasing organisation 
to make more flexible use of all the public finance available to a defined 
population.  The organisation could, as a result, reduce the current eligibility 
for and levels of co-payments for primary care services and increase the 
amount of services provided free at the point of use.  However, in order to do 
so, there would need to changes to the way in which general practitioners and 
others are remunerated. 
This model inevitably has drawbacks as well as advantages compared with 
current arrangements.  Principal among them is the possibility that an 
increase in the number of sub-purchasers will increase the transactions costs 
in the system, that central government policy will be interpreted differently by 
each sub-purchaser, that the available expertise in purchasing will be spread 
too thinly and that primary care-based purchasers may make inappropriate 
purchasing decisions influenced by their self-interest as potential providers. 
The intrinsic weakness in the position of any purchaser of health services (due 
to problems of monopoly and information imbalances), coupled with a 
recognition of the undoubted transactions costs generated by purchaser - 
provider contracting, have led to calls for reversion to a more vertically 
integrated system.  Under this approach, the most likely design would be to set 
up a series of equitably funded, territorial health services’ authorities or 
boards across New Zealand, responsible for planning and delivery of all health 
and disability support services for a defined population.  Boards/authorities 
might have a blend of elected and appointed members, but the emphasis 
would be on lay involvement and local representation rather than experience in 
a commercial, contractual environment.   
To justify the disruption to existing arrangements which the re-introduction of 
this model would bring, it would be important to take advantage of the 
opportunity offered by the abolition of the internal market to make all publicly 
funded and subsidised services in an area the responsibility of the local health 
authority/board, including those of general practitioners, in order to improve 
the co-ordination of services.  On the other hand, it is possible that general 
practitioners would not welcome this, especially if the health authorities 
included locally elected board members.  In addition, it is unclear what greater 
incentives territorial health authorities would face to challenge inherited 
patterns of service delivery in order to improve effectiveness and efficiency of 
local services than the current monopoly national purchaser (the HFA).  The 
only sanction which government could use in the event of poor purchaser 
performance, as now, would be to remove board members and replace them 
with more effective individuals or take direct control of the health authority.   
One of the difficulties which a model based on re-integration of purchase and 
provision would face is the fact that disability support services, many parts of 
primary care and some mental health services are provided by private or ‘third 
sector' organisations.  Thus the local territorial health service will need to 
retain the capacity to contract and would not, in practice, be able to dismantle 
all parts of the purchaser-provider system.  Some of the costs of the 
contracting process would remain.   Summary 
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As well as the risk of increasing the costs of managing the health system and 
spreading purchaser expertise more thinly because of the larger number of 
purchasing bodies compared with a single national purchaser, wholly or partly 
elected territorial health authorities are also likely to generate increased 
conflict with central government unless precautions are taken to define their 
respective responsibilities and decision making autonomy carefully.  Finance 
would continue to come from central government, while the health authorities 
would tend, inevitably, to identify with their localities. 
The final option is the least disruptive and unpredictable: to take opportunities 
within the existing purchaser–provider arrangements to make purchasing more 
economical, flexible and effective.  A variety of changes are worth considering, 
including removing the ‘ring fences’ which currently reduce the flexibility of the 
purchaser to re-allocate resources between different parts of Vote: Health, 
purchasing programmes of care rather than services which relate to historic 
budgetary divisions, shifting to longer term contracts, rewarding providers for 
quality improvements as well as cost-reducing measures and avoiding strategic 
policy settings which commit the system to particular institutional solutions to 
service delivery.  This last change would signal the end of policy goals such as 
those contained in the current hospital plan which focuses on the stability of 
the institutions as much as the hospital services which should be made 
available to different populations. 
Other potential improvements include experiments with contracts for services 
and contracts for facilities for public hospital services in order to focus 
contractual incentives directly on groups of clinicians delivering services and 
re-negotiating contracts on a rolling basis so that not all contracts require re-
negotiation at the same time each year, thereby allowing greater attention to 
be given to each contract negotiation.  Finally, the currency of accountability 
between the Ministry of Health and the HFA could be adjusted over time to 
emphasise health and disability outcomes rather than exclusively the delivery 
of contracted outputs.  
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 7   
Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and 
Review of Recent Experience 
This part of the post-election preparation report on health and disability 
support services’ purchasing sets out the rationale for, and origins of, a 
separate health services purchasing function, generally, and in New Zealand, in 
particular.  It defines health and disability support services’ purchasing and its 
goals.  The experience of purchasing in other health systems is briefly 
summarised together with what is known about the characteristics and 
strategies of effective purchasers.  The paper continues by describing the 
recent evolution of the purchaser-provider split in New Zealand and its current 
strengths and weaknesses. 
What is Purchasing? 
The delivery of health and disability support services involves several key 
functions: 
• a financing role (through taxes, co-payments, insurance premiums and out-
of-pocket payment); 
• a funding role (allocating resources either to purchasers, directly to 
providers or to vertically integrated purchaser and provider organisations 
via a formula of some kind, or payment schedules or on the basis of past or 
prospective expenditures); 
• a purchasing role, which is distinguished from the funding role by a more 
strategic and proactive resource allocation role than funding, determining 
which services will be provided in some detail.  This usually involves 
assessing health needs, selectively and differentially contracting with 
providers, and monitoring performance; 
• a provision role – the delivery of services; 
• a consumer role, in terms of accessing and using services; and 
• a regulatory role. 
The separation of these different functions in health care systems is 
historically quite common, and continues to be common.  Given the salience of 
public financing of health care in all OECD countries, governments have taken 
a strong interest, on behalf of the population, in the nature and pattern of 
health services.  In order to ensure that adequate and appropriate health 
services are provided, governments have relied on a variety of intermediary 
agents either to fund or actively purchase services, to monitor the 
consequences and to regulate activities in the health sector.  Sometimes, these 
agents have been part of central government; in other countries, they have 
been quite distinct, though governed by statute.  Wherever public finance has 
predominated in the health sector, the agents have been ultimately politically 
accountable, regardless of their identity. Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
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In a number of countries, the funding and provider roles have been separated 
for many years (eg, private medical insurance in New Zealand and in many 
other countries; Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) funding of health 
and rehabilitation services before the changes of July 1999; risk-bearing, gate-
keeping arrangements in managed care organisations in the United States; and 
sickness fund-provider arrangements in many European countries).  While 
many health care systems had planning arrangements in the past, principally 
to determine the location and scale of major infrastructure such as hospitals, 
active purchaser organisations are a far more recent feature of Western health 
systems.  Like the previous planners, the purchaser makes decisions on behalf 
of community members (or the enrolees in various types of pre-paid health 
plans) as to their health care requirements.  Unlike previous planning systems, 
purchasers are more likely to take decisions which visibly affect the interests of 
particular patient groups since purchasers commonly determine, or at least 
strongly shape, the range and balance of services made available to the 
population rather than simply decide on the location of infrastructure. 
The development of the purchasing function is central to the quasi- or ‘mimic’ 
market changes in publicly financed health systems which occurred in 
countries such as the UK and New Zealand in the 1990s.  The aim of quasi-
market arrangements is for providers to compete to win contracts to provide 
services to patients whose interests are represented by publicly funded, 
monopsony purchasing organisations.  In such a system, the effectiveness of 
the purchasers is crucial in driving quality and efficiency gains on the provider 
side.  In turn, public purchasers depend on being given relatively clear 
objectives to work towards and the freedom to make the necessary changes to 
the mix and location of services, which enable these objectives to be met.  In 
other words, the purchaser-provider model is predicated on a more business-
like and less politically-driven approach to health system management by 
governments.  Whether this can be sustained in publicly financed systems is 
another matter. 
Separation of Purchase and Provision 
The “purchaser-provider separation (or split)” is often used to describe the 
structural arrangements within quasi- or ‘internal’ markets, in which the 
purchasing and provision functions are undertaken by separate entities who 
focus solely on one or other role.  Relationships between the purchaser (buyer) 
and provider (seller) are established by contracts, which specify the services to 
be provided in exchange for financial returns.  However, the separation of 
purchase and provision can take various forms and at times the roles may be 
quite blurred.  With internal market arrangements, the ‘sharpness’ of the 
separation varies.  For example, in New Zealand contracts between purchasers 
and providers are legally recognised and enforceable within the courts, 
whereas NHS contracts in the UK carry no such legitimacy, and contracting 
disputes are ultimately arbitrated by the Secretary of State for Health.  
Purchase and provision roles may also be separated within vertically integrated 
health care arrangements, that is, single entities that undertake both purchase 
and provision roles, with providers either owned and managed by the entity or 
contracted to them.  For example, Health Maintenance Organisations in the US 
are a well-known example where purchase (or insurance) and provision are Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
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managed by the same entity.  In New Zealand, some Area Health Boards 
(AHBs), which both purchased health services for their local populations and 
provided hospital and related community health services, internally separated 
purchase and provision functions shortly before their abolition in 1993, the 
most notable example being the ‘Wellbank’ within the Wellington AHB. 
Goal of purchasing 
The allocation of resources within the health care system occurs at every level 
– government, funder (if separate from government as in a social insurance 
fund), purchaser (if present), provider and clinician.  Purchasers allocate 
resources to particular services, groups of providers or individual providers in 
order to achieve particular efficiency and equity goals.  This differs from 
funding which describes the more passive process of allocating resources to 
providers such as through determining a global budget for a hospital or setting 
and administering fees for specific services to physicians.  Under the latter, the 
providers largely determine the efficiency and equity goals of the system 
through a large number of more micro-level decisions.  The role of allocating 
resources to individual patients is not generally considered part of the 
purchasing role.  However, there are exceptions to this.  For example, under 
the former GP fundholding scheme which operated at general practice level in 
the UK NHS, the budget holding GP was both the purchaser and could also act 
in a clinical capacity as the referral agent for individual patients.  Similarly, the 
HFA is required from time to time to make decisions on a small number of 
exceptional cases, usually when their treatment incurs extremely high costs.  
However, the involvement of purchasing agents in, for example, determining 
criteria for rationing kidney dialysis services, indicates that the purchasing role 
can extend as far as involvement in decisions about which types of patients 
should receive which sorts of care.  The extent to which this occurs will depend 
on how concerned the purchaser decides to be about the identity of the 
recipients of particular forms of care and the rarity and cost of the treatment.   
Ultimately, in a largely publicly financed health system, the purchaser is the 
agent of central (and occasionally, local) government, acting on behalf of the 
people.  Ovretveit (1995) defines the goal of the publicly funded health care 
purchaser as being: 
• ‘to make the best use of available resources to improve health and prevent 
illness by influencing other organisations to contribute to those ends and 
by contracting for health services’. 
This is a wide-ranging definition of purchasing, which goes far beyond simply 
purchasing services.  It probably captures the expectations surrounding 
purchasing in New Zealand, if not the specific goals set for the HFA.  However, 
it raises issues of the appropriate objectives and targets for which purchasers 
can legitimately be held accountable since it implies that purchasers can be 
held responsible for improving the health of the population as well as the 
health of the patients who receive the services which it purchases.  Though this 
is a laudable goal, it is problematic since so many of the determinants of 
population health lie outside the health sector.   Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
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Others have argued that, by contrast, purchasers should only be held to 
account for the delivery of outputs which are regarded as having a causal link 
with outcomes (Cumming and Scott, 1998) (see below for more on this issue).  
The latter argument equates to the current approach in New Zealand’s public 
sector to defining the accountability of purchasing organisations and other 
strategic policy agencies: such bodies are accountable for monitoring the 
population’s need for a range of services, procuring a defined range of 
‘outputs’ which are hypothesised to be capable of positively influencing the 
desired outcome of maximising health and independence and then monitoring 
the performance of the providers.  This formulation links the desired end (cost-
effective health services to improve health) to what the purchaser will be held 
accountable for achieving towards that end.  To work well, this approach 
requires an analysis (perhaps by the agency which performance manages the 
purchaser) to determine the degree to which the purchased outputs are, in 
fact, influencing outcomes positively. 
However, both Ovretveit’s and Cumming and Scott’s formulations of the goals 
and related accountability of purchasers in a publicly financed health care 
system, though broad, are over-simplifications.  Experience tells us that public 
health systems (and, therefore, especially purchasers) are simultaneously 
expected by the public, patients, politicians and control agencies to maintain 
high levels of allocative and technical efficiency while safeguarding quality, 
containing costs, assuring equity of access, responding to individual needs and 
providing acceptable services to all sub-groups in the population.  It is no 
surprise if, from time to time, these goals conflict and this is reflected in the 
contracts and accountability regimes of the principal institutions in the sector.  
Public purchasers have to build up support for, and/or trade off, multiple and 
sometimes conflicting, goals. 
Main functions of purchasers 
Using a less ambitious definition of purchasing that focuses on outputs, 
purchasing can be broken into two principal functions: 
• to make priority decisions according to ‘need’ (usually defined in terms of 
ability to benefit) which result in allocating particular volumes of resources 
to particular services, client groups and providers rather than to individual 
patients; 
• to specify, negotiate and monitor contracts with providers that embody 
these resource allocation decisions. 
However, even this less ambitious definition of the functions of health care 
purchasers, cannot escape complexity and controversy.  The definition of 
‘need’ used by purchasers to prioritise services and volumes of services is 
fraught with difficulty.  The principal stumbling blocks are the definition(s) of 
‘need’ selected and the acceptability of the chosen definition to a range of 
interest groups.  The main dispute tends to be between those who see ‘need’ 
as fundamentally about ability to benefit from treatment or care and those who 
regard ‘need’ as concerned with the severity of the patient’s condition. Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
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Why have Purchasing? 
During the later 1980s and early 1990s, a wide range of countries 
experimented with developing a purchasing function separate from that of 
providing health services, within previously vertically integrated health care 
systems (UK and New Zealand were particularly noteworthy examples).  
Countries that already had separate financing bodies and providers attempted 
to encourage the funding bodies, such as sickness funds in the Netherlands 
and in Germany, to take on a more active purchasing role.  The broad concern 
motivating reformers in each country was a belief that public hospitals and 
other provider organisations faced few if any clear incentives to operate 
efficiently or responsively and that patterns of resource allocation tended to be 
driven by providers’ interests rather than by the needs of patients or the 
strategies of planning authorities (Savas, Sheiman, Tragakes and Maarse, 
1998).  Rather than privatising the providers or turning them into for-profit 
firms, which would have been unpopular in many jurisdictions, reformers 
concentrated on turning planning bodies into purchasing organisations without 
any ties to specific providers. 
The most commonly expressed reasons for introducing a ‘purchaser-provider 
split’ were as follows: 
• to improve technical efficiency by allowing purchasers to select the best 
value provider accessible to their populations, including private and 
voluntary sector providers, thereby giving purchasers some control over 
providers; 
• to allow those charged with determining the future pattern of health 
services in relation to the needs of the population to concentrate on this 
task unhindered by their previous responsibilities for managing health care 
institutions and, at the same time, to allow the providers to manage their 
own affairs with the minimum of unnecessary interference; 
• to act as a counter-weight to decades of professional dominance of service 
specification and to challenge traditional patterns of resource allocation 
and sectional interests (active purchasing rather than passive funding or 
bureaucratic planning); 
• to improve allocative efficiency by permitting purchasers to negotiate a new 
balance of services with providers; 
• to encourage providers to respond more accurately and effectively to the 
needs of individual patients in order to retain contracts from purchasers; 
• to facilitate clearer lines of public accountability for the performance of the 
purchaser and provider roles in the health system; 
• to clarify providers’ costs and the amount spent in each service area by 
comparing the services and costs of each provider; 
• to make priority decisions in the system more explicit (Secretaries of State 
for Health, 1989; Hospital and Related Services Taskforce, 1988; Taskforce 
on the Funding and Provision of Health Services, 1991; Upton, 1991). Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
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The rationale for developing a separate set of institutions to ‘purchase’ health 
services is based on the assumption that providers and their staff will 
inevitably have a partial view on the appropriate range and balance of services 
to be provided to a population.  This necessitates a separate purchaser that 
can take a population and system-wide perspective on the needs of the 
population and how best to meet them, irrespective of the well-being of any 
individual institution or form of health care. 
The rationale for having a separate purchaser function also presumes that 
there is a continuing need to change the nature of the health services offered to 
patients in a conscious, strategic manner which would not spontaneously occur 
through the aggregation of the individual decisions of providers and their staff, 
if they were left to take the allocative decisions.  The rationale further indicates 
that there may be conflicts between the purchaser function and a range of 
professional and commercial interest groups (eg, the tension between Pharmac 
and the pharmaceutical industry in NZ) and that the ultimate funder (ie, the 
government) is willing to face the political consequences. 
Pre-conditions for Effective Purchasing 
For the separation of purchaser and provider functions in a quasi-market within 
any health care system to produce the gains in efficiency, quality and 
responsiveness put forward by its proponents (see above), three broad 
conditions in the environment have, as far as possible, to be met: 
• There has to be some likelihood that competition or the threat of 
competition (contestability) will occur for most services (ie, the purchaser 
has to have some choice of providers, either institutions or clinician 
groups). 
• It has to be relatively easy for new providers to enter the ‘market’ created 
by the separation of purchase and provision.  There have to be few 
economies of scale and scope, but large returns to specialisation and low 
entry costs for this to occur.  Alternatively, it needs to be relatively easy for 
new providers to exit the market without a large capital loss.  In these 
circumstances, contestability can exist even if there are large economies of 
scale and scope.  In the case of public hospitals, throughout the world, it 
appears to be difficult for governments to remove support for ‘failing’ 
institutions. 
• The purchaser has to be sufficiently free from government or funder 
interference to be able to take decisions in line with its objectives which 
may adversely affect particular providers (eg, individual hospitals).  This 
requires politicians, specifically, to avoid interventions on the supply side 
of the health system simply on the grounds that there are professional 
and/or public criticisms of the effects of the decisions made by the 
purchaser.  This requires the government to acknowledge, in practice, the 
rationale for setting up a separate purchaser, which is to distance the 
government from direct involvement in decisions affecting particular 
provider interests. Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
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Unfortunately, in the case of most services and most geographic areas in NZ, 
these conditions only hold patchily, or for certain services.  Information 
asymmetries between purchaser and provider and barriers to market entry are 
far less prominent in social care of older people than in the case of many 
public hospital services.  Public hospitals, further, tend to enjoy natural 
monopolies in many parts of the country and for many services, especially 
emergency and urgent care and some forms of chronic services (eg, kidney 
dialysis) for which patients cannot travel long distances.  On the other hand, it 
is possible to envisage greater contestability for the provision of services such 
as elective surgery where patients can be booked well ahead of treatment.  
There are few major centres of population in New Zealand able to sustain a 
number of acute hospitals, the remaining population is thinly scattered and the 
total population is small.  In addition, the general difficulty of measuring the 
comparative cost and quality of health care is as daunting in NZ as elsewhere.  
Regulations restrict who can and cannot offer particular services to protect 
public safety, but also have the effect of further restricting the role of the 
purchaser.  As a result, bilateral monopoly relations are commonplace in the 
public hospital sector. 
This analysis suggests that health care purchasing, in general, and in New 
Zealand, in particular, is far less likely to be a major driver of improvements in 
the cost and quality of services than it may be in other service sectors.  
Competition in the health care market appears unlikely to occur for many 
services.  As a result, interest has grown in developing periodic competition for 
the market, in the form of franchising arrangements or tendering devolved 
purchasing arrangements to other organisations.  For example, proposals from 
consortia involving GP groups and private insurers to take budgetary 
responsibility for purchasing and/or providing comprehensive health services 
for a defined population on behalf of the Health Funding Authority under the 
rubric of ‘integrated care’ may be seen as one form of franchising. 
Whatever the limits to the strict economic rationale for the purchase-provider 
split in relation to many health services in a country the size of New Zealand, it 
must be remembered that there are related, but not strictly economic, reasons 
for a government to implement a separation of purchase from provision.  The 
principal motive for government relates to the possibility that the split makes it 
easier for government to take controversial decisions which it believes are in 
the public interest.  Thus it may be easier to reduce services at a particular 
hospital if the government does not also own and manage the hospital and 
employ the staff (see below for more on this). 
This analysis indicates that, in practice, the question is whether imperfect 
purchasing is better than the previous approach in which health services were 
relatively passively funded through bodies which incorporated both provision 
and planning responsibilities. Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 14 
Characteristics of Effective Purchasers 
Despite the difficulties of the task of determining what and how powerful 
professionals will produce health services, the experience in the UK and the US 
highlights a number of features of purchaser behaviour which appear to be 
associated with greater success in pursuing the multiple and sometimes 
conflicting goals of health systems (Light, 1998; Mays and Dixon, 1996). 
Relationships based on trust in order to influence providers 
It is difficult to assess the quality of many health services, especially from the 
vantage point of the purchaser.  It can even be difficult to assess whether a 
service has been (fully) delivered or not in accordance with the agreement 
reached between purchaser and provider.  Thus the scope for writing contracts 
which have the capacity to describe all eventualities and to describe all service 
options is limited.  The cost of so doing would also be high.  In these 
circumstances, one option is to integrate purchase and provision in a single 
organisation.  Alternatively, the purchaser can work to develop contractual 
relationships with providers based on trust backed up by systems for auditing 
the services provided.  This is made easier when there is a reasonable degree 
of continuity of personnel on both sides of the relationship and the negotiation 
of contracts that are longer than the typical annual contracts seen in the New 
Zealand health sector at present. 
Despite the risks of opportunistic and dishonest behaviour, more rather than 
less trust can often be a rational strategy provided that those who are trusting 
can also take strong action against those who take advantage of them.  In this 
context, professionally imposed sanctions on fellow professionals can be a 
powerful sanction against poor performance.  Similarly, professionals are 
strongly motivated to live up to peer expectations in order to maintain their 
status within the profession.  This sort of motivation can be used by 
purchasers to encourage desirable behaviour. 
Willingness to change provider in extremis in order to improve efficiency 
Despite the day-to-day emphasis on building and maintaining relationships of 
trust, the effective purchaser has to demonstrate the willingness, faced with 
persistent under-performance or deviation from the objectives contained in 
contracts, to change providers.  In order to do so, the purchaser has to have 
some choice of providers and/or a willingness to enable new providers to enter 
the market, thereby enabling some degree of contestability to be maintained. 
Without contestability, one of the main justifications for maintaining a 
separation between purchase and provision within a publicly funded system is 
lost, since the separation incurs costs (a separate purchasing function can 
continue to be justified on grounds of public accountability, as a counter-
weight to the narrower perspective of specific professional groups and as a 
means for establishing spending priorities systematically).  Yet moving services 
between, say, one specialist centre and another is always fraught with 
controversy unless the shift is on a very small scale.  As a result, purchasers 
need to be large enough to recruit high calibre staff with the expertise to take 
on specialist providers.  As hospitals and other provider organisations merge, 
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purchasing power vis-à-vis local monopoly providers.  At the very least, a larger 
purchaser is likely to have direct access to performance information on a range 
of providers, thereby enabling some form of ‘benchmarking’ of individual 
providers. 
Access to Good Information on Cost and Quality of Services 
The effective purchaser has access to a wide range of information on the 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of health services derived from research so 
that well informed choices can be made about the potential menu of services 
which providers offer.  The main use of such research evidence is to enable the 
purchaser to engage in constructive discussion with clinicians and managers 
over the specification of services within a particular service area.  This can lead 
to the development of clinical protocols for use in contracting.  The purchaser 
must have the capacity to interpret and, if necessary, adjust the findings of the 
research to take account of local circumstances (eg, population 
characteristics, costs of inputs, etc). 
The effective purchaser also needs access to reliable, up-to-date information on 
the quality, cost and efficiency of the services provided by different providers.  
In part this will depend on the requirement for monitoring information included 
in contracts.  On the other hand, it will need investment in information systems 
to collect comparable data across all providers.  Obtaining good information on 
provider performance is costly, which is why larger rather than smaller 
purchasing entities are likely to be preferred.  This may, in turn, conflict with 
the desire to ensure that purchasers operate in a manner which is sensitive to 
local variations in needs and community priorities (see below). 
Understanding of Population Needs 
The greatest sensitivity to variations in population needs between different 
areas or in different sub-groups in the population is likely to result from 
devolved, local forms of purchasing organisation whereas larger purchasers are 
probably required for other aspects of purchasing such as securing good 
information on provider performance and spreading contracting costs over a 
wider population base.  In addition, in the New Zealand context, it is important 
to consider the capacity of the purchaser to understand the needs of Maori and 
to put in place appropriate services.  There are thus trade-offs to be made 
between the different dimensions of purchaser performance. 
Ability to make Priority Decisions in a Manner Commanding Public and Professional 
Confidence 
With declining trust in government agencies a feature of many Western 
countries, it is important for an effective purchaser to have not only an 
intellectually defensible strategy for taking hard priority decisions within a 
finite budget for health care, but also a means for involving the public, patients 
and professionals in the decision making process in ways which they find 
appropriate.  Evidence suggests that the public does not wish to become 
involved in the detail of such decisions, but rather wishes to be involved in 
determining the principles and values to be employed to take such decisions 
(Lomas, 1997).  At the same time, few members of the public will have any 
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providers.  GPs are important to involve since they have extensive contact with 
patients and influence their views about the system and local services. 
The core of the difficulty facing purchasers lies in the multiple, often 
conflicting, goals both explicit and implicit in the publicly funded health care 
system.  The effective purchaser has to have the ability to explain the nature of 
the trade-offs which it is making, as well as admitting in advance the likelihood 
that no one section of the population will be entirely satisfied with its 
decisions.  The co-option of influential clinicians may assist with this task. 
An alternative approach, which would result in a very different form of health 
system, would be to allow individual members of the population to choose the 
purchaser which they believed would best meet their personal mix of health 
care goals.  In theory, this would place clear incentives of the purchasers to be 
responsive to the wishes of individual patients rather than attempting to 
interpret the health care purchasing implications of national government 
policy.  This option is discussed in the second part of this paper.  It is 
interesting to note that the emphasis in market reforms in mainly publicly 
financed health systems was not so much on individual user choice of 
purchaser, but on developing new professional agents to act on behalf of 
groups of patients (eg, general practice budget holders). 
Developing a Purchasing Plan 
This involves the capacity to decide approximately how much of which services 
and interventions to purchase, for whom and at what likely cost. 
Ability to Specify, Negotiate and Monitor Contracts 
Experience and research on total purchasing pilots in the UK suggest that the 
process of building a relationship with providers is at least as, if not more, 
important for effective purchasing of health services than the contracting 
process itself (Mays, Goodwin, Killoran and Malbon, 1998).  The preparation of 
detailed contract documentation may be necessary for financial accountability, 
but appears to contribute little, in practice, to the goal of improving health 
services.  On the other hand, the purchaser has to be able to specify the 
service required with some precision.  The costs of contract specification have 
to be relatively low and the purchaser has to be able to obtain the necessary 
information to know that the service has been delivered as specified (ie, it 
must be possible to establish and monitor cost and quality even if the precise 
form of contract is less important). 
Ability to Monitor Outcomes, Efficiency and Equity of Access to Services 
This characteristic of an effective purchaser relates directly to the sub-sections 
above on understanding population needs, and accessing good data on the 
cost and quality of services. Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 17 
Ability to Minimise Transaction Costs 
Here again, there may be a trade offs between transaction costs and the 
number of purchasers and the number and detail of contracts.  It is likely that 
system-wide costs will rise if purchasing responsibilities are delegated to more, 
smaller organisations. 
Ability to Manage Financial and Clinical Risk 
Put simply, this is the ability of the purchaser organisation to predict the 
demand for services, to work with providers to manage demand, to ensure that 
providers take appropriate responsibility for the risks they face and to make 
contingency arrangements for over- or under-spending. 
An integrated budget 
In order to discourage cost shifting by providers and purchasers, it important 
that purchasers have a budget, which, as far as possible, covers the entire 
spectrum of health services.  This also encourages purchasers to consider new 
forms of service delivery that transcend conventional institutional barriers; for 
example, by contracting for the care of specific patient groups rather than 
separately for acute hospital, community and general medical services.  This 
does not mean that the budget is managed without internal differentiation 
(managers will still need to be responsible for particular sub-budgets), but that 
the purchaser has equal control over all parts of the health services’ budget, 
including the ability to define sub-budgets which relate to the patterns of 
services most likely to deliver the purchaser’s goals. 
Reconciling the characteristics of effective purchasers 
It is reasonable to ask whether it is possible for a purchasing organisation to 
exhibit all of the 11 features discussed in this sub-section, whether there are 
potential conflicts between any of the features and abilities and whether all the 
characteristics are equally important for successful purchasing.  For example, 
a purchaser might be very well placed to assess the needs of its local 
population by virtue of its small size or its close identification with a particular 
ethnic group (eg, Maori or Pacific Island peoples), but struggle to manage 
clinical and financial risk, or lack expertise in particular clinical areas.  A 
purchaser might be superbly equipped with information about the cost and 
quality of services, but have little or no choice of providers and, therefore, be 
unable to use the information to choose the best provider, thus reducing the 
value of that information. 
The 11 characteristics can be grouped into four broader categories which help 
in understanding the relative importance of each characteristic discussed 
above: 
• The relationship between the purchaser and its environment (affecting its 
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• The identity of the purchaser (affecting its ability to make priority decisions 
with legitimacy, building public confidence and to counter professional 
objections to its course of action, including decisions to move services 
between providers) – this also influences the incentives which operate on 
the purchaser (eg, comparing the incentives acting on a private, for-profit 
purchaser versus a public authority); 
• The technical capacity of the purchaser (in gathering information, in 
understanding services, in managing risk, in contracting, etc.), including 
basic features such as its size and scope of budget; 
• The costs generated by the purchaser both itself and for providers. 
It is extremely difficult to prioritise the four groups or the 11 individual 
characteristics.  However, on balance, the identity of the purchaser, including 
the incentives operating on the purchaser and the degree of autonomy 
permitted to the purchaser, together with its relationship with its environment, 
appear to be more significant than the technical aspects of the purchaser or 
the costs it generates for the health system.  The latter seem to be necessary, 
but not sufficient characteristics for effective purchasing.  The former set of 
characteristics influences the ability of the purchaser to take decisions and 
follow them through. 
International Experience with Health Care Purchasing 
While the expectations of what the purchaser-provider separation could achieve 
in terms of efficiency and quality gains in publicly funded health care systems 
(eg, UK and NZ) and in employer-based systems (eg, the USA) have been high, 
the reality has been less encouraging, because, usually, not all the above pre–
conditions have been met and not all purchasers have been able to emulate the 
behaviour of the most effective purchasers. 
A summary of the experience to date with purchasing in the UK NHS is that: 
• Purchasers have found it difficult to engage in meaningful dialogue with 
providers, especially with clinicians, and to obtain adequate information to 
assist with active purchasing.  Health authority purchasers found this a 
particular difficulty, whereas GP fund holders found it easier to develop 
relationships with clinicians. 
• The initiative continues to lie with the providers to define what will be 
provided since most of the clinical expertise resides with the providers.  
Even assuming that health authorities could have afforded to retain the 
services of clinical experts in every specialty, it is unlikely that practising 
clinicians would have volunteered to take on the roles.  Again, GP fund 
holders found it easier to challenge their specialist colleagues, and had 
some incentives to do so, in that they were able to retain any ‘savings’ 
which they generated from more efficient budgetary management and 
service purchasing.  These ‘savings’ could be used in ways which indirectly 
increased the attractiveness or value of their practices.  In addition, they 
were clinicians themselves, which may have helped.  Health authorities had 
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public authorities, they could not retain ‘savings’ and re-invest them in 
their businesses. 
• Few changes brought about by purchasers have been more than marginal – 
the drivers of health system change appear to be demographic, 
technological and professional as before – for example, it has proved 
extremely difficult to extract resources from acute hospitals for investment 
elsewhere.  The main improvements brought about by GP fund holders 
were shorter waiting times, more information on the progress of their 
patients and some alterations in the place of care.  (Goodwin, 1998) 
• Purchasing is intellectually demanding and it is frequently difficult clearly 
to identify the ‘added value’ provided by the purchasing process.  
Purchasers have struggled to recruit the best people.  The bias in the 
training of NHS managers was towards operations not purchasing strategy.  
It was also easier to justify higher salaries for managers running large 
hospitals rather than health authorities, the role of which was less well 
understood by the public or politicians. 
• Purchasers have mainly failed to become identified with the public interest 
rather than with bureaucratic restriction and supposed ‘cost-cutting’.  The 
role of the purchaser is generally not understood by the public.  Purchasers 
are easy targets for ‘bureaucrat bashing’ in the mass media. 
• Central agencies and national politicians have been unable to avoid 
involvement in the provider side of the health system, since the NHS 
remains tax-funded, which has weakened the position of purchasers.  There 
has been a reluctance to allow public hospitals to ‘fail’ because of the high 
esteem in which they are held locally.  This has inhibited the private sector 
from trying to enter the market. 
• Purchasers, the public and politicians are all uncomfortable with taking the 
hard priority decisions that are at the heart of efficient purchasing when 
faced with a budget constraint.  If a budget constraint operates, then these 
decisions are made, whether by purchasers, providers, or both in 
collaboration.  However, a purchaser-provider separation encourages the 
providers to behave self-interestedly by exposing the rationing decisions 
imposed by the purchasers.  It is plausible that the public takes greater 
confidence from a provider-driven system in which clinicians make the 
decisions and that such decisions are less visible to the public when taken 
by professionals in the course of their day-to-day clinical work (Le Grand, 
Mays and Mulligan, 1998; Light, 1998; Rosen and Mays, 1998). 
The experience in the UK NHS can be explained, in large part, by the fact that 
the quasi-market model was put in place on the assumption that relatively 
straightforward supply-side competition would be the norm.  In fact, 
purchasers have generally faced managing bilateral monopoly relationships in 
which there has been a considerable divergence of interest between purchasers 
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Where purchasers have been able to tender competitively for services (eg, state 
mental health services in USA), they have made substantial, but mostly one–off 
gains, for example by being able to reconfigure provision in ways which were 
not possible under the former vertically integrated systems (Bachmann, 1996).  
However, soon after, they have found themselves re-establishing former 
bilateral monopoly relations once the contracts have been awarded (albeit with 
new providers) since there are high costs associated with re-tendering and 
disruption to patient care.  In addition, over time, alternative providers cease 
to operate, leaving the purchaser without a choice of provider in future.  In the 
long term, the purchaser has had little scope for driving efficiency gains and 
little opportunity to engender contestability.  A large part of the gains of these 
tendering exercises has been strictly non-economic in that they weakened 
producer interests and allowed certain strategic decisions to be taken which 
had proved impossible under the previous arrangements.  Nonetheless, this is 
an important benefit of purchaser-provider separation from a government 
decision making perspective. 
In the USA, where purchasing has probably been the most advanced (though 
usually for enrolees in a competitive environment rather than for a geographic 
population in a monopoly purchase environment), experience has shown that 
successful purchasing requires large, well informed and tough organisations 
with strong motivation to take on vested producer interests (Light, 1998).  
These organisations are costly to run.  Even in these circumstances, the 
benefits of active purchasing take a number of years to appear. 
Rationale for New Zealand’s Purchaser-Provider Separation 
Before the purchaser-provider split 
With the passing of the Area Health Boards Act in 1983, the administration of 
publicly funded hospital and community health services was gradually 
transferred from hospital boards to 14 geographically based Area Health 
Boards (AHBs).  Each was allocated a budget based on the relative needs of its 
populations using the newly introduced Population-Based Funding Formula.  
AHBs were integrated purchaser-providers that allocated budgets to services 
and to individual service users for hospital and community health services.  
The Department of Health continued to fund primary health care directly 
through primary health care subsidies.  Administration of disability support 
services was split between the Departments of Social Welfare and Health.  
AHBs did not compete with each other or with the private sector to attract 
public patients, and they received their funding regardless of the level of their 
performance.  Aside from simple forms of financial accountability, AHBs were 
generally not upwardly accountable to their funder (the government) for the 
services they provided, but to their elected boards.  In the late 1980s, general 
management was introduced into AHBs, and the Department of Health began 
to develop more explicit expectations of what the AHBs were to do in return for 
their funding. 
In 1987 the Fourth Labour Government established the Hospital and Related 
Services Taskforce (the Gibbs Taskforce).  While recommending that the 
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Taskforce, and its successor the Taskforce on Funding and Provision of Health 
Services, recommended separating out the purchase and provider functions of 
the Area Health Boards (AHBs), and establishing regional purchasers that 
would buy publicly-funded health services on behalf of their populations 
(Hospital and Related Services Taskforce, 1988; Taskforce on the Funding and 
Provision of Health Services, 1991). 
The Taskforces perceived several key problems with the structure and terms of 
reference of the then AHBs, together with the incentives that they faced, as 
follows: 
• a conflict of interest between the planning or ‘purchase’ and provision roles 
of the AHBs.  Their hospital service provision role dominated the planning 
of other services; 
• weak incentives for AHBs to use the most cost-effective providers and seek 
out cost-saving technology and service delivery options.  There was little or 
no incentive for the AHB to choose alternative (more efficient) providers 
when they would directly face the costs associated with closing down their 
own facilities and reducing their own staffing levels.  As a result, they 
tended to continue inherited patterns of hospital and related services’ 
funding; 
• slack in the system, as shown by the variations between the AHBs in unit 
costs and other measures of financial efficiency; 
• a tendency to fund over-spends and service developments by running down 
capital investment (eg, deferring essential maintenance); 
• an unresolved conflict between the requirement for upward accountability 
for their resources and for the implementation of government health 
services policy, as opposed to their locally elected board members’ 
concept of accountability downwards to the local community.  As well as 
political friction, this conflict was also associated (rightly or wrongly) with 
poor cost control on the part of AHBs; and  
• lack of fully integrated purchasing budgets (eg, not able to influence GMS 
or DSS and a separation between ACC and other health funding). 
The Taskforces and subsequent government policy documents identified a 
number of benefits potentially flowing from the purchaser-provider separation 
and the resultant opportunity for provider competition for the business of 
purchasers, as follows: 
• Government could set clear non-conflicting objectives for purchasers and 
providers (AHBs’ mixed, conflicting objectives would be removed).  
Performance could be monitored more readily against objectives.  
Decisions on resource allocation would no longer be made by provider 
organisations with a vested interest in the status quo.  The influence of 
large hospitals on resource allocation should be reduced and, with it, an 
increased likelihood of shifts of resources in response to consumer demand 
and considerations of cost-effectiveness.  Purchasers would focus on the 
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health care provision, while providers would focus on the quality and cost 
of services.  The two would be linked by contracts which would specify 
efficiency improvements which could then be monitored; 
• Market or quasi-market arrangements would permit and encourage greater 
competition in the provision of health care services, and thereby improve 
overall efficiency.  The poorer performing hospitals would be compelled to 
improve their efficiency levels, thereby releasing resources; 
• The creation of a set of prices would allow the performance of hospitals to 
be compared, while competition between providers for contracts would 
encourage the elimination of waste and improve the allocation of resources 
within provider organisations; 
• Successful provider organisations would be rewarded for their performance 
and poor ones penalised, instead of both automatically securing their 
budgets; 
• Competition between providers would promote greater responsiveness and 
choice for service users; 
• The reforms would allow providers greater autonomy to manage their own 
affairs flexibly without bureaucratic interference and would distance 
Ministers from operational decisions; 
• Allowing purchasers a choice of providers including the private sector 
would reduce the likelihood of over-investment in particular facilities.  It 
was argued that the previous separation between public and private finance 
and provision might have led to duplication of investment and inefficiency.   
The case for moving towards a more market-oriented structure mirrored the 
nature of wider economic reforms, which had taken place in New Zealand after 
1984. 
Recent Purchase Arrangements in New Zealand 
1993 quasi-market changes 
Following the statement of government policy in the ‘Green and White Paper' 
(Upton, 1991) purchasing and provision was separated in 1993 with the 
establishment of four RHAs comprising Ministerial appointees as purchasers to 
replace the partially elected AHBs.  Population-focused public health services 
were purchased separately by a national Public Health Commission (PHC).  
Twenty-three Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) were set up to provide hospital 
and community health services.  These were separate state-owned entities 
operating as shareholding enterprises under the Companies Act 1993 with 
statutory objectives to exhibit a sense of social responsibility while also 
operating as successful and efficient businesses able to make profits.  Their 
boards of directors were Ministerial appointees.  The RHAs were accountable to 
the Minister of Health and the CHEs to a separate Minister of Crown Health 
Enterprises, thereby extending the purchaser-provider distinction into central 
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The four RHAs established a joint subsidiary, Pharmac, responsible for 
purchasing GP pharmaceuticals.  Pharmac’s role was to determine which drugs 
within each therapeutic category attracted government subsidies and which did 
not on grounds which include their relative cost-effectiveness. 
Although the original thinking had been to allow patients to choose whether 
they wished to obtain their health care competitively either through the RHAs 
or through non-governmental purchasers (unlike the internal market in the UK 
NHS), this aspect of the reforms was suspended for a mixture of practical and 
political reasons.  RHAs remained regional monopoly purchasers, having 
started life on the assumption that they would eventually either be taken over 
by competing, independent health plans or compete with such plans.  When 
the plan for demand side competition was suspended, the justification for the 
separate PHC was weakened since population-based RHAs were regarded as 
being capable of purchasing public health services in a way that competing 
health plans would not have been.  It had been argued, on theoretical grounds, 
that since patient choice of competing health plans might lead to considerable 
patient movement between plans, this would discourage plans from investing 
in screening and health promotion services for their enrolees.  Eventually, the 
PHC was abolished. 
RHAs were allocated budgets according to a needs-weighted capitation formula 
in the same way as the former AHBs.  They were to purchase all primary and 
secondary care as well as community health services and public health 
services, which had previously been administered separately.  They were also 
nominally responsible for GMS subsidies.  Later, disability support services 
were gradually shifted into Vote: Health and included in the health services 
purchasing process.  Despite an original intention to include services for 
accident victims paid for by ACC in the purchasing responsibilities of the RHAs, 
this plan was eventually dropped in 1995.  Instead, the RHAs purchased acute 
accident care, but elective surgery, rehabilitation and primary care associated 
with accidents remained with ACC. 
A range of Ministerial advisory bodies was established, including The National 
Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Services which was set up in 
1992 to define the package of health services to be financed from the public 
purse to which all New Zealanders should have access.  A ‘core’ set of publicly 
funded services was essential to the original concept of developing competing 
health plans since there could not be fair competition unless each plan agreed 
to provide the same basic package of services to its enrolees.  Not only did the 
task of defining a ‘core’ and agreed terms of access prove impossible, it 
rapidly lost its political purpose as it became apparent that the Government 
did not wish to pursue the option of developing competition on the demand 
side of the quasi-market.  Instead, the Committee under its new name of the 
National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability (known as the National 
Health Committee) has concentrated on developing guidelines and protocols to 
shape clinical practice in the direction of beneficial treatments.  It also 
provides the Minister of Health with independent analysis and advice on major 
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As part of an approach to demand management across the primary and 
secondary care divide, subsidies towards the charges faced by patients for GP 
visits were targeted more sharply on those with low incomes, user charges for 
pharmaceuticals were increased and new charges for laboratory tests and 
outpatient and inpatient secondary health care services were introduced 
alongside the quasi-market (Shipley 1991).  The hospital user charges were 
intensely unpopular.  Inpatient hospital charges were removed after 13 months 
and hospital outpatient charges in 1997, leaving the re-targeted charges for GP 
visits, but not for hospital attendances such as visits to the A&E department.  
The increases in pharmaceutical charges and new laboratory charges were 
accompanied by the gradual phasing out of demand-driven budgets for 
pharmaceuticals and DSS. 
Adjustments after 1996 
The Coalition Health Agreement of 1996 retained the basic architecture of the 
1993 system by maintaining the separation of purchaser and provider which 
enables the potential for some form of competition between providers.  The 
company model of provider governance was also retained.  However, the 
Agreement marked significant change and a shift away from the earlier 
emphasis on supply side competition as the motor for health care 
improvement towards giving a greater emphasis to collaboration between 
providers and across the purchaser-provider split.  The Agreement also 
signalled that the original idea of having competing health plans financed by 
individual patient ‘vouchers’ was very unlikely to be developed.  The separation 
of purchase and provision at Ministerial level was removed and the Minister of 
Health and Minister of Finance made jointly responsible for the Crown’s 
ownership interest in the public providers rather than the Minister for Crown 
Health Enterprises.  The 23 CHEs were given the less commercial-sounding 
name of Hospital and Health Services (HHSs) and formally turned from for 
profit to not-for-profit status.  This last change of status was largely symbolic 
since any ‘profits’ from the CHEs would have been ploughed back into the 
health system under the arrangements which existed between 1993 and 1996.  
A new capital charging regime was instituted in order to encourage the HHSs 
to consider the opportunity cost of their capital in the same way as their 
revenue.  There was also to be a shift towards longer-term contractual 
relationships between purchasers and providers based on comparative 
performance data rather than on a competitive price and volume basis.  This 
change was largely a recognition of how the system was operating in practice, 
rather than a substantial alteration of payment incentives.  In September 1998, 
a single, national purchasing authority, the Health Funding Authority (HFA) 
took over purchasing responsibilities from a Transitional Health Authority 
which had been managing the shift from four RHAs to a single national agency.  
Finally, in 1998/99, the prices paid by the purchaser to HHSs were uprated in 
order more fully to reflect underlying costs and to eliminate HHSs’ deficits (the 
so called ‘deficit switch’).  The HSSs had argued since the inception of the 
quasi-market that the public purchasers had placed unreasonable demands on 
them in terms of volume and quality criteria compared with the level of 
resources which they had been prepared to make available.  As a result, they 
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Objectives of the HFA 
• To monitor the need for public health, personal health and disability 
support services of the people of New Zealand; 
• To purchase the best mix of public health, personal health and disability 
services to maximise the population’s health and independence within 
available resources through purchase agreements and other arrangements; 
• To monitor the performance of providers against those purchase 
agreements or arrangements. 
Roles and functions in the post-1996 system have remained broadly the same, 
but the Ministry of Health has encouraged the HFA to use more diverse 
approaches to contracting, including longer-term contracts.  In line with a shift 
towards ‘benchmark’ competition, a national pricing schedule has been 
developed by the HFA.  HHSs and the HFA are now required to disclose 
information relevant to the contracting process to one another.  Previously, a 
wide range of information on price, cost and quality standards was deemed 
commercially sensitive by the CHEs on the assumption that they were 
competing companies.   
Following the earlier attempt to define a ‘core’ of publicly funded health 
services, the HFA has begun work on its own method for setting priorities 
across its entire portfolio based on maximising ‘health gain’ within available 
resources.  In parallel, the Ministry of Health and the HFA have used the annual 
Funding Agreement between the Minister of Health and the HFA to increase the 
level of explicitness in documents setting out the services covered by Vote: 
Health.  This represents a continuation of the earlier aim of establishing ‘core 
services’ in the public sector and of giving the public greater certainty as to 
what it can expect from the sector.  Private health insurers have encouraged 
this trend believing that it is in their long term interests for patients to be able 
to identify more precisely what the public sector will and will not provide for 
them. 
The ACC has increasingly moved away from a relatively passive role towards a 
more active purchasing role in relation to its health services, especially in the 
case of elective surgery.  For example, in 1998/99 ACC signed a contract with 
the naval hospital at Devonport for elective surgery rather than with any of the 
HSSs in Auckland.  This was made possible by the fact that the hospital had 
spare capacity which it offered at a competitive price, and was prepared to 
implement the detailed treatment protocols developed by ACC.  The major 
changes to employer and employee accident insurance introduced in July 
1999, in which companies must now choose a private insurer rather than ACC 
to manage their risk of work-related accidents, is already leading to changes in 
the purchase of accident-related health services.  For the present, the HFA will 
continue to purchase hospital emergency services relating to accidents, 
wherever they occur.  However, the new private insurers will reimburse 
providers for the primary medical, elective surgical and rehabilitative services 
required by workplace accident victims.  Increasingly, private insurers are 
likely to shift from funders to active purchasers of these services, particularly 
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New Zealand’s Experience of the Purchaser-Provider 
Separation 
Very little evaluation work has been undertaken or published on the 
experiences in New Zealand since 1993, other than at a very general level 
(Cumming and Salmond 1998; Ashton, 1999).  The reforms are also difficult to 
evaluate because of the increased public funding allocated to the sector 
between 1993 and 1999, and because of the changes in policy and structure 
which have occurred over the five years the reforms have been in place.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to make some general observations about the 
purchaser-provider split and contracting processes (eg, Cumming, 1998): 
General points 
• Purchaser-provider contracting was initially hampered by the lack of 
information on the pattern of services previously delivered, their quality 
and their costs.  This was particularly the case for mental health services. 
• The ring-fencing of budgets (eg, that for Disability Support Services [DSS]), 
the continued separation of accident-related health care services’ funding 
from the rest of the health services, the continuing involvement of Ministers 
in setting priorities, and the requirements placed on Crown Health 
Enterprises (CHEs) and later Hospital and Health Services (HSSs) to signal 
in advance their intentions to exit the provision of particular services, have 
reduced the flexibility that the reforms were in part intended to increase. 
• There was relatively little competition between CHEs, and between CHEs 
and the private sector for acute services, despite the expectation that the 
quasi-market system would generate supply-side competition thereby 
improving efficiency.  In many cases, public hospitals are monopolies or 
face very limited competition.  There is little sign that the purchaser-
provider split has increased the level of competition (Ashton and Press, 
1997).  Where competition has occurred it has been at the margin and only 
for specific services.  This may have reduced the potential efficiency gains 
of the market system.  There has been more competition for rest homes 
and other services in which the cost of market entry is relatively low and it 
is easier for purchasers to assess service quality.  In any event, purchasers 
have been compelled to contract out rather than make decisions on a 
service by service basis as to whether to “make or buy” as a private firm 
would do. 
• Very little work has been tendered to private acute hospitals.  The Crown 
and the RHAs have both been perceived to be biased in favour of the public 
sector and to have worked together in the early stages of the quasi-market 
to prevent private hospitals entering the market.  In part, this conservatism 
may have been due to difficulties in drawing up detailed contract 
specifications for individual services that had traditionally been bundled 
together with other services. 
• The separation of purchasing and provision functions has proved difficult, 
with trade-offs required between contract specificity and allowing providers 
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On occasions, relations between RHAs and CHEs were confrontational, 
reflecting the difficulty of managing relations between monopoly providers 
and monopsony purchasers.  At the same time, while CHEs were legally 
companies like any other, their shareholders were unusual in being two 
‘shareholding’ ministers of the Crown (the Minister of Health and the 
Minister of Finance).  As a result, two central government agencies (CCMAU 
and Treasury) and their Ministers were directly involved in relatively 
detailed aspects of the finance and operation of the CHEs, while ultimately 
having limited control over them as legal companies.  This pattern has 
continued in the case of the HSSs.  This situation might be likened to the 
relationships between a parent company and its subsidiaries in the private 
sector in which the subsidiaries are stand-alone entities, but reliant on the 
parent for finance. 
• Additional transaction costs were undoubtedly incurred in negotiating and 
monitoring contracts between purchasers and providers, especially for 
services such as surgery which had traditionally been part of hospital 
global budgets and less so for rest homes and the like (Ashton, 1998).  
These costs have been increased by the legal status of contracts which has 
led to detailed service specifications and protracted negotiations.  On the 
other hand, with only four RHAs, followed by a single national purchaser, 
the number of contracts has been contained.  It is not clear whether the 
extra transaction costs have been justified in terms of efficiency gains. 
The experience of purchasing 
• There have been problems with contracting arrangements: delays in 
concluding contracts (eg, because of disputes about realistic prices and 
volumes), poor communication and high costs in negotiating one-year 
contracts.   
• Monopsony purchasers faced with monopoly providers have, on occasion, 
demanded more output for the same or less money, regardless of 
providers’ costs, as a way of attempting to drive efficiency improvements.  
Providers have argued that this has led them to sign unrealistic contracts 
that have resulted in deficits.  However, provider costs have risen over 
time, weakening this argument on the part of providers.  It has taken 
several years to determine reasonable prices in such a context (see the 
‘deficit switch’, above).  In practice, neither purchasers nor providers faced 
any clear incentive to avoid over-spending/deficits, since they were 
reasonably confident that the Crown would step in and assist. 
• Purchasers have found it difficult to make comparisons between prices for 
different providers and to draw boundaries around contracts. 
• It is argued that too much attention may have been paid to the legal form 
of contracts rather than to their purpose which is to build relations which 
enable the purchaser to have confidence that appropriate, timely and cost-
effective services are being provided within budget.  However, the emphasis 
on legal contracting can be traced back to the original aim in the Green 
and White Paper (Upton, 1991) to set up a system of competing health 
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• However, the novel development of contracting arrangements with general 
practitioners has proceeded more smoothly than expected.  There has been 
some movement away from fee-for-service payments towards capitation 
and modest budget-holding experiments which have reported impressive 
‘savings’ in GP-initiated expenditure on pharmaceuticals and laboratory 
tests (Malcolm, 1997).  Such arrangements appear to have led to 
significant savings against projected budgets and have also created greater 
possibilities for integrating primary and secondary care, thereby possibly 
improving the cost-effectiveness of service delivery.  This is a major 
achievement of the development of the purchasing function, but it must be 
recognised that the budget holding groups were, by definition, self-
selected.  In addition, their level of funding has proved controversial.  
Sceptics have argued that the ‘savings’ reported are no more than a 
reflection of the generosity of the RHA funding. 
• The purchaser-provider separation has had the effect of permitting new 
suppliers to promote their services and to receive government contracts in 
a way that did not occur under the AHBs, perhaps because they were more 
strongly influenced by the interests of the public hospitals.  Most notably, 
there has been an increased focus in purchasing on services delivered by 
Maori for Maori.  For example, according to the Ministry of Health, the 
number of Maori health care providers increased from around 21 in 1993 
to 240 by 1998.  This is likely to have improved access, at least to primary 
care services, in a small way.  However, firm evidence is lacking. 
• New provider organisational forms have also emerged.  In particular, the 
organisational form of general practice has also changed.  The very 
numerous solo or small group GPs practices prior to the reforms have now 
grouped or affiliated themselves to fewer, larger primary care 
organisations, predominantly “Independent Practitioner Associations” 
(IPAs) most of which are limited liability companies.  This organisational 
change is primarily attributed to the need of GPs, but also RHAs, to find 
more effective structures to negotiate contracts.  IPAs have taken budgets 
for pharmaceuticals and laboratory investigations, but have tended not to 
manage their GPs’ GMS payments directly.  The GPs have continued to 
claim fee-for-service subsidies in most cases.  IPAs have increased in size, 
while the total number of IPAs has decreased, since the reforms began, 
prompting speculation that IPAs are increasingly strengthening their 
relative bargaining position and may achieve provider monopoly in some 
areas. 
• Purchasers have been persuaded by Ministers and the Ministry of Health to 
introduce the elective surgery ‘booking system’ designed to give patients 
greater certainty in the timing of their admission and to improve equity of 
access to electives across the country.  This was largely a central 
government initiative which built on the concern of providers to change the 
way in which surgical waiting lists were managed. 
• Improvements in waiting times have been reported as a result of particular 
contracts and competitive tendering processes in secondary care, mental 
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• Significant savings have been made in relation to the pharmaceuticals 
budget, due to an aggressive purchasing stance taken by Pharmac, the 
national pharmaceuticals’ purchaser.  It is not known whether savings in 
the drug budget have led to increased use of hospital and other services.  
Pharmac also reports that the proportion of pharmaceuticals prescribed by 
GPs in line with its ‘best evidence’ recommendations has increased. 
The experience in relation to provision of care 
• Competition between private and public providers has been difficult to 
promote, particularly for public hospital services and it has not always 
resulted in lower prices.  The need for many services to be provided near to 
where people live has limited opportunities for competition, although there 
has also been virtually no public-private competition even for elective 
surgery.  Competition has been more noticeable in the rest home market. 
• Efficiency gains - particularly in CHEs - appear to have been limited; and 
the rate of improvement in simple measures of performance such as 
throughput appeared to slow down compared to the AHB period, though 
throughput has continued to rise and length of stay to fall.   
• Keeping expenditure within budget has proved a problem for CHEs and 
HHSs.  The CCMAU noted that an extra $200 million a year was paid to 
CHEs between 1993/94 and 1995/96, but CHEs reported that their costs 
had increased by $267 million in the same period, resulting in rising 
deficits (Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, 1996).  Although 
CHEs/HSSs tended to argue that unrealistically low purchaser prices were 
to blame for their deficits, there were other factors involved such as an 
inability in some cases to manage the volume of clinical work in the 
hospital and rising costs (eg, clinical salaries rose immediately after 1993).  
In addition, the advent of price/volume contracts based on Diagnosis-
Related Groups (DRGs) encouraged providers to record patient activity 
more assiduously than before, leading to notionally increased volumes for 
which they then expected to be paid.  The so-called ‘deficit switch’ 
implemented in 1997/98 effectively increased purchasing power in the 
sector sufficient to eliminate most deficits by 1998/99. 
• The expenditure cap made it difficult for CHEs to increase their revenues 
by expanding service delivery since this led to income reductions for other 
CHEs, all of which were government owned. 
• A number of provider groups argued that the new contracting process 
imposed significant costs in terms of contract negotiation and monitoring 
requirements.  This was said to have been exacerbated by the fact that 
each of the RHAs had its own requirements, the poor state of information 
when the contracting environment was initiated, the legalistic approach to 
contracting (including the tendency to specify all obligations in detail), the 
adversarial relations between many purchasers and providers and the 
financial environment in which there was normally a gap between what 
RHAs wished to purchase with their budgets and the costs of the services 
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• On the positive side, providers have reported greater clarity and focus and 
increased accountability as a result of the contracting process.  In 
principle, this should have enabled managers and clinicians to plan the 
pattern of clinical activity within budgets. 
• It is widely held that the requirements of contracting have improved the 
quantity and quality of information on the costs of providing services and 
that this has been beneficial regardless of how the health care system is 
organised in future.  Although routine information on primary care is still 
weak, IPAs have developed good information systems covering the 
activities of their member GPs. 
• Waiting lists and waiting times increased between 1993 and 1996, but fell 
after that due to the addition of an earmarked sum for waiting list surgery 
to the health budget (the so called Waiting Times Fund). 
• Beyond information on waiting times and lists, there is very little 
information about the effects of the reforms on service users.  For example, 
the impact of the reforms on quality of care is largely unknown, although 
some CHEs reported steadily rising rates of overall satisfaction with 
treatment and reduced readmission rates (Ashton, 1998).  There is little 
information on the quality and cost of specific services, and so far, 
relatively little use has been made of ‘benchmarking’ of provider 
performance on a range of clinically relevant indicators.  ‘Benchmarking’ 
activity has been confined to analyses of costs between hospitals by the 
HFA with a view to setting fair and ‘efficient’ prices by Diagnosis-Related 
Group (DRG). 
By the end of 1996, most commentators had concluded that the New Zealand 
reforms were yet to produce the efficiency gains, such as savings from the 
hospital sector, to justify the costs associated with the reforms.  The analysis 
of ‘the problem’ of the lack of incentives to efficiency in the public hospitals 
and the potential for ‘savings’ which was carried out by Arthur Andersen for the 
Hospital and Related Services Taskforce (1988), had argued that public 
hospitals were inefficient because they were not operating in a competitive 
market.  Without international benchmarking, this had been impossible to tell.  
The expected benefits of the quasi-market from this analysis included major 
‘savings’ in the running costs of the acute hospitals.  However, the expectation 
of ‘savings’ which could be removed from the health budget failed to take into 
account the fact that if hospitals become more efficient, this alters referral and 
treatment thresholds downward, thereby leading to more admissions.  As a 
result, ‘savings’ would be swallowed up in additional services.  This has been 
the case.  The analysis also failed to take account of the likely effect of 
provider competition on the wages of clinical staff, particularly those in short 
supply.  Rising demand for hospital admission, which is poorly understood, has 
also been a feature of the period and has influenced the effects of the changes. 
Explaining the difficulties facing New Zealand purchasers 
Purchasing health services is inherently difficult in publicly financed health 
systems since purchasers are continually faced with the multiple and 
frequently conflicting explicit and implicit expectations of politicians, central 
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health system.  In addition, purchasers are legitimately required to contribute 
to better population health, despite the knowledge that their contribution to 
this end can only be partial and that many of the most powerful determinants 
of population health lie outside the health sector and, particularly, outside the 
scope of personal health services (Cumming and Scott, 1998).  For this reason, 
it is important that purchasers are only held accountable for outcomes that it 
is reasonable to expect that they can influence.  As a result, the current 
accountability arrangements focus on outputs (eg, the volume and quality of 
services secured) and an additional sub-set of outputs which are known to be 
associated with better outcomes. 
Some of the specific difficulties faced by New Zealand purchasers between 
1993 and 1998 were as follows: 
• Lack of a single, integrated health care budget.  Despite bringing together 
under Vote: Health the budgets for Personal Health Services and DSS, this 
was no more than an administrative integration.  General Medical Services 
are still largely separate from other Personal Health Services since 
spending is demand-led and DSS is still ‘ring fenced’ (ie, its share of health 
spending is fixed on historic grounds) and mainly separately managed.  
The Waiting Times Fund was another earmarked sum of money determined 
with central government rather than purchasers’ priorities in mind, 
whatever its impact on waiting times.  Similarly, central government 
‘tagged’ additional resources for mental health services before it allocated 
them to purchasers.  Accident-related health care is still separately funded 
and purchased, now by a range of private and public insurers.  As a result, 
purchasers have been constrained to some degree in making certain 
innovative substitution decisions.  In addition, accident insurers face 
different incentives compared with the HFA and may make different priority 
decisions, since the former internalise the trade-off between 
treatment/rehabilitation costs and the costs of cash benefits to those who 
have suffered workplace accidents.  The HFA does not bear the societal 
costs of continued ill-health as a charge on its budget.  On the other hand, 
if its priorities are set on the basis of a society-wide cost-utility analysis, it 
should take account of the wider costs of ill-health, not just those 
measured by benefit transfer payments.   
• Lack of time to develop skills, relationships and experience between 
reorganisations.  Purchasing takes time and is not helped by organisational 
instability that discourages providers from taking purchasers’ objectives 
seriously.  Restructuring has also led to loss of experienced staff. 
• Annual funding of purchasers has resulted in contracts with providers for 
the same period, which providers have argued, limits their ability to bring 
about significant service changes.  However, in practice, a ‘funding path’ is 
set for Vote: Health over a three year period, thereby allowing a greater 
degree of budgetary certainty than is frequently acknowledged. 
• Lack of choice and competition between providers, especially for public 
hospital services, because of population size and dispersion outside the 
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• Lack of clear incentives for hospitals and other providers to become more 
efficient since the total level of spending was fixed.  One provider’s 
increased budget was perceived as a potential loss for another.  Providers 
also, correctly, perceived that government was reluctant to see them fail 
and so had little reason to be overly concerned about their deficits.  Since 
1996, hospitals have been allowed to keep any efficiency gains which they 
have been able to make, thereby improving incentives to efficiency.  The 
capital charge regime has had a similar effect. 
• Ministers’ and the Crown’s continuing commitment to an ownership 
interest in the CHEs/HHSs led to the protection and subsidy of specific 
providers, sometimes in circumstances when purchasers might have acted 
to close them down.  For example, the HFA is currently constrained by its 
Funding Agreement with the Minister of Health not to do anything by its 
purchasing which would alter the public hospital system.  Implicit Crown 
guarantees also reduce the incentives for hospitals to alter their activities 
to improve efficiency. 
• Ministers’ and central government’s continuing ad hoc involvement in the 
detail of purchasing; for example, by specifying individual services which 
should be made available regardless of the goals and priorities of the 
purchasers.  The Funding Agreement between the Minister of Health and 
the RHAs included a great deal of detail, much of which the RHAs ignored.  
However, requirements for additional services tended to be accompanied 
by extra resources and were usually responded to, though sometimes only 
as a result of central pressure. 
• Lack of good, reliable price and quality information which has hampered 
the contracting process, particularly the tendering of services. 
• Excessive attention to the legal form of contracts coupled with early 
adversarial relations between purchasers and providers has increased 
transaction costs without necessarily improving services.  It appears that 
contract negotiations can take place without involving clinicians in a 
meaningful way, thereby reducing the likelihood that the purchasers’ 
priorities will be implemented in practice. 
Conclusions on Theory and Experience of Purchasing 
This review of the justification for a separate purchasing function in health 
care, together with a review of some of the international and domestic 
experience shows that health care purchasing is a difficult task in any system.  
Purchasing normally takes time to show results since the current providers 
tend to have far more information on the current pattern of provision, ‘best 
practice’ and the feasibility of change, than the purchasers.  Public purchasers 
have to attempt to satisfy multiple, conflicting objectives and are unlikely to be 
able to escape entirely from political imperatives as long as health services 
remain publicly financed.  Furthermore, given the nature of health care 
markets, the ideal pre-conditions for purchasing rarely obtain consistently.  For 
example, the predominant situation in the public hospital sector, if not for 
residential care, is one of bilateral monopoly in which a single purchaser faces 
a single provider.  Contracting in health care is a relatively blunt instrument for 
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need to be well informed and have considerable expertise, which is costly too.  
They also need to develop relatively long-term relations with providers to bring 
about measurable service gains without losing sight of their ultimate raison 
d’etre.   
In addition, it is impossible to design purchasing organisations which combine 
all the features generally regarded as desirable by policy makers since some of 
these are mutually incompatible (eg, sensitivity to local needs and a high level 
of expertise in particular service areas; or public participation and consistent 
expectations of providers).  Some of the characteristics of purchaser 
organisations, such as their responsiveness to the views of local community 
leaders, are hard, if not impossible, to assess, let alone ‘measure’ in relative 
terms.  As a result, it is unlikely that there is a single, ‘best’ configuration of 
purchasing for the New Zealand health system.  Instead, trade-offs will need to 
be made between different goals (eg, between reducing contracting costs and 
holding providers closely to account for their actions) when deciding how to 
evolve the current organisation of health services’ purchasing. 
Despite all the above limitations and caveats about the separation of 
purchasing from providing functions, the separation has generated far more 
information on the nature of the health services paid for from public funds.  
For example, it is now possible to construct and use ‘benchmark’ national 
prices for hospital services with some confidence that these will encourage 
efficiency while being feasible for the hospitals.  Adaptations have been made 
to the contracting process to reduce the transactions costs associated with 
purchaser-provider separation such as long term contracts and national pricing 
to reduce bargaining costs over price.  In addition, steps have been taken since 
1996 to reduce the transaction costs of bilateral monopoly associated with 
information imbalance by insisting on full disclosure of information between 
providers and purchasers and an end to notions of ‘commercial 
confidentiality’. 
The separation of purchasing from providing and the changes to public 
accountability which go with this, have also made the resource allocation 
decisions in the health sector far more transparent and explicit than they were 
in the former vertically integrated system.  This is a particularly important 
justification for maintaining a separation between purchase and provision in a 
publicly funded system.  In a private market, the decisions of individual users 
determine the ‘success’ of the health care organisation.  With public funding, 
these signals are far more indirect and government has to put in place 
arrangements that allow citizens to have confidence that reasonable decisions 
are being taken about their health care. 
As a result of the development of purchasing and the related work to debate 
priorities and ‘core services’ (National Advisory Committee on Core Health and 
Disability Support Services, 1994), together with the more recent elective 
surgical ‘booking system’, the public may be more aware of the choices and 
decisions made in the health sector.  This situation has both positive and 
negative consequences.  People may be more worried about the direction of 
the sector, while, at the same time, transparency is consonant with the wider 
goals of public sector and government reform.  There is evidence from 
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Zealanders have significant concerns about the health system.  Public disquiet 
appears to be considerably higher than in the UK, which has a health system 
very similar to New Zealand’s.  However, users report high levels of satisfaction 
with services, as in the UK.  A possible explanation for the disquiet may lie in 
specific features of the 1993 reform process, particularly its rapid 
implementation in the face of considerable professional opposition, the short-
lived introduction of hospital co-payments and the original aim of the 
government to shift from monopoly purchasers to health plans competing for 
individual patient enrolments.  Disquiet may have been maintained, despite the 
compromises which followed 1993, by the experience of paying considerably 
more out-of-pocket for primary health services than had been the case 
previously and far more than people in most OECD countries.  It is also 
possible that disquiet with the publicly financed health system was part of a 
more general rise in anxiety about changes to the welfare state produced by an 
increase in private contributions in other fields, notably higher education. 
A further justification for purchasing, in some form, lies in the fact that 
provider organisations will always take a partial view of the needs of the health 
sector and the population.  As a result, it is valuable to have a purchaser 
perspective in the system, which is less influenced in its decision making by 
the self-interest of particular institutions and professional sectional interests 
as by a concern to meet the needs of the population in the most equitable and 
cost-effective way possible. 
Finally, some sort of separation between purchase and provision permits a 
range of different forms of competition and contestability to develop, at least 
in theory.  For example, although straightforward forms of supply-side 
competition for the business of purchasers has proved difficult to organise in 
many health systems, including in New Zealand, there is still scope for 
competition for rather than in the market in the shape of periodic competitions 
for the right to purchase or provide services to particular populations.  This is 
already largely a reality in most fields within the DSS.  In addition, the 
separation continues to allow the purchaser in extremis to alter the pattern of 
purchasing away from unsatisfactory providers, as long as an acceptable 
alternative exists or could conceivably be established.  This, in turn, means 
that comparisons of performance and other benchmarking exercises are more 
than token exercises. 
The purchaser-provider split is likely to work better for some services than 
others (eg, those where information asymmetries and market entry and exit are 
less of a problem).  Perhaps greater freedom should have been given to the 
purchasers to determine in which circumstances to contract and in which to 
integrate vertically, rather than forcing them to develop a purchaser-provider 
contract in all circumstances.  In a private market, firms can always choose 
whether to ‘make or buy’ goods and services.  However, it is likely that the 
compulsory separation of health care purchase from delivery in the publicly 
financed market in New Zealand reflected the fact that the purchasers 
continued to be monopolies.  It was judged, therefore, that they could not be 
permitted to make these decisions spontaneously themselves since they would 
lack incentives to make efficient choices. 
Despite these undoubted advantages of the separation of purchase from 
provision, there are limitations to the current arrangements.  Providers and the 
HFA are strictly separated in the New Zealand arrangements, but the 
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applies to the HHSs and most of the relationships involve bilateral monopolies.  
This tends to lead to contracting problems, high transaction costs and, in turn, 
to Ministerial and official intervention in what would in other markets be 
matters to be resolved between the two parties.  However, the Crown Company 
status of the HHSs increases the complexity of Ministerial intervention since 
the Boards of HHSs have considerable operational autonomy while they 
recognise that the Crown is unlikely to wish to see them fail financially.  
Similarly, the publicly funded health system currently relies on a single 
national purchaser, the HFA, which appears to face relatively weak incentives 
to hold influential providers to account for the cost-effectiveness of their 
services and to take action, accordingly, if it judges that services can be 
improved.  The HFA and its staff will not be rewarded any more or less 
depending on the quality and cost-effectiveness of the publicly financed health 
services.  Indeed, there might well be strong public resistance to any such 
move.  It can be argued that the current system represents potentially ‘the 
worst of both worlds’: a system without the incentives and financial disciplines 
of the market, but lacking the straightforward controls of a single hierarchy. 
For these reasons, it might be argued that the Crown should cease to own any 
providers, thereby attempting to remove the implicit Crown guarantee of 
funding and increasing the influence of the purchaser, since the Crown would 
not then be responsible for any losses incurred by providers should the 
purchaser alter the pattern of health services purchased in order to pursue 
greater efficiency.  Unfortunately, this remedy cannot directly tackle the 
monopoly status of many hospitals, for example.  Such a change would replace 
a public by a private monopoly.  Destabilising providers runs the risk of 
undermining continuity of access to health services.  The Crown would be 
equally reluctant to de-stabilise providers through its purchasing decisions 
because of concerns that gaps in service might occur.  Hospitals and their 
senior clinicians would also continue to enjoy high levels of public support, as 
they do in other countries such as Canada and the Netherlands where 
government does not own the hospitals, when their interests were threatened 
by purchasers’ decisions.  It is also doubtful whether the implicit Crown 
guarantee of funding can be entirely removed in relation to non-hospital non-
Crown providers, particularly where there are major health problems to be 
addressed. 
As a result of these limitations, a judgement has to be made as to whether the 
imperfect merits of a purchaser-provider separation in publicly financed health 
care outweigh the limitations of the previous vertically integrated, hierarchical 
model.  If a separation between purchase and provision is retained, there are a 
number of options for strengthening purchasing; for example, abolishing the 
purchaser-provider split for those services which do not match the criteria for 
purchaser-provider contracting; or encouraging a range of alternative forms of 
purchaser-provider relationship such as devolving the purchasing role to 
primary care based organisations; developing purchaser competition (so called 
‘regulated competition’); or acting to make the provider side of the market 
more competitive (eg, via facilities-services splits in HHSs or compulsory 
tendering of acute services for private provision of all DSS).  The range of 
options for the purchase of health care, and the extent of separation between 
purchase and provision within those models, is explored in the second part of Part One: Theory of Effective Purchasing and Review of Recent Experience 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 36 
this paper.  The second part also considers the case for returning the health 
system to some form of completely vertically integrated service which existed, 
in part, before 1993 under the AHBs.  
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Part Two:  Review of Purchasing Options 
The Options 
Dimensions on which options can vary 
The potential range of ways in which purchasing of publicly funded health 
services can be organised is determined by varying combinations of the 
following features of purchasing arrangements: 
• Whether purchasing is organised around geographic areas/populations or 
not (eg, national, regional or local purchasers versus patient enrolment 
with purchasers); 
• How purchasers are paid (eg, needs weighted capitation based on 
aggregate information about population characteristics or individually risk-
rated premia related to patients enrolled); 
• Whether there are monopoly purchasers or some degree of competition 
between purchasers (either driven by patient choice or periodic 
competition for the market through government franchising); 
• The identity and legal status of the purchaser (whether a public, semi-
public, private, or voluntary organisation and whether for-profit or not); 
• The range of services purchased and the scope of the budget (eg, specialist 
purchasers responsible for purchasing particular services versus generalist 
purchasers and whether the budget extends beyond health services to 
include disability support, education, housing, etc.); 
• Whether the purchaser exclusively purchases or has some provider capacity 
of its own as in GP budget holding (ie, the extent of vertical integration and 
the nature of the relationships between purchasers and providers which 
includes forms of regulated competition in which patients choose their 
managed or integrated health care organisation which offers 
comprehensive care); 
• How the purchasers are held to account for their actions (ie, whether 
accountability is exclusively to central government as funder or shared with 
patients and/or the local population; eg, whether the board of management 
of the purchasing organisation is appointed, elected or a hybrid); 
• Whether the purchasers can raise additional revenue from their enrolees 
beyond the tax dollars allocated to them. 
All options require government to set out clearly the strategic aims, shorter 
term objectives and service priorities which it expects purchasers to embody in 
their purchasing decisions and means for assessing the extent to which 
purchasers have been successful.  All options require some degree of 
regulation.  For example, particularly in a tax-funded health system, it would 
be inappropriate for purchasers to be permitted to indulge in ‘cream 
skimming' or the under-service of needy patients in order to protect a surplus Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 38 
or profits.  If purchasing is decentralised, and, especially if it is devolved to 
non-state entities, government may need to specify with reasonable clarity at 
least the minimum range of services which citizens should expect to receive via 
each purchaser.  In general, purchasers with more integrated budgets (ie, 
budgets which cover a wider range of services) are to be preferred to those 
with more specialised or narrower purchasing responsibilities.  However, the 
wider the potential range of services to be purchased by a purchaser, the more 
difficult it is for government to specify users’ expectations of access to care in 
advance.  This problem of performance assessment is exacerbated if the focus 
is less on the delivery of specific services to a particular standard and more on 
the purchasers’ ability to secure specific outcomes.   
The main options to be assessed 
The following comprise the principal options for organising the purchasing side 
of the publicly funded health system.  The six possible options for separating 
purchase from provision can exist in combination as well as alone.  For 
example, a national purchaser could choose to delegate part of its purchasing 
role to more local purchasing organisations while retaining purchasing 
responsibility for, say, highly specialised services provided on a national basis.  
In addition, it is conceivable that different options could be instituted in 
different parts of New Zealand.  For example, it might be possible to envisage 
user choice of purchaser (eg, via competing health plans) in the larger cities, 
but monopoly purchasing arrangements might be inevitable in rural areas.  
Whether such dual arrangements would be acceptable politically is another 
matter.  The final option discussed is the abandonment of the current 
purchaser-provider separation coupled with a full or partial return to a more 
vertically integrated publicly funded health care system.  Again, this broad 
option could be combined with others.  For example, it might be decided that 
the purchaser-provider separation would be maintained for those services 
within Vote: Health where contracting appears to be cost-effective (eg, 
residential care) and abandoned for those where it might be judged to be more 
problematic (eg, non-elective acute hospital services).  At present, the system 
in respect of Vote: Health mandates a strict form of purchaser-provider 
separation, but this may not be sensible in relation to all services.  The July 
1999 changes to the purchasing of health services related to accident 
compensation claims has distinguished between those services for which a 
strict separation of purchase and provision will be maintained (elective surgery 
and rehabilitation which will be purchased by private insurers) and those which 
will be funded largely in response to demand (emergency and urgent treatment 
of injuries).  It will be interesting to see how successfully this approach works. 
1. Single national public purchasing agency 
Under this option, a single, public body would undertake all the health care 
purchasing in the public sector.  This is the current arrangement with the HFA, 
its regional offices and subsidiary (Pharmac) responsible for purchasing all the 
services covered by Vote: Health. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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2. Sub-national, monopoly public purchasing agencies 
The main sub-types are determined by the number and population size of 
purchasing organisations (eg, regional, area, or more local) and whether board 
members are appointed, elected or derived from a mix of the two methods.  
The operation of sub-national, public purchasers will also depend on the 
degree of autonomy (eg, to deviate from national policies) which they are 
granted. 
3. Sub-national, monopoly independent purchasing agencies 
This option would include periodic franchising of the purchasing function either 
for geographic, ethnic or other populations, to non-governmental bodies (eg, 
commercial companies, iwi-based organisations, etc.).  The 1998 Marlborough 
Trust proposal for an integrated care pilot is of this type.  Under this option 
competition exists periodically for rather than continuously in the market. 
4. Primary care-based, sub-national, monopoly purchasing agencies 
The main sub-types under this heading consist of GP-based organisations (eg, 
based on Independent Practitioner Associations) or more broadly based 
primary care organisations (PCOs) in which a team of primary care 
professionals has responsibility for a budget including primary and potentially 
some proportion or all of secondary care for the population registered with the 
PCO.  Both sub-types are likely to be largely local monopolies, but there is 
scope for periodic tendering or re-accreditation of such organisations, 
particularly if they were not owned by GPs.  Under this group of options, 
patients would continue to have a choice of primary care provider/team or GP 
(although they would be required to register with one), thereby, indirectly, 
choosing their purchaser.  However, in order to be large enough to manage 
risk, organisations would tend towards being local monopolies or near-
monopolies. 
5. National or sub-national, competing purchasers 
In brief, this option represents individual patient choice between competing 
health plans as envisaged in the original ‘Green and White Paper’ of 1991 
(Upton, 1991).  This represents a radical departure from the current system 
since it relies on individuals to make their own choices between purchasing 
agents rather than relying on the government to engineer an effective pattern 
of purchasing agents.  Under this arrangement, the whole of Vote: Health 
would be allocated to a number of comprehensive health plans, based on the 
risk profile of their enrolees.  Each plan would be free to decide how it secured 
comprehensive publicly funded health care for its enrolees through a range of 
sub-contracts with provider groups, hospitals and so on.  Given the size and 
dispersion of the New Zealand population, it is possible that such a system 
could only be developed in the largest urban centres.  An important design 
issue under this option concerns whether or not people would be offered the 
choice to remain with the public purchaser, the HFA. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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6. Specialist purchasers 
Under this option, specific service areas might be purchased on behalf of the 
HFA or the Ministry of Health by a specialist-purchasing organisation.  This 
organisation could operate throughout the country or in specific locations.  
These so-called ‘carve-outs’ tend to be discussed in relation either to highly 
specialised, tertiary services or services such as mental health or services for 
people with learning difficulties.  However, ‘carve-outs’ could be based on the 
extent to which the individual service can easily be contracted for, with the 
national purchaser retaining responsibility for other services such as public 
hospitals where market entry and choice of provider are more problematic.  
Another variant of this option would be for the HFA to retain responsibility for 
purchasing ‘high cost-low volume’ services in the context of, say, a shift of the 
remainder of the purchasing function to GP-led organisations or some form of 
area purchasing authority. 
7. Vertical integration 
This set of options involves either the abandonment of the distinction between 
purchase and provision (eg, the Ministry of Health running the public provider 
organisations directly) or internalising the distinctive roles within a single 
entity responsible for both functions (eg, establishing district health services 
across the country with responsibility for both planning and delivering health 
services).  In either event, there are certain areas within Vote: Health where it 
is most unlikely that the purchaser-provider split could be removed since the 
vast majority of the providers are in the private sector and separate from 
government (eg, rest homes). 
The Status Quo – A Single National Purchaser at Arm’s 
Length from Central Government 
In 1999/2000 the planned level of funding for Vote: Health is $6.5 billion.  The 
great majority of Vote: Health is allocated to the Health Funding Authority 
(HFA), which, in turn, purchases health services from a range of providers in 
the public, private and voluntary sectors.  A far smaller percentage of health 
spending in the public sector is via workplace accident insurers and ACC in 
their roles of making available health services to people after accidents (less 
than 10%).  The HFA’s subsidiary, Pharmac, is responsible, exclusively, for the 
purchase of GP prescribed pharmaceuticals.  Viewed in this way, there are, in 
reality, three national health care purchasers – ACC/accident insurers, 
Pharmac and the HFA.  Each has responsibility for a different range of services 
and products and has a distinct approach to its remit.  For example, ACC funds 
a range of complementary therapies that are not funded by the HFA.  Thus 
patients with identical needs will be treated differently depending on the 
whether the needs arose following an accident or not.  Intriguing as such 
issues are, they are beyond the scope of this paper. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Rationale 
The first element in the rationale for having a national purchasing agency for 
Vote: Health separate from the Ministry of Health appears to be that it will 
enable the Ministry to focus on strategic, sector-wide policy and regulation, 
while the HFA concentrates on purchasing the mix of services required to meet 
strategic goals.  This part of the rationale is thus one of specialisation and 
clarity of function.  This arrangement is mimicked on the provider side of the 
publicly funded sector by the role of CCMAU which is responsible for 
representing the Crown’s ownership interest in the HHSs separate from the 
Ministry of Health and Treasury.  Such an arrangement aims to maintain the 
separation between purchase and provision and strategy and operations at the 
centre as well as locally.  The existence of a purchaser distinct from the 
Ministry of Health is also intended to distance the centre and, especially, 
politicians from priority setting and direct involvement in purchasing decisions.  
Finally, the replacement of four Regional Health Authorities by a single national 
purchaser at the end of 1996, was designed to overcome the lack of 
consistency and collaboration between the RHAs, as well as to reduce cost by 
collapsing four territorial organisations into one.   
Assessment of current arrangements 
Purchaser accountability and inter-agency relationships 
Although it is apparent that the relations between the Ministry and the HFA 
have settled down after an initial teething period, and that role demarcation is 
now clearer, it is intrinsically difficult to separate the making of policy for 
strategic purposes and the making of policy to support purchasing.  Some 
Ministry policy work is beyond the scope of the HFA (eg, altering public health 
regulations and developing inter-sectoral initiatives) and, therefore, quite 
distinct, but much of the work of the two organisations, particularly in the field 
of health services policy, overlaps.  In addition, the advent of the HFA has had 
the effect of removing experienced Ministry staff from the ‘frontline’ of policy 
into a more advisory role.  There is thus experience and knowledge in the 
Ministry that cannot be directly drawn on to support purchasing.  On the other 
hand, Ministry staff become involved in the affairs of the providers when 
Ministers are put under political pressure to deal with difficulties caused for 
providers by the objectives of the purchaser.  For example, the Minister and 
Ministry may be drawn into debates about the future of small, rural hospitals 
to the extent of issuing policies which curtail the freedom of manoeuvre of the 
HFA. 
The existence of the Ministry and an independent purchaser in the shape of the 
HFA has placed a premium on the quality of communication between the two 
organisations since the Ministry continues to require detailed information 
about the sector in order to support political accountability processes.  When 
there are perceived to be specific problems arising in the publicly funded 
health system, Ministers tend to turn to the Ministry in the first instance for 
briefing and advice, though not invariably.  Ministers continue to use advice 
from both agencies, without being greatly concerned about the distinction 
between the roles of each. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Although the separation of the purchasing function from the Ministry and the 
Minister was intended to reduce the level of political involvement in day-to-day 
decision making in the publicly funded health sector, there is little indication 
that this has occurred.  This is because the lines of accountability of the HFA 
and the publicly owned providers (the HSSs) still end with the Minister of 
Health.  There is no New Zealand equivalent, for example, of the NHS in 
England, whose Chief Executive and Board are responsible for the strategic and 
operational management of both the purchase and provision sides of the 
publicly funded health system.  Much of the political and Parliamentary 
discussion of health issues still relates to the internal, managerial affairs of the 
HSSs from which the changes in the system since 1993 were designed to 
remove Ministers as far as possible.  However, opposition politicians continue 
to wish to make political capital out of laying providers’ problems at the door 
of the Minister, while Ministers continue to wish to gain political credit from 
presiding over developments in HSSs (HSDP in Auckland and the plans for a 
new hospital to serve the Wellington region are the latest and most prominent 
examples).  The latter can be justified since Ministers are required to make the 
decision whether or not to approve a large, new investment in the health 
system. 
The existence of two separate national bodies with a major input into 
determining the direction of the sector also spreads scarce skills and 
experience thinly.  For example, both HFA and the Ministry have the capacity to 
commission, undertake and use research, particularly in the shape of 
programme/policy evaluation.  With the very limited resources likely to be 
available both to manage and undertake this research, questions have to be 
raised about the wisdom of such duplication.  In a similar vein, both the 
Ministry and HFA are separately involved in developing service strategies for 
particular service areas.  The most notable recent example was in relation to 
dental health. 
Further, there is the issue of the cost of having a number of inevitably 
overlapping, central control, strategy and advisory agencies.  Work needs to be 
done to review the costs of the Ministry and HFA in their own terms and to 
compare them with other similar organisations in the publicly funded health 
sector in other countries before definitive conclusions can be reached about 
the appropriateness of the current costs of the central agencies.  The 
justification for additional independent policy advice from bodies such as the 
National Health Committee, the Mental Health Commission and Maori Health 
Commission should also be scrutinised.  There may also be scope for the 
central agencies to share more functions and support services in common (eg, 
for IT, supplies, payroll, R&D, etc.).  The NHS in Scotland (population 5 
million) has long relied on a Common Services Agency to provide such services 
to central and local organisations involved in purchase and provision in order 
to reduce systemic overheads.  The same Agency also administers payments to 
GPs and other family practitioners as the separate Health Benefits Ltd does in 
New Zealand. 
Another difficulty with the current arrangement concerns the monopoly status 
of the HFA.  Whereas with four RHAs, the government at least had some 
comparative information on direction and performance with which to Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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encourage improvement, now there are no such pressures and the government 
is wholly reliant on a single body.  It is not clear what incentives the HFA faces 
to tackle difficult issues involving conflict with providers or professional 
interests.  This makes the task of monitoring and incentivising the HFA very 
difficult.  Much rests on the system for setting the objectives and monitoring 
the performance of the HFA. 
The final tension in the current structure predates the advent of a single 
purchaser and relates to the strict separation at central government level 
between the Crown’s ‘ownership’ and ‘purchase’ interests in the health sector.  
CCMAU, representing the government as ‘shareholder’ has traditionally 
encouraged the CHEs/HHSs to press for adequate revenue, frequently at the 
same time as the RHAs/HFA were being encouraged by the Ministry of Health 
to purchase the same or higher levels of service with smaller allocations on the 
assumption that efficiency gains could be made.  With monopolies on both 
sides, this sort of situation often led to contracting stalemates. 
Counter-balancing concerns about the costs, complexity and potential for 
overlap, confusion and conflict between national agencies (Ministry, HFA, 
CCMAU, Pharmac, ACC and private accident insurers, National Health 
Committee, Mental Health Commission, etc) under the current arrangements, 
it must be recognised that the last major structural reorganisation of 
purchasing in the sector occurred comparatively recently.  The HFA has only 
existed in its current form since early 1998.  Internal re-structuring and 
recruitment of staff continued well into the second half of 1998.  Anecdotal 
evidence hints that a considerable number of experienced staff were lost in the 
transition from four RHAs to a single national purchaser.  Experience tends to 
show that structural reorganisation, while superficially attractive and giving the 
impression of purposive change, rarely achieves its desired outcomes.  
Furthermore, there is a strong sense in the health system of change fatigue in 
that most clinicians and managers appear to prefer to work towards improving 
the status quo rather than facing further wholesale reorganisation.  For these 
reasons, it may not be wise to make further major changes to the national 
organisations in the system.  For example, there is a case for absorbing the 
HFA’s purchasing role into the Ministry of Health, or even to slim down the 
Ministry of Health and absorb most of its functions into the HFA.  However, this 
would divert the energies of all the purchasing staff away from their main role 
for at least 18 months, judging by the disruption caused by the abolition of the 
four RHAs, as well as generating costs of its own and risking losing more 
experienced staff.  It would be more sensible to focus attention on new ways 
for the HFA to devolve parts of its responsibility for purchasing to a range of 
different intermediaries on an experimental basis than to devise new national 
bodies. 
The purchasing process 
Assuming that the current agency structures and allocation of functions remain 
in place, there are still aspects of the current purchasing arrangements that 
could be improved without major re-structuring.  Table 1 summarises some of 
the positive and negative features of the current arrangements for national 
level purchasing. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 44 
Table 1:  Assessment of the current arrangements for HFA purchasing 
Features which appear to be beneficial 
to effective purchasing 
Features which appear to handicap the 
purchasing process 
HFA’s exclusive mission to purchase 
services with no responsibility for 
provider organisations.  In theory, this 
allows Ministry of Health to focus on 
strategy and inter-sectoral health policy 
work, though signs of overlap and 
duplication of work between Ministry and 
HFA. 
Minister of Health remains responsible 
for financial ‘health’ of HHSs and for 
purchaser – contradiction between 
government as owner of institutions and 
purchaser of services with monopolies on 
both sides.  Potential to improve 
allocative efficiency in hospital budgets 
is prevented by government commitment 
to ‘stability’ in hospital sector.  Other 
incompatible government goals include 
protecting electives irrespective of trends 
in unplanned use of hospitals.  Ministers 
ultimately determine the degree of 
autonomy of the HFA 
Fully integrated budget covering all of 
Vote: Health (at least in theory) including 
GMS and DSS as well as preventive and 
curative services.  Wider scope of budget 
than in many systems.  Should allow for 
rational priority setting across the whole 
of health and social care. 
Financial accountability still not fully 
integrated (accident-related services 
purchased to pursue different goals) and 
ring-fence around DSS spending level 
remains.  Not possible to substitute 
between GMS and other areas because of 
structure of GMS subsidy.  Small number 
of integrated care pilots.  None fully 
integrated in budgetary terms.  Still 
ample scope for inadvertent cost shifting 
between budget heads within Vote: 
Health, from GMS to out-of-pocket 
payments and now between private 
accident insurers and Vote: Health.  
Need for careful monitoring.  Separation 
of Pharmac from wider purchasing 
prevents consideration of substitution of 
drug therapy for hospital care as does 
DSS ring fence. 
Bundles of services mostly still 
purchased according to historic budget 
heads (eg, DSS, GMS, GP 
pharmaceuticals).  Little programme of 
care purchasing outside a small number 
of integrated care pilots.  Few 
disincentives for GPs not to refer 
patients to hospital. 
Single national purchaser overcomes 
supposed rivalry and inconsistency of 
former RHAs.  This reduces transaction 
costs of monitoring performance for 
MoH.  Potential to set nationally 
consistent quality standards and access 
thresholds in key service areas (and 
allow for local variation in other areas) 
and to mount national initiatives (eg, 
mammography, elective surgery booking 
system). 
Unresolved tension between national 
consistency and local responsiveness to 
variations in need and priorities in the 
role of the HFA.  Also HFA priority setting 
method under development is likely to 
require major modifications to the 
surgical booking system criteria since 
the two approaches use different criteria 
of ‘need’ and different methods for 
arriving at priorities.   Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Features which appear to be beneficial 
to effective purchasing 
Features which appear to handicap the 
purchasing process 
Still able to contract selectively and 
move business between providers though 
scope limited outside main centres of 
population and by policy settings.  HFA is 
required by Ministry of Health to 
progress a range of integrated care (IC) 
initiatives in order to improve co-
ordination of local services for particular 
conditions, client groups, etc.  These 
have potential to develop into devolved 
purchasing organisations on contract to 
HFA. 
Reluctance of HFA, to date, to devolve 
any of its risk management function to 
other purchasing organisations prevents 
experiments with sub-purchasers which 
may face clearer incentives than HFA to 
purchase cost-effective services.  
Preference for ‘bulk funding’ of more 
integrated provider organisations.  IC 
pilots to date have focused on care co-
ordination rather than devolved budget 
management.  Unclear what incentives 
act on HFA to surrender part of its 
purchasing role to sub-purchasers 
Hospital Services Plan constrains 
purchasing of public hospital services. 
Contracting process has generated more 
and better information on what has been 
provided, how much and at what cost, 
including some ‘benchmark’ prices. 
No outcomes-based purchasing.  
Contracts tend to reward providers for 
identifying sick people and devoting 
inputs to them.  Tend to be based on 
past patterns of care.  Contracts may 
encourage a culture of ‘contract 
compliance’, including having to balance 
income and expenditure within each 
contract rather than across all contracts.  
Long term care contracts do not include 
incentives to rehabilitate and discharge 
clients home.  DRG-based contracts 
encourage separate identification of 
items of service and recording of more 
complex interventions (DRG creep). 
Little or no money is held for 
contingencies in an effort to encourage 
provider cost control.  Gradual shift 
towards longer term contracts and 
national ‘benchmark’ prices in acute 
sector may reduce transaction costs and 
encourage more constructive relations 
with providers. 
By committing all resources at once, HFA 
over stretches contracting staff and loses 
scope for marginal cost purchasing in-
year.  Providers support this approach 
because it gives them financial certainty. 
 
Table 1 indicates that there is considerable potential for continuing to work on 
refining the contracting process to make it more flexible, less fragmented and 
more collaborative.  There is change underway to better manage the embedded 
bilateral monopoly problem.  Changes since the Coalition Health Agreement of 
1996 have led to a national approach to setting HHSs’ prices based on 
benchmarks designed to narrow the discrepancies between HHSs over time 
and to provide ‘fair’ price levels designed to avoid HHS deficits.  Separate 
price negotiations with each of the 23 HHSs have been replaced by a national 
pricing policy and an attempt to set ‘fair’ service volumes between HHSs in 
order to ensure equitable access to services in relation to need across the 
country.  Although negotiations between the HFA and the Crown Health 
Association (CHA), representing the HHSs, with the aid of a national approach 
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organisations, the bi-lateral relationship has not been straightforward.  The 
HHSs via CHA rejected the HFA’s approach to setting volumes and prices in 
1998/99.  Steps are already in hand to move away from annual contracting 
towards longer-term agreements with guarantees to providers that they will 
receive a high proportion of current funding with the remainder contestable.  
HHSs could be given permission and encouragement to sub-contract where this 
appeared to bring advantages. 
The HFA is gradually organising its own operations to reflect programmes of 
care for particular client groups rather than historic budgetary distinctions 
with a view to making better use of the totality of its resources through an 
explicit priority setting methodology focused on maximising health 
improvement at the aggregate level.  For example, while it is relevant to the 
HFA’s mission to have staff who understand the potential and appropriate role 
for DSS, it makes no sense for DSS to be purchased separately from other 
services to older people.  Indeed, at least one of the former RHAs organised its 
purchasing around ‘services for older people’ rather than the conventional 
divisions of budgetary responsibility.  There is also scope for the HFA to hold 
back part of its budget for in-year contracting in response to capacity bottle-
necks, availability of unused capacity, changes in patterns of demand and so 
on, and even to use this money to reward providers who improve patient 
outcomes rather than those who simply consume inputs.  The Authority is now 
trying to organise its purchasing in order to free some resources which it can 
use flexibly during the year. 
The HFA accountability arrangements are driven off a strategic business plan 
that the Authority should develop with the sector and the Crown Statement of 
Objectives which the Minister of Health expects the HFA to contribute directly 
to achieving through its purchasing.  The Ministry of Health and HFA 
subsequently negotiate a detailed Funding Agreement.  The Funding Agreement 
is the principal accountability document against which the Ministry of Health 
assesses the performance of the HFA.  The Agreement incorporates a Service 
Coverage Document agreed with the Ministry of Health that sets out the range 
and type of services to be purchased from public funds.  The HFA is held 
accountable for purchasing these outputs and contracts tend to be structured 
into similar bundles of outputs, often defined historically.  Thus providers are 
typically paid to deliver outputs rather than for the ‘added value’ or health 
status improvement associated with their efforts.  For example, public 
hospitals are largely paid on the basis of the severity and complexity of their 
case mix measured by Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) rather than with 
reference to the effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of their treatments.  It is 
usually easier to classify patients so that they appear sicker, thereby attracting 
higher DRG reimbursement, than to treat them any more effectively or at lower 
cost in order to make a surplus! Case-mix based funding also rewards 
providers, which lower patient lengths of stay and allow more frequent 
admissions.  One way of encouraging more of a focus in contracting on 
outcomes would be to reimburse providers, at least in part, for delivering 
service ‘protocols’ (ie, patterns of care regarded as best practice based on 
research on cost-effectiveness), not outputs (Sheldon and Borowitz, 1993), or 
for the ‘value added’ which they have been able to achieve given the severity of 
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patients by DRG within each hospital could be audited for fairness and 
consistency.  Where patients have chronic or continuing care needs, few, if any, 
providers currently face any specific incentives to improve the level of 
symptoms or functioning of their clients.   
Sub-National Monopoly Public Purchasing Agencies 
Rationale 
Currently, there are no public purchasers below national level.  The rationale 
for having a number of geographic purchasing agencies in the public sector 
rests on the fact that different parts of the country have different health needs 
and inherit a different pattern of provision.  In addition, it is argued that the 
people in different parts of the country should be able to play some part in 
influencing the nature of the health care in their areas.  The response is to set 
up agencies or public authorities responsible for purchasing services for people 
living in different geographic areas.  Whether these organisations should be 
elected or appointed bodies (see below the section on abolishing the 
purchaser-provider split, below), their precise functions, their degree of 
decision-making autonomy and their size are then usually the subject of 
considerable debate, frequently followed by a series of reorganisations.  Most 
publicly funded health systems are organised on a hierarchical, geographic 
basis even when their funding is largely derived from the national level.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that the sub-national purchasers 
operate independently.  They usually work to a set of national health system 
goals.  They may also be regulated nationally, for example, by being required 
to purchase public hospital services according to a national, ‘efficient’ pricing 
schedule designed to minimise bi-lateral monopoly problems between 
purchasers and large hospitals and to reduce the transactions costs of the 
system. 
Previous experience of sub-national purchasing agencies in New Zealand 
Between 1983 and 1993, New Zealand’s hospital and community health 
services were increasingly planned and delivered by 14 geographically based, 
part locally elected AHBs, which gradually replaced the former hospital boards 
and their districts.  The AHBs were abolished as a result of the practical 
difficulties that they raised for central government (eg, conflict between the 
AHBs and the government), together with a theoretical critique of their 
incentives and accountability structures.  Although some of the problems and 
criticisms related to the fact that the AHBs were both purchasers and 
providers, others are still relevant to today’s system with its purchaser-
provider distinction.  Firstly, there were difficulties in determining the 
objectives against which the AHBs were to be held to account and in assessing 
whether these had been met, although over time more detailed performance 
targets were set for AHBs.  Secondly, the objectives of the AHBs sometimes 
conflicted with one another.  There was no single, simple measure of 
performance such as shareholder value in a private company.  Thirdly, the 
Crown’s ownership interest in the institutions of the publicly funded health 
sector sat uneasily with its strategic interest in health services.  Fourthly, there Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 48 
were conflicts between local and national accountability.  Locally elected AHB 
members, in particular, faced divided loyalties to government for the proper 
use of public money and to the local community for the improvement of local 
services.  The fact that AHBs were partly locally elected, but had no 
responsibility for raising even part of their revenue risked muddled lines of 
accountability and weak AHB incentives to contain their expenditure within 
budget.  Finally, it was unclear what incentives existed for good AHB 
performance and what sanctions, in the event of AHB failure, were available to 
the Health Minister beyond removing board members or cutting budgets.  The 
latter would simply penalise patients and was unlikely to be useable (see below 
for more on AHBs and vertical integration). 
Although the RHAs that replaced the AHBs were set up exclusively to be 
purchasers and without locally elected members, thereby mitigating two of the 
sources of conflicts of interest, many of the same difficulties remained.  RHAs 
developed their own interpretations of government policy and moved at 
different speeds towards policy goals.  Central government found it difficult to 
distinguish between legitimate variation based on regional circumstances and 
differences derived from RHA competence and commitment to implementing 
government strategic priorities.  Accountability and incentive regimes remained 
problem areas.  Just like the AHBs, the RHAs faced no threat of take-over from 
more efficient purchasers. 
The replacement of the RHAs by the HFA has left the same set of problems in 
place, apart from the difficulty of distinguishing legitimate differences in focus 
from variations in competence. 
Assessment of the case for sub-national purchasing agencies 
Conflict between local and central accountability does not necessarily 
invalidate policies to devolve responsibility to a more local level.  Twin, 
competing lines of accountability are possible and exist elsewhere (Klein and 
New, 1998).  For example, the UK NHS has had territorial health authorities 
since 1974 within a national service.  The difficulty of sustaining increased 
local democratic involvement in a centrally funded system, however, lies in the 
potential it brings for increased conflict between the national and locally 
elected representatives (see below).  Conflict may occur even with local 
appointees, but is likely to be more acute with elected representatives at local 
level and more difficult to resolve since appointees are upwardly accountable, 
ultimately.  Such conflict may be worthwhile if locally elected boards improve 
democracy in the wider sense of accountability, pluralistic debate, 
transparency, responsiveness to citizens and protection against arbitrary 
decisions (Klein and New, 1998).  However, direct electoral control is unlikely 
to do so, principally because of the likely low level of voter knowledge 
concerning the function of local health authorities and low level of interest in 
health system-specific elections.  As a result, those putting themselves forward 
for election in the health system tend to come from health-related interest 
groups.  Frequently, they are service providers.  There are also concerns that 
minority views may be lost as elected representatives attempt to respond to 
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Strong local accountability requires a central government which is willing to 
live with the consequences of local variation in decision making affecting the 
availability of different services across the country.  It also requires an effort to 
distinguish what the local purchaser is and is not required to account for to 
central government. 
Nevertheless, there remain legitimate concerns about unelected boards 
whether at regional, area or local levels.  Part of the solution to dissatisfaction 
with the current system of appointees and reservations about locally elected 
bodies, may lie in efforts to develop new ways of bridging the gap between the 
citizen and political representatives.  Such approaches are generally termed 
‘shared decision-making’.  They include innovations such as citizens’ juries, 
health panels, issues forums, deliberative polls, future search conferences and 
‘round tables’ (Stewart, 1996) and can operate in the context of a variety of 
different forms of health system organisation (see below for more on these 
techniques).  However, none of these techniques is perfect.  For example, while 
voting potentially allows everyone to take part, their participation is episodic 
and can only set a broad direction for a set of representatives.  By contrast, 
citizens’ juries offer in-depth participation in the decision-making process, but 
only for a small number of people chosen at random and over a small number 
of decisions.  Finally, no system will remove the potential for political conflict.  
As long as there is national funding for health care, upward accountability to 
the political centre will remain a priority which has to be managed ahead of 
local accountability to electors (see below for more on this in the section on 
vertical integration and the role of local representation). 
Primary Care-Based Devolved Purchasers 
Current primary care budget-holding in New Zealand 
Currently, the vast majority of public health and social care resources are 
deployed at national level by the HFA.  However, almost all Independent 
Practitioner Associations (IPAs) (independent GP groups, mostly organised as 
private limited companies) now hold at least some form of indicative budget 
for their members’ pharmaceutical and laboratory test expenditure, 
irrespective of whether their members are also capitated for their General 
Medical Services (GMS) expenditure.  About 20% of GPs are reimbursed for 
providing GMS via capitation contracts.  There are indications that such budget 
holding may have potential both to slow the rate of increase in spending in 
these demand-led service areas as well as to lead to new ways of improving the 
quality of primary care by allowing the IPA to use ‘savings’ to develop new 
services (Malcolm, 1998a).  However, before budget holding by groups in 
primary care can be generalised, there needs to be an agreed fair way of 
setting such budgets that can be applied to all primary care organisations. 
In addition to developments centred on IPAs, a range of other organisations 
providing primary care has developed since 1993.  There are so called ‘loose 
networks' of GPs and practices (Malcolm, Wright and Barnett, 1999).  These 
are the so-called ‘third sector’ primary care organisations (PCOs) (Crampton, 
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Maori primary care organisations vary widely in size, services delivered, level of 
funding, staffing and managerial sophistication (Crengle, 1999).  However, they 
are distinguished from the IPAs, which are GP owned and controlled in the 
main, by being community owned and controlled.  All groups tend to operate 
on a not-for-profit basis.  Third sector groups are a response by consumer and 
iwi groups to a desire to overcome the financial barriers and availability 
problems which characterise ‘main stream’ primary care for low income 
populations and to tackle the poor health status of Maori.  Maori primary care 
organisations tend to provide a wide variety of services including those of 
nurse practitioners, GPs, midwives, community mental health workers, health 
promoters, etc.  They tend to be block funded or on the basis of rough and 
ready capitation amounts and to use their resources to offer as much free care 
as possible.  Some of the primary care organisations have become involved in 
Integrated Care Pilots.  The ultimate vision of this sub-group of providers is to 
develop into integrated purchasing organisations capable of taking 
responsibility for an entire Maori population either in an area or by enrolment. 
Rationale for devolving purchasing responsibility and budgets to primary care 
The rationale for giving greater budgetary and purchasing responsibility to GPs 
and/or other primary care professionals is generally couched in the following 
terms: 
1. It either fully or partially reduces budgetary fragmentation by integrating 
primary care and other funding in order to reduce incentives to cost shift 
between sectors.  For example, there is no disincentive under current 
arrangements for GPs to refer patients to hospital outpatients or to take 
any interest in the cost of their patients’ hospital care. 
2. It sensitises professionals such as prescribers and referral agents (eg, 
community nurses and GPs) to the opportunity costs of their behaviour and 
encourages them to seek better ways of using resources, including 
providing more services themselves or reducing unnecessary use of 
resources, since they are able to retain any ‘surpluses’. 
3. If clinician-led, it brings a direct clinical (provider) perspective to bear on 
health care purchasing, allied to local knowledge of patients’ needs and 
providers’ capacities.  This is fundamentally different from purchasing 
undertaken by staff in public authorities. 
4. It can reduce the traditional dominance in the health system of specialist 
providers, particularly the acute hospitals, and stimulate the development 
of more cost-effective alternatives to hospital services. 
5. Like other forms of devolved purchasing, it allows decisions on the type of 
services to be provided to be taken nearer to the patient level.  This may 
lead to services that are more closely attuned to the needs of particular 
sub-groups in the community such as Maori. 
By contrast to systems such as the UK NHS, New Zealand has made relatively 
little use of devolving extensive budgets for purchasing to integrated 
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primary care organisations.  For example, none of the IPA budget holding 
schemes currently covers any hospital services.  Yet, there is circumstantial 
evidence from Malcolm’s study of South-Med IPA in Auckland that the low use 
of primary care services and pharmaceuticals observed in deprived areas is 
associated with a higher use of more costly hospital services (Malcolm, 1997).  
Similarly, work in Christchurch South suggests that well organised primary 
care may reduce the requirement for hospital admission especially among 
older people.  Malcolm’s work also suggests that, contrary to international 
evidence, improved access to primary health care may lead to some increase in 
utilisation of hospital or secondary health care services.  There is some 
evidence internationally that where a population has good access to primary 
care services and there are weak incentives for primary care in relation to 
referrals to secondary care, access to secondary care is not reduced.  One 
possible explanation for Malcolm’s finding in New Zealand is that relatively 
poorer groups of the population with poorer access to primary care have 
higher, unplanned utilisation of secondary care, while more affluent groups of 
the population with good access to primary health care are more likely to then 
access secondary care services like specialist consultations and elective 
treatments. 
Such insights do not appear at present to have influenced policy development, 
but would indicate the scope for improving access to primary care among 
deprived populations through budget holding.   
Of course, like all policy instruments, budget holding by GPs is likely to 
generate a range of costs and benefits in comparison with the status quo.  The 
most extensive experience and research have taken place in the UK are 
reviewed below. 
There are differences between the UK and New Zealand primary health care 
systems that should be borne in mind when looking at the UK experience of 
funding and any lessons to be drawn out for New Zealand.  In particular, the 
use of co-payments in New Zealand and budget holding by GP groupings (like 
Independent Practitioners’ Associations) rather than individual GP practices 
may dilute some of the incentives associated with UK GP fundholding.  Table 1 
summarises the NZ and UK primary health care arrangements: 
Table 1:  Primary care and subsidies in UK and NZ 
United Kingdom  New Zealand 
Almost exclusively public finance  Largely private finance for GP 
consultations - NZ$30-$50 charge for an 
unsubsidised GP visit 
GP visits and related primacy care free 
at point of use 
Subsidies for low income, high use 
patients and under 6 years of age, 
otherwise unregulated out-of-pocket 
payments 
Patients enrolled with GP, though free to 
change GP at any time 
No enrolment at present 
Pharmaceutical co-payment with 
exemptions 
Pharmaceutical co-payment with 
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United Kingdom  New Zealand 
All GPs paid a mix of capitation, fee-for-
service and incentive payments 
80% GPs fee-for-service; 20% some 
capitation 
Practice staff allowances  Partial cost of staff allowances 
All GPs in Primary Care Groups (since 
April 1999) 
80% of GPs in Independent 
Practitioners’ Associations 
90%-95% of GPs income public  40%-45% of GPs income public 
General Medical Subsidies and GP 
prescribing costs cash limited from April 
1999 
CHS cash limited.  GMS and 
pharmaceutical subsidies open-ended, 
but targeted.  Some pharmaceutical 
budget holding 
GPs independent contractors to the NHS  GPs independent though traditionally 
not in a contractual relationship with 
government 
GPs gatekeepers to secondary health 
care 
GPs gatekeepers to secondary health 
care 
Extensive experience with secondary 
care budget holding 
Limited fundholding (laboratory tests 
and GP pharmaceutical subsidies) 
 
The evidence on GP fundholding in the UK NHS 
Under GP fundholding, volunteer practices were granted a budget to purchase 
a limited range of elective hospital and community health services in addition 
to managing their prescribing and practice staff costs from a single budget.  
Fundholders were free to shift resources between any parts of the budget.  
Their budgets were deducted from the allocations of the local health 
authorities.  Fundholders could make ‘savings’ from their budgets which could 
be used either to purchase additional services from other providers or to 
improve facilities in the practice.  Generally, fundholders negotiated a share of 
the savings with the local health authority, although legally they were entitled 
to retain the whole amount.  Each fundholding practice was granted a fairly 
generous management allowance to cover the additional clerical and 
computing costs of managing the fund. 
Fundholding GPs’ reimbursement for the GMS that they provided to their 
enrolled patients remained separate from the fundholding scheme.  Thus 
fundholding GPs were not directly at risk financially for the management of 
their budgets.  Nonetheless, they were required to work to the budget as long 
as the practice remained in the scheme and they had strong incentives to make 
better use of their budgets in order to produce ‘savings’ for reinvestment. 
Table 2 distils the research evidence on the impact of fundholding from 1991 
to 1998 from a comprehensive review in Le Grand, Mays and Mulligan (1998).  
Most of the research focused on the processes of care and activity changes 
brought about by fundholding rather than changes in quality of care or 
patients’ experiences of services.  There is little doubt that GP fundholding, 
despite the criticism it received, fundamentally altered perceptions of how the 
NHS should be organised.  The balance of power between community 
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time since the advent of the NHS.  Although fundholding has now been 
abolished by the Labour Government elected in May 1997, all GPs in each area 
are now involved in driving the health care purchasing process through large 
collectives known as Primary Care Groups (PCGs).  In this sense, all GPs are 
now fundholders and the purchaser-provider separation has been retained.   
Fundholding encouraged secondary care providers to become more responsive 
to the needs of individual patients and their GPs, to improve communication 
between secondary and primary care and to offer fundholders’ patients shorter 
waiting times for elective surgery ( Le Grand, Mays and Mulligan, 1998).  It is 
generally accepted that this was brought about by the fact that fundholding 
GPs controlled resources which the hospitals and other specialist providers 
wished to retain rather than simply because the fundholders were, in some 
sense, ‘over-funded’.  Fundholding practices were comfortable taking 
responsibility for managing the budget for elective surgery for their patients.  
Fundholders purchased much of their elective surgery via cost per case 
contracts which were attractive to providers as an additional source of income 
alongside the cost and volume contracts used by the health authorities which, 
by contrast, shifted most of the financial risk onto the providers. 
Fundholding enabled GPs to widen and improve the range of primary care and 
other (eg, specialist outpatient) services provided at practice level on the 
grounds that services should become more accessible to patients.  
Fundholders were able to reduce the rate of increase of their prescribing 
expenditure more than non-fundholders, particularly in the first two years of 
the scheme.  Subsequently, the rate of increase of prescribing costs in the two 
groups appears to have converged though the fundholders’ absolute level of 
spending remained lower.  Fundholders were not generally higher prescribers 
before entering fundholding, so differential funding cannot explain these 
differences.  These broadly beneficial effects appear to have been generated 
without signs of systematic cost-shifting or ‘cream skimming’.  However, the 
latter is notoriously difficult to detect.  The fact that the GPs were not 
personally financially liable may have mitigated the pressure to discriminate 
against potentially high cost patients.  There was no sign in studies that 
fundholders’ patients made greater use of services outside the scope of the 
fundholding budget (eg, emergency admissions). 
Table 2: Summary of research evidence on the impact of general practice 
fundholding 
Evaluative criterion  Evidence 
Efficiency  No direct research on technical or 
allocative efficiency, but research on 
related areas. 
Prescribing costs  Considerable body of research showing 
reduced rate of growth of prescribing 
costs initially compared to non-
fundholders (FHs), probably due to 
greater use of generics and less repeat 
prescribing, but not sustained.  
However, absolute difference between 
FHs and non-FHs persisted.  Some non-
FHs able to reduce rate of growth 
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Evaluative criterion  Evidence 
Referral rates  Vast majority of studies showed little or 
no difference in trend of referrals 
compared with non-FH practices.  No 
sign of effects of budgetary pressure or 
price sensitivity.  No sign that FHs 
shifted costs to health authority (HA) by 
increasing emergency admissions 
(though they had an incentive to do so). 
Shift in location of care  Growth in practice level services (eg, 
using savings) with smaller growth in 
non-FH practices.  Mainly specialist 
outreach, but questions about cost-
effectiveness of practice level specialist 
clinics. 
Financial management and savings  Greater savings than HAs.  Underspent 
each year 1991-96.  Extent to which 
savings due to more efficient 
purchasing, economies, lower prices, 
more generous funding or healthier 
patients was not clear. 
Majority of savings spent on practice 
premises, facilities and staff rather than 
secondary care, thereby advantaging FH 
practices over non-FHs. 
Transaction costs  Consensus that transaction costs rose, 
though no direct data, due to more 
complex contracts than HAs and large 
number of small purchasers.  Crude 
estimates suggest that additional costs 
were more than FHs’ savings. 
Equity   
Level of funding  Evidence is mixed as to whether FHs 
were fairly funded versus HAs, though 
largely funded on basis of past 
spending.  Likely that position varied 
across regions, though data were poor. 
Access to care (‘two-tierism’)  Focus of most criticism and large 
amount of anecdote and case study 
information.  Best study shows 
significant difference in waiting times in 
favour of FHs though not possible to tell 
if non-FHs’ patients were worse off as a 
result.  (possibility of spill-over benefits 
for patients of non-fundholding GPs).  
Believed to be result of greater market 
power of FHs as marginal purchasers 
with protected budgets (see Table 4). 
‘Cream skimming’  Major concern initially, but no empirical 
studies.  Hard to study directly, but less 
likely than theory suggested. 
Quality  Little attention and no comparisons with 
HA. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 55 
Evaluative criterion  Evidence 
Quality of secondary care received  One study which showed little change 
pre/post FH. 
Quality improvements in contracts with 
providers 
Feature reported by FHs, HAs and 
locality commissioners, but FHs 
convinced that FH led to quality 
improvement in contracts (mainly better 
communication).  No direct studies of 
service quality. 
Quality of practice-based services  Increase in practice-level services (see 
above, Efficiency), but no empirical 
evidence on quality or substitution.   
Choice and responsiveness  FHs more willing to offer patients choice 
of hospital, etc, but patients indifferent 
to this.  Few patients knew if GP was FH 
or not.  No direct evidence about choice, 
but FHs reluctant to change hospitals. 
Accountability  Greater freedom than HAs.  
Accountability framework not introduced 
until 1994.  This was criticised since 
still no assessment of value-for-money of 
FHs’ purchasing. 
Source: Goodwin (1998); Mays, Mulligan and Goodwin (2000) 
On the other hand, the scheme had definite drawbacks.  Since it only covered 
elective hospital services such as outpatient referrals and inpatient surgery, 
there was scope for cost shifting.  However, there is no evidence that this 
occurred to any significant degree, perhaps because the GPs’ incomes were 
not directly affected by the way in which they managed their funds.  The 
scheme generated significant additional administrative costs since, despite the 
existence of multi-funds and fundholding consortia, many ‘funds’ were 
managed by single practices, which greatly increased the costs of the scheme.  
Not all fundholding practices proved to be effective change agents, despite the 
fact that a minority was outstandingly successful.  Simply, holding a budget 
could not guarantee that local providers would be responsive.  In addition, 
relatively few fundholders appeared to be price sensitive in relation to hospital 
care and they made only limited use of their ability to move contracts between 
providers to improve performance.  Since larger practices were able to enter 
the scheme, particularly in the first few years, and since these tended to be 
better resourced and in less deprived areas, the advantages accruing to 
fundholders tended to exacerbate underlying inequities between practices in 
more and less deprived localities.  This was a result of making the scheme 
voluntary and open initially to larger group practices only.  Thus this effect was 
not intrinsic to GP fundholding. 
Finally, fundholders were shown to be better at micro-level, ‘spot purchasing’ 
in response to the needs of individual patients than at bringing about more 
strategic local service developments. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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The evidence from extensions to GP fundholding in the UK NHS 
Although fundholding remained controversial (especially because of the 
accusation that it led to a ‘two-tier’ NHS), it was perceived to be sufficiently 
innovative and to have sufficient potential to be extended beyond elective 
services in a number of pilot projects.  In addition, groups of non-fundholders 
began to work together to influence the purchasing of the local health authority 
in locality or GP commissioning groups with indicative or ‘shadow’ budgets.  The 
more that such schemes resembled fundholding (ie, the more the practices 
were given devolved budgets over which they had control and could negotiate 
their own contracts with providers), the more likely they were to bring about 
the service changes they desired (Glennerster, Cohen and Bovell, 1998).   
So called, ‘total purchasing pilots’ (TPPs) in which experienced fundholding 
practices or small groups of fundholding practices (average population size 
30,000) took on responsibility for potentially all the hospital and community 
health services (Personal Health Services minus GMS in New Zealand terms) 
for their enrolled patients were the most ambitious extensions of fundholding.  
TPPs could choose which services they wished to take responsibility for, 
beyond the scope of the fundholding scheme.  Each pilot was a sub-committee 
of the local health authority since the additional resources deployed by the TPP 
remained the legal responsibility of the health authority.  As with standard 
fundholding, the GPs were not at personal financial risk under total 
purchasing, but, again, had incentives to make ‘savings’.   
The pilots demonstrated that volunteer TPP practices were motivated by their 
extended budgetary responsibility to develop a range of ‘managed care’ 
responses to improving the use of hospital resources, such as utilisation review 
by discharge planning nurses or investment in nursing home beds as a 
substitute for extended acute hospital stays (May, Goodwin, Killoran and 
Malbon, 1998; Goodwin, Mays, McLeod, Malbon and Raftery, 1998).  TPPs 
further demonstrated that they were able to alter the pattern of use of 
unplanned, acute inpatient services by using such techniques where this was 
one of their priorities.  In the first ‘live’ year of total purchasing (1996/97), 28 
out of the 53 pilots had one or more purchasing objectives either to reduce 
acute emergency admissions or reduce length of stay.  Twenty-one of the 28 
performed better than matched local practice populations and the remainder 
of the health authority population in this regard (Raftery and McLeod, 1999).  
For example, if rates of admission in all three populations were rising, the TPP 
rate was rising the most slowly, or static, or falling.  Thirteen of the TPPs had a 
main objective to reduce their emergency admission rate and ten were 
‘successful’ (ie, they performed better than their comparators).  Sixteen had a 
main purchasing objective to reduce length of acute hospital stay and 9 were 
‘successful’ (ie, they performed better than their comparators).  However, most 
of the TPPs were unable to negotiate the length of stay-sensitive pricing which 
was necessary to be able to shift resources out of the acute sector and improve 
overall resource use.  Acute providers were reluctant to see any reduction in 
their incomes and health authorities generally refrained from intervening to 
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Although the TPP evaluation shows that GPs can be successful in altering the 
use of services outside their direct influence as clinicians, where this is a 
particular priority, the same study also showed that the GP purchasers as a 
whole were most sure-footed in purchasing and developing services which were 
close to primary care and community health services.  TPPs found negotiating 
service changes with specialist hospital providers more taxing, particularly in 
mental health (Mays, Goodwin, Killoran and Malbon, 1998).  This suggests that 
there may be a limit to the range of services which GP purchasers should be 
given responsibility for negotiating.  If so, this poses a dilemma, since, to avoid 
cost shifting, it is generally argued that devolved purchaser-providers should 
have as near to a fully integrated budget as possible. 
In the long run, the larger TPPs appeared to be more successful in bringing 
about desired service changes and developments than the smaller, single 
practice projects, but it took the multi-practice pilots considerably longer to 
become sufficiently organised to do so.  In the first, ‘live’ year, the small 
projects were significantly more successful (Goodwin, Mays, McLeod, Malbon 
and Raftery, 1998).  As with fundholding, having budgetary autonomy was 
necessary for the practices to be taken seriously by providers, but it was not 
sufficient for effective purchasing.  The TPPs needed to develop a robust 
management infrastructure, particularly information systems and means for 
linking practices and engaging as many GPs as possible in decision making on 
priorities and resource use (Bevan, Baxter and Bachmann, 1998). 
The evidence from IPA budget holding in New Zealand 
IPAs have the advantage over developments such as GP fundholding in the NHS 
of having developed spontaneously rather than following a government design 
so that they are owned and run by the GPs themselves.  However, it has meant 
that primary care budget holding has tended to become associated with GP-
dominated organisations.  They are changing the face of New Zealand general 
practice rapidly away from single handed practitioners working in competition 
with one another to larger groups capable of taking on greater responsibility 
for more integrated forms of health care delivery.  Seventy per cent or more of 
GPs are currently involved in budget holding for their pharmaceutical 
expenditure.  A lower, but rising proportion has become involved in budget 
holding for the costs of their laboratory tests and investigations (Malcom, 
1998a).  However, there is little or no budget holding for hospital outpatient 
day case or inpatient services.  Thus incentives to cost shift remain, in theory.  
Budget holding generally takes place through IPAs with the budget held at IPA 
rather than practice level.  IPAs’ budgets for laboratory and pharmaceutical 
expenditure have largely been set on a historical basis with in-built 
adjustments for growth trends and additional cash (at least initially) for 
‘development costs’ (ie, the costs of implementing budget holding at IPA level) 
(Malcolm, 1998b).  Thus budgets appear to have been generous in most cases 
and possibly higher than previous spending.  In most budget holding ventures, 
the IPAs have been able to keep all or a significant proportion of any ‘savings’ 
made to provide additional services to their patients.  Schemes vary in terms 
of who carries the risk of over-spending.  In many cases, the IPA has not borne 
the risk of over-spending. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Some concerns have been expressed that the former RHAs and latterly the HFA 
have been left with potentially all or most of the risk and that the IPAs have 
been granted access as local monopolies to all the potential ‘savings’ plus the 
opportunity to make them by cost shifting and with no clear indication of how 
the savings should be used.  Critics have argued that such imbalanced 
arrangements are inevitably ineffective in terms of the weak economic 
incentives facing the GPs and the danger that the national purchaser will face 
cost over-runs.  Some proponents have argued that IPAs cannot ethically 
manage the full risk, that the GPs involved are not primarily motivated by 
personal gain and that they do not need to bear full risk in order to generate 
improvements in resource use (Malcolm, Wright and Barnett, 1999 and 2000).  
Others have pointed out that IPAs need time to develop before assuming major 
responsibility for managing financial risk.  Current arrangements for IPA 
budget holding are similar to GP fundholding and total purchasing pilots in the 
UK in that risk is shared with the main purchaser/funder on terms 
advantageous to the GPs in order to encourage GPs to take part and to begin 
to test out the potential of budget holding.  Over time, it may be feasible and 
desirable to make the IPAs bear more of the financial risk and to move from 
historic budgets to fairer forms of capitation.  In the meantime, the effects of 
IPA budget holding have been important in identifying the scope for further 
policy change to deliver better, more-cost effective care, rather than 
representing the end-point of policy development.  For example, care would 
have to be taken if budget holding in primary care were to be extended to other 
organisations (eg, Maori primary care providers) without considering the 
potential for cost shifting if budgets continue not to include any allowance for 
hospital services. 
The most discussed effect of IPA budget holding has been the ability of many 
IPAs to make ‘savings’ in their laboratory and prescribing budgets.  Large 
savings in laboratory expenditure have been reported, particularly in the first 
year of budget holding (eg, Pegasus IPA in Christchurch reported a 23% 
‘saving’ against its baseline by reducing unnecessary tests accompanied by a 
reduction in inter-practice variation in spending).  It is not clear how 
sustainable these ‘savings’ have been.  The larger number of IPAs with 
extensive experience of pharmaceutical budget holding appeared to have been 
able to save between 5% and 10% on the best available estimates against 
national upward trends in spending in 1995/96 (Malcolm, 1997).  These 
‘savings’ are more modest than the laboratory savings reported, but greater 
than fundholding ‘savings’ on prescribing in the UK.  Given the difficulty of 
establishing the true level of pre-budget holding expenditure, it is wise to 
assume that savings have been smaller than some of the more spectacular 
results reported. 
An indirect and, in the long run, possibly more significant consequence of 
granting budgets to IPAs for their practitioners’ laboratory and pharmaceutical 
expenditure has been to reveal big variations both between IPAs and between 
practices within IPAs in their spending on these services (Malcolm, 1998c) 
(See Table 3).  These differences appear to be due to volume rather than price 
differences.  The differences seem to be unrelated to the needs of the patients 
served since more deprived populations tend to be lower utilisers of laboratory 
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services.  For example, research comparing practices within the South-Med IPA 
in Auckland indicates that lower use of primary care resources in more 
deprived areas appeared to be associated with higher use of the public 
hospitals (Malcolm, 1997).  Budget holding appears to have had relatively little 
effect on reducing these variations between practices so far.  Since there does 
not appear to be any evidence that the higher use practices are offering a 
better standard of health care (in fact, if anything, the reverse is likely to be 
true), the implication is that there is considerable scope for providing more 
and better services by reallocating spending between practices and between 
IPAs.  Alternatively, money could be used elsewhere in the health system.  The 
important point is that IPA budget holding provides a means of redistributing 
resources between IPAs, between practices and between different sectors of 
health care (eg, between secondary and primary care). 
Table 3: Average mean total and percentage changes in expenditure of the 
bottom and top members of ProCare, South-Med and Pegasus IPAs, 1995-96 
  Mean total cost, 
1995 in $000 
Mean total cost, 
1996 in $000 
Percentage change 
ProCare       
Mean   198.9  174.8  –12 
Bottom 15  43.5  26.8  –38 
Bottom 30  51.0  42.4  –17 
Top 15  402.9  362.2  –10 
Top 30  452.6  409.0  –10 
South-Med       
Mean  207.9  191.4  –8 
Bottom 10  53.7  39.5  –27 
Top 10  374.6  359.9  –4 
Pegasus       
Mean  240./1  214.2  –14 
Bottom 15  61.6  47.8  –22 
Bottom 30  105.7  82.0  –23 
Top 15  510.9  435.7  –15 
Top 30  440.4  379.2  –14 
Source:  Malcolm (1997) 
A third consequence of IPA budget holding has been the development of 
practice guidelines and personalised feed back to GPs on their prescribing and 
laboratory test use organised by the IPA in order to help realise ‘savings’ 
(though there is no intrinsic reason why such information cannot be provided 
to non-budget-holding GPs).  This is a marked change in the highly 
individualistic culture of general practice and shows that incentives to change 
resource use can be generated even when money is used to improve patient 
services rather than to improve GP remuneration.  This indicates that IPAs as 
private entities can potentially manage public funds to achieve public goals.  A Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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recent survey of IPA leaders indicates that there is broad support not only for 
capitation budgets for laboratory tests and pharmaceuticals, but also for GMS 
payment (formerly fees for items of service) (Malcolm, Wright and Barnett, 
2000).  There is also support in some quarters for IPAs to experiment with 
taking budgetary responsibility for hospital outpatient and elective inpatient 
services on the grounds that GPs’ referral behaviour is directly responsible for 
the use made of these services. 
Overall assessment of the pros and cons of devolved budget holding by GP practices 
and other primary care providers 
Having reviewed experience in the NHS with fundholding and in New Zealand 
with budget holding by IPAs, it is possible to make an overall assessment of 
the strengths and weaknesses of devolving budgetary responsibility to GPs and 
other primary care organisations (PCOs).  Table 4, below, summarises the 
arguments for and against primary care budget holding. 
Table 4:  Potential pros and cons of primary care budget holding 
Potential pros  Potential cons 
Enables clinical and resource use 
decisions to be brought together at the 
same point in the system as primary 
care doctors and nurses can act to 
manage demand within capitated 
budgets – brings GPs into the 
‘mainstream’ of resource management 
building on their traditional role as 
referral agents. 
Reduces patients’ trust in their GPs as 
their advocates because of their new 
rationing role on behalf of government. 
Potential for more efficient use of overall 
resources because GPs and other 
primary care workers face incentives to 
make ‘savings’ to use to develop new 
services and to substitute less for more 
costly forms of care (eg, averting 
hospital admission through using tools 
of ‘managed care’).  Bureaucratic 
purchasers do not face such clear 
incentives. 
Risk of ‘cream skimming’ of high cost 
patients if PCOs are financially at risk 
for budgets.  Risk-adjusted capitation 
formulae cannot totally remove this 
possibility, however sophisticated, 
though much depends on resources 
available per patient.  However, budgets 
can be set over more than one year to 
smooth out demand fluctuations. 
GPs and other primary care workers 
‘closer to patients’ than large 
purchasers and knowledgeable about 
local providers. 
Risk of ‘under-service’ or quality 
reductions as PCOs try to make ‘savings’ 
to re-deploy.  Important to monitor what 
is being provided to patients or allow 
them some choice of PCOs. 
Alters the balance of power between 
hospitals/specialists and extramural or 
generalist care. 
As private, self-employed contractors, 
GPs may be regarded as too self-
interested to be charged with managing 
large amounts of public money.  
However, budgets could be allocated to 
PCOs which, in turn, contract with GPs. 
Enables one group of clinicians to 
develop an organisation which can exert 
influence on another group of clinicians 
rather than bureaucrats in purchasing 
agencies. 
Risk of cost-shifting onto other budgets 
unless PCO given extensively or fully 
integrated budget (though they may not 
be capable of managing full range of 
purchasing). Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Potential pros  Potential cons 
Enables some patient choice of 
purchaser if patients free to enrol with 
any practice/PCO. 
Tends to increase the number of 
purchasers which may lead to 
fragmentation and inconsistency of 
decision making, as well as higher 
transaction costs.  Higher costs may be 
judged as outweighing potential 
benefits. 
Leads to greater GP collegiality, 
accountability for resource use, peer 
review of performance based on shared 
information systems. 
May encourage GPs and related staff to 
offer services which they are not best 
placed to provide (ie, bias towards 
primary care solutions). 
  Most GPs are not interested in a wider 
purchasing role so organisations will 
tend to be run by a few practitioners. 
  GP-led organisations not good 
traditionally at patient and public 
involvement, but this would argue for a 
different form of more broadly based 
PCO to receive the budget. 
  Unless on large scale, PCOs may lack 
expertise to act as effective counter 
weight to influential provider 
organisations.  If large scale, may lead 
to bi-lateral monopoly problems in 
primary care which currently exist 
mainly in secondary sector. 
 
Prerequisites for primary care budget holding 
There are a number of prerequisites for effective GP or primary care-based 
budget holding which do not apply to the simpler regional or district 
population-based approaches to purchasing (see above).  In all cases, the 
prerequisites become more taxing if PCOs are directly in competition with one 
another.   
Patient enrolment 
The first is a system of patient enrolment with a specific budget holding 
organisation, preferably for a defined period of time.  The easiest way to 
organise this is normally to encourage patients to enrol with a particular GP or 
group practice or PCO which is part of the budget holding group, although it is 
possible to separate enrolment with the budget holder from enrolment with a 
specific practitioner.  The issue of the accuracy of enrolment data depends on 
the degree to which the budget holder is risk bearing, the size of the risk pool 
(ie, the size of the enrolled population) and whether the PCOs are in 
competition with one another.   
Fair method for setting a capitation budget 
The second prerequisite is a fair mechanism for setting the capitation budget 
of each budget holding entity.  It is important that the PCO can relate its 
activities reasonably closely (if not perfectly) to a defined set of enrolees.  
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healthy as possible by the most cost-effective blend of professional staff time 
and other resources at its disposal.  Capitation, in whole or in part, appears to 
be supported by most of the IPAs as their preferred method of financing 
primary care in the future rather than fees-for-service in order to ensure fair 
funding between PCOs and, thereby, practitioners (Malcolm, Wright and 
Barnett, 2000).  However, like all funding methods it creates some undesirable 
incentives; in this case, to under-provide services and to enrol individuals with 
above-average health.  Hence the need for a means of risk-adjusting capitation 
payments.  The sophistication of the approach depends on how large the 
population is, the extent to which financial risk is being borne by the PCO and 
the precise incentives facing the individual practitioners (for example, to 
under-serve their patients).  Generally, systems of GP budget holding have 
used relatively simple approaches to budget estimation based on aggregate 
data on the socio-demographic and/or health characteristics of the population 
served, as against the methods of individual risk-rating used by US managed 
care organisations to estimate the likely future costs of individual enrolees.  
Although capitating the budget holding entity does not, in itself, determine the 
method of remuneration of the health professionals, it makes it difficult, but 
not impossible, to manage fee-for-service reimbursement against a fixed 
budget constraint.  In these circumstances, it may make greater sense to put 
teams of professionals onto capitated reimbursement arrangements with fees 
for particular activities which the PCO particularly wishes to encourage. 
Open enrolment 
The third prerequisite, which is familiar to those who have considered the 
implementation of competitive managed care organisations (see below), is for 
open enrolment; ie, a budget holding group cannot refuse any patient who 
wishes to enrol.  This supports the effect of a fair system of capitation and 
should largely prevent discrimination against potentially high cost, sick 
patients, but cannot remove it entirely.  The alternative is to make PCOs 
geographic monopolies and require them to look after all the patients within a 
specific areas.  The extent to which high cost patients require protection 
depends, in part, on the next prerequisite – the level of risk borne by the PCO. 
Risk and surplus sharing agreements 
The fourth prerequisite is an agreement on the responsibility for bearing 
financial risk and using any surplus or ‘savings’ generated by more efficient 
demand management or purchasing.  One of the consequences of GPs 
coalescing into larger groupings is that it makes it feasible for them to bear 
financial risk in a way which is not possible with solo practitioners.  Yet the 
IPAs have shown reluctance, to date, to bear financial risk.  Seventeen of 28 
respondents to a recent survey of all 30 IPAs in August 1998 were opposed to 
taking on the risk of going over budget (a lower proportion than in earlier 
surveys) and 26/28 were opposed to retaining savings as personal benefits 
(Malcolm, Wright and Barnett, 1999 and 2000).  This is similar to the position 
of managed care organisations in the USA, few of which have succeeded in 
persuading clinical teams to take on all the financial risk despite strong 
competitive pressures (Roberts, 1998).  Despite this, there is ample scope for 
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groups or other PCOs and the HFA.  These can include fairly simple ‘stop-loss’ 
arrangements which protect the PCO from costs over a certain limit per patient 
per year or blended payment systems in which the bulk of reimbursement 
comes from capitation and the balance from fee-for-service and incentive 
payments.  Indeed, risk-sharing rather than full risk transfer to the PCO may be 
preferable on the grounds that it should reduce the incentive to under-service 
and risk selection.  In this way, the doctors and others can be persuaded to 
enter the scheme while they retain a level of resource consciousness that 
should encourage more efficient deployment of resources.  The larger the 
organisations, the easier it should be for them to manage financial risk for a 
reasonably wide range of services, but this would inevitably reduce their 
sensitivity to local variations in population needs. 
Wide budgetary scope 
The fifth prerequisite, is that the PCO accepts budgetary responsibility for a 
wide range of primary and secondary service use by its patients.  Otherwise, 
there is always a risk of cost-shifting.  For example, a PCO might reduce its 
prescribing costs in order to invest in other primary care services which it can 
provide directly and be reimbursed for, but do so by referring patients 
unnecessarily to hospital if secondary care were outside the scope of its 
budget. 
Options for developing GP or primary care organisation budget holding 
The options set out below differ in terms of the degree of integration of the 
budget which is managed by the GP-led or primary care-based organisation.  It 
is assumed that, in each case, the budget holding consortium of practices, or 
IPA, or Maori provider or other new form of primary care organisation, has a 
cash-limited budget derived from a needs-weighted capitation formula.  The 
HFA enters into contracts with the consortia or IPAs or primary care 
organisation.  Each primary core organisation can then decide how it wishes to 
relate to, and reimburse, the range of providers it requires to deliver the 
package of services and standards set out in its HFA contract.  Thus an 
organisation might employ certain staff, sub-contract on a capitation basis with 
other teams and pay for certain services on a fee-for-service basis.  Patients 
would normally be able to choose the budget holding group with which they 
wish to be registered and, within the group, the practice team/practitioners 
(including nurse practitioner) who would be their principal source of GMS.  In 
certain circumstances, such as remote rural areas, PCOs might be 
geographically-based including responsibility for all people in a catchment area 
without the need for enrolment.  Local monopolies are permissible as long as 
groups do not exceed a particular percentage of the patients in an area.  
Financial risk is shared with the HFA (or possibly other local budget holding 
groups) on a clear basis and, likewise, any ‘savings’ made from efficient 
purchasing and budgetary management are shared.  Risk sharing might 
include the retention of some elements of fee-for-service payment for specific 
services.  Very costly tertiary services might be excluded altogether.  The more 
risk the entity assumes, the more of the ‘savings’ it could retain to use as it 
saw fit.  A decision would need to be taken as to whether, and if so, on what 
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made.  The population size of the entity will depend on local circumstances, 
the degree of risk sharing and the scope of purchasing responsibility, but is 
unlikely to be smaller than 30-40,000 people. 
Important policy issues raised by a number of the models of PCO budget 
holding concern the relation between the different funding streams within Vote: 
Health and, particularly, the distinction between the means-tested subsidy 
regime for GMS and universal free at the point of service hospital and related 
services.  There is inconsistency in having substantial user fees for most 
patients in primary care (which has the potential to contain demand for 
hospital care) and no user fees in the public hospitals.  Budget holding PCOs 
would be sure to wish to address this at local level in order to make the best 
use of their resources. 
Assuming no increase in public funding for health care, it is possible for GP 
groups and PCOs to be required to administer the current level of subsidy for 
GP visits which is targeted, at present, on those on low incomes with 
Community Service Cards; ie, their capitation budgets would be based partly 
on their patients’ historic aggregate use of subsidies).However, as GP 
consultations are significantly privately financed under current arrangements 
(ie, around half the New Zealand population pays fully for GP consultations 
through cash payments or private health insurance), capitating existing 
subsidies increases the risk of ‘cream-skimming’ and will limit the extent to 
which government can exert influence over general practice through payment 
mechanisms.   
Alternatively, and far preferably, PCOs could be funded on the basis of their 
needs-weighted ‘fair’ share of the total Personal Health budget.  They would 
then be free to use their budgets as they saw fit which could include widening 
the scope of free-at-the-point-of-use GP services, particularly if they could 
potentially make compensating ‘savings’ in their patients’ use of hospital 
services.  This would mitigate some of the drawbacks of the current system 
that is predicated on the assumption that all those on low incomes take up 
Community Service Cards (CSCs).  It is known that this does not happen.  
Widening the scope of free GP services would also reduce the inequity in the 
current system in which those with incomes just above the CSC threshold pay 
as much for GP services as people with high incomes.  The current pattern of 
GMS subsidy is also justified on the basis that user charges are necessary and 
effective in deterring inappropriate or trivial use of the GP’s time.  
Unfortunately, it appears that user charges also reduce appropriate and 
inappropriate demand equally, making them both inefficient and inequitable 
(Chalkley and Robinson, 1997).  An unfortunate corollary of the deterrent effect 
of GP visit fees for those with low incomes is the likelihood that such people 
will go directly to the hospital rather than visiting their GP, thereby increasing 
the inappropriate use of health services, and at greater cost.  By making more 
flexible use of a more integrated budget, GP groups could develop patterns of 
provision free-at-the-point-of-use, which reduce the current incentives to by-
pass the GP and make better use of overall resources.  They might also be 
freed to pilot more sensitive systems of cost-sharing that, for example, relate 
charges more closely to income and/or inversely to the cost-effectiveness of 
drugs and treatments. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Non-hospital budget holding 
Under this model, GP groups or other PCOs take budgetary responsibility for 
primary (including GMS and practice nurse costs) and community health 
services, GP prescribing and routine laboratory tests and investigations, but 
not for hospital care.  This is similar to most current IPA budget holding 
arrangements, but the capitation budget would include GMS and other primary 
care services, so that the GPs would be remunerated from the capitation sum 
which is not the case with current IPAs.  It would be up to the group to decide 
the basis of allocation of funds to individual GPs, perhaps influenced by 
government policy objectives.  A strong contender would be to allocate funds to 
practices according to some mixture of capitation, an allowance for practice 
expenses and additional payments dependent on achieving specific targets set 
by government (eg, changes towards more cost-effective prescribing, higher 
immunisation coverage, etc).  This combination of payment methods should 
balance the risks of over- and under-treatment inherent in either fee-for-service 
or purely capitated environments.  If capitation became the dominant source of 
GP income, this should encourage GPs and the wider practice team to develop 
more preventive health and ‘wellness’ services. 
While this option would have the advantage of giving GPs and primary care 
workers responsibility for the resources which their own clinical behaviour 
directly affects and which they probably understand best, it does nothing to 
encourage GPs to consider their patients’ wider use of hospital and other 
specialist services.  Thus there is the risk of cost shifting through referrals 
which are costless to the PCO.  The contract between the HFA and the GP 
group/IPA/PCO could include a performance element related to maintaining 
hospital utilisation rates within some acceptable range, allowing for the age, 
sex and socio-economic profile of the population served in order to ameliorate 
this potential limitation.  However, it would not be possible to eliminate the 
risk of cost-shifting fully without extending the budget to include hospital 
services (see below). 
As well as being current HFA policy for groups with a minimum population of 
30,000 (HFA, 1998), non-hospital service budget holding appeared to have the 
support of 70% of IPAs leaders in a recent survey (Malcolm, Wright and 
Barnett, 2000). 
Although this model is presented here as an option for developing devolved 
purchasing of health services, it represents primarily a model of a capitated 
provider organisation sharing risk with the national purchaser (the HFA). 
Primary care and chronic disease management 
Under this option, GP consortia or IPAs or PCOs would take responsibility for 
budgets covering primary care and related community health services, GP 
prescribed drugs and laboratory tests as in the previous model, but with the 
addition of budgets for integrated health and social care for patients with 
specific chronic diseases such as asthma, diabetes, coronary heart disease, 
etc., or for particular vulnerable client groups such as people over 75 years of 
age.  Where evidence-based ‘care pathways’ or comprehensive patterns of care 
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securing such care which they would provide themselves at practice level 
and/or buy in from other providers as necessary.  For example, the PCO might 
contract with specialists to review their management of patients with chronic 
conditions and to provide them with continuing medical education, while 
retaining control over the care of these patients in a ‘case management’ 
capacity.  The approach would be similar to a number of the current Integrated 
Care Pilots, such as Elder Care Canterbury, which attempt to ensure less 
fragmented patterns of care for people with long term health or dependency 
needs. 
This model would substantially reduce the scope for cost-shifting without 
giving the GPs and co-workers purchasing responsibility for services in which 
they might have no relative advantage as purchasers over the HFA or others.  
The approach should stimulate the development of a range of non-hospital care 
for patients with chronic conditions. 
Fully integrated budget holding 
Under this option, GP groups or other PCOs would take on budgetary 
responsibility for all, or nearly all, publicly funded health services for an 
enrolled population.  This is similar to the arrangements for Primary Care 
Groups (PCGs) in the NHS in England, although the PCGs are geographic 
monopolies, whereas this need not necessarily be the case in New Zealand.  It 
is likely that the enrolled population would need to be at least 50-60,000 to be 
able to manage this extent of risk.  Highly specialised service purchasing could 
continue to be managed at national level by the HFA. 
This model of budget holding is the strongest, in theory.  Its 
comprehensiveness would guard against incentives to cost-shift since the GP 
group or PCO would be responsible for a very wide range of services.  On the 
other hand, the scope of budgetary responsibility (even with some risk-sharing) 
would tend to necessitate a fairly large population base, thereby reducing the 
likelihood that patients would be able to choose their purchaser in a number of 
less populous areas of the country. 
In the August 1998 survey of IPA leaders, 11/24 supported taking on budgets 
to purchase secondary care, six were opposed to it and seven were undecided 
(Malcolm, Wright and Barnett, 2000).  This suggests that a substantial 
minority of the current IPAs would be interested in piloting this form of budget 
holding. 
Conclusions on primary care-based devolved purchasing 
There is sufficient encouraging, if not revolutionary, evidence from New 
Zealand and the UK to indicate that primary care organisations involving GPs 
have considerable potential to improve resource use by building on their 
unique status as integrated purchaser-providers separate from the hospital 
sector.  The ability of primary care-based purchasers to make ‘savings’ and to 
re-invest them appears to offer more powerful incentives to improve services 
than those which currently face other purchasers (eg, public authorities).  It 
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financially to be motivated to make better use of resources, but can be 
influenced by professional incentives as well, as long as the additional costs of 
managing budgets are reimbursed.  This is in line with other international 
evidence which shows that health systems that have more developed systems 
of primary care tend to produce better health outcomes at lower cost 
(Starfield, 1998).   
However, further developments of primary care budget holding in New Zealand 
raise the issue of the status of GPs as private practitioners operating small 
businesses and receiving only limited public subsidies based mainly on fee-for-
service.  This model of practice does not sit easily with a move towards larger 
PCOs based on enrolled populations, funded via capitation and involving the 
services of a team of primary care professionals.  It may also limit their ability 
to manage large amounts of public funds for health services.  As long as 
New Zealand GPs remain largely dependent on private fee income and act as 
private entrepreneurs who can set their own fee rates without any external 
regulation, there will continue to be those who are extremely reluctant to see 
them allocated budgets which cover their patients’ use of hospital services, 
despite the fact that this might guard against cost shifting.  There will be 
reservations about the incentives on the GPs to under-serve their patients in 
order to make a ‘profit’.  This is in contrast to the UK NHS where GPs are 
legally in the same position (as independent contractors), but receive over 90% 
of their incomes from the NHS.  This analysis suggests that, ultimately, the 
development of extensive PCO budget holding involving GPs is connected with 
changes to the way in which GMS is subsidised and the ways in which GPs are 
paid. 
This section has shown that there is a range of possible models for primary 
care-based budget holding, related, in the main, to the scope of the services 
included in the budget and the size of population required to manage risk.  In 
addition, it is possible to apply models to the general population or to specific 
sub-groups such as Maori and Pacific Islanders where they might be based on 
iwi, pan-iwi organisations or other community groups.  Each model can be 
judged in relation to a range of performance criteria such, as its potential 
effect on: 
• Management and transaction costs; 
• Cost control and cost shifting; 
• Sensitivity to local needs; 
• Equity; 
• Efficiency of resource use; 
• Accountability to local people and upwards to central agencies; 
• Effect on the stability of providers. 
Assessed in this way, no single model appears likely to be superior on a priori 
grounds (Smith, 1997).  Each model has a distinctive pattern of potential 
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Thus larger primary care-based purchasers will be able to manage a wider 
range of clinical risks, will reduce incentives to cost-shift, will have greater 
purchasing leverage, the ability to secure access to a higher level of purchasing 
expertise and should generate lower transaction costs.  Between them, they 
may produce less variation in decisions about the level and nature of services 
to be purchased than the greater number of smaller purchasers.  However, 
they will tend to become local monopolies, thereby reducing patient choice of 
purchaser.  In addition, they are unlikely to be as sensitive to variations in 
needs between areas as smaller scale purchasers.   
Larger groupings may also find it more difficult to encourage individual 
practitioners to identify with the collectivity and to develop incentives for 
clinical change at the practice level.  The larger groups are likely to find it 
more challenging to prevent ‘free rider’ problems in which individual GPs 
benefit from the economies of scale produced by the multi-practice 
organisation (eg, by reducing their practice support services’ costs) without 
participating in the management of a shared, cash limited budget. 
While the wider scope of the budget managed by the larger groups should 
reduce the incentive to shift costs to other organisations, it is likely to mean 
that primary care professionals are required to purchase services with which 
they have relatively little personal knowledge or familiarity (though some 
models would exclude certain specialised services).  In these circumstances, 
they are likely to rely heavily on the expertise of their advisers and managers.  
This, in turn, might tend to undermine the case for involving primary care 
professionals in purchasing in the first place since the organisation may be 
vulnerable to the same risks of poor performance as more bureaucratic forms 
of purchaser organisation. 
In addition to these general trade-offs, local circumstances, such as the 
distribution of the population and the configuration of local providers, are 
likely to have a strong influence on the choice of the ‘best’ model of primary 
care-based purchasing. 
National or Sub-National Competing Purchasers 
Purchaser Competition 
One alternative to a monopoly national purchaser is to allow individuals to 
choose between a number of purchasers (or insurers) that offer comprehensive 
publicly-funded coverage for health and disability services (ie, at least similar 
to the current publicly-funded coverage).  This is an individually driven version 
of the employer-driven competition between private insurers generated by the 
1999 changes to the financing of accident compensation.  Early reports 
suggest that the advent of competition has reduced prices paid by employers 
markedly.  However, it is difficult to compare the pre- and post-reform 
situation since the move to insurer competition has been accompanied by 
changes to accident insurance itself.  In addition, the employers opting for 
private insurers in the early stages are unlikely to be typical of New Zealand 
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This approach would involve purchaser competition, in which a number of 
purchasers compete to attract individuals or families, who enrol with the 
purchaser of their choice (there is also potential scope for purchaser 
competition without individual choice, eg, through franchising local monopolies 
to different purchasers) bringing with them a ‘voucher’ or capitation fee 
calculated by the government to equate to their fare share of the total public 
health care budget.  Once enrolled, the purchaser is responsible for an 
enrolee’s health and disability care.  Such purchasers are likely to be non-
governmental organisations although this is not inevitably so.  They would bear 
all or most of the financial risk associated with providing comprehensive 
coverage for health and disability services, thereby transferring responsibility 
for such risk from the Crown to themselves.  The Crown would continue in its 
roles as financier and deepen its role as regulator and monitor of the system. 
The assumption underpinning this approach is that competition between 
purchasers for enrolees will produce incentives for better performance and that 
current monopoly purchase arrangements fail to ensure that purchasers have 
adequate incentives, skills, or resources to make efficient resource allocation 
decisions.  Consumers will make choices about which purchaser to enrol with 
based on the quality of care offered by a purchaser, and potentially also on the 
basis of the service coverage offered and the premium charged (though this 
depends on the design features of any model of purchaser competition).  In 
theory, those purchasers that offer high quality care at a lower price will 
expand their market share, and all purchasers will have incentives to provide 
cost-effective, high quality care and reduce costs (Cumming, 1998).  Thus this 
system is qualitatively different from the others discussed in this paper in that 
it relies explicitly on individuals and families making their own decisions about 
the health care organisation which is most likely to best meet their 
requirements. 
In a competitive market, however, profit-maximising purchasers (or insurers) 
would charge consumers premiums based on individual and family risk or limit 
consumers’ entitlements proportionately.  This would raise significant issues 
about the affordability and coverage of health care for high risk individuals or 
groups of the population, and thus equity concerns.  Consequently, there is 
usually a high degree of government involvement, at least in the OECD, in the 
financing of, and payment to purchasers and providers for, health care 
services.  This involvement is either by collecting premiums through taxes or 
social insurance schemes and allocating them to purchasers and providers 
through a separate process, or by requiring “community rating” of premiums 
charged by purchasers (ie, premiums are not based on individual or family 
risk). 
Consequently, purchaser competition in health care policy is widely referred to 
as “regulated competition”, as a significant regulatory framework for 
purchasers is usually considered necessary to promote equity and market 
efficiency. 
“Regulated” competition has developed primarily in the United States as part 
of the shift away from traditional third party payer indemnity insurance based 
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limited aspects of regulated competition (eg, Netherlands).  The most 
developed proposals for purchaser competition, therefore, tend to originate 
from the US.  A well-known example is the US Health Maintenance Organisation 
(HMO), better known as a pre-paid health plan, of which there are a number of 
distinct models.  There are few examples in publicly funded or social insurance 
based health care systems of risk bearing, comprehensive health care 
organisations which compete for individual enrolments. 
Organisational forms 
There are numerous different ways of organising regulated competition 
between ‘health plans’.  Purchasers may be quite distinct from providers, as 
with the current separation between the HFA and service providers (ie, the HFA 
and service providers are separate legal entities whose relationship is governed 
by contract, with no mutual employment or ownership interests).  Alternatively, 
there may be increasing degrees of “vertical integration” between purchasers 
and providers; that is, competing purchasers may contract solely with, employ, 
or even own, some or all of the providers through which they provide health 
care coverage.  There is generally integration between primary and secondary 
providers, so that patients are required to receive their first contact care from 
a specified team which acts as gatekeeper to other more specialised services 
rather than having free choice of provider (see Figure 1).  Clinicians may be 
micro-managed by the health plan to varying degrees whenever their decisions 
involve resources and they may take varying degrees of responsibility for 
financial risk.  There has been considerable debate and successive changes of 
policy by managed care organisations as to the appropriate level and 
combination of managerial scrutiny and financial incentives which individual 
clinicians should face.  Currently, managed care organisations appear to be 
retreating from expensive and intrusive micro-management, preferring to rely 
on getting clinicians to work within broad budget limits and retrospective feed 
back of comparative data on quality and outcomes of care to individual doctors 
in order to influence their behaviour (Anonymous, 1999).   
Figure 1:  Three Dimensions of ‘Health Plan’ Organisation
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In the US, proposals for managed competition have been based on health 
benefit intermediary (HBI) organisations that act as insurers/purchasers of 
health care services on behalf of their membership.  The HFA in New Zealand, 
therefore, bears some similarity to the HBI, except that there is no patient 
choice of HFA.  The different forms of managed care organisations (MCOs) are 
distinguished by the extent to which HBI and service provider functions are 
integrated and providers deal exclusively or non-exclusively with a particular 
HBI (Robinson and Steiner, 1998).  In New Zealand, a few proposals for 
‘integrated care’ have involved integrated care organisations (ICOs).  
Notionally, these have been similar to MCOs, but, organisationally, they are 
based solely on contracts between a purchaser and providers, and not to the 
exclusion of other purchasers contracting with the same providers.  The small 
number and lack of choice of hospital providers in New Zealand makes it 
unlikely that exclusive relations could be sustained here. 
Proposals for managed competition in publicly funded health care vary, but 
usually involve the following key features: 
• consumer choice of purchaser or health care plan (ie, competition between 
purchasers or health plans for consumers); 
• health plans with a strong primary care ‘gate-keeping’ role; 
• consumers normally have an opportunity to switch plans once a year or 
less frequently; 
• close relationships between purchasers and providers of health care 
services, often with vertically integrated purchaser-providers (ie, health 
care plans or ICOs).  Purchasers and providers may be integrated into the 
same organisation (through purchaser ownership or employment of the 
provider) or there may be strong contractual arrangements linking 
purchasers and providers, or preferred provider, or network arrangements; 
• open enrolment – arrangements to ensure that purchasers or health plans: 
take on all individuals who wish to enrol, cover all individuals, and do not 
exclude individuals on the basis, for example, of pre-existing health 
conditions, unlike most private insurers; 
• standard packages of coverage or health benefits to be offered by 
purchasers or plans, in order to prevent risk selection by purchasers/plans.  
This potentially limits the benefits of consumer choice; 
• financing arrangements in which individuals, employers or the government 
(as in the case of Medicare in the US) pay premiums which are community 
rated, ie, premiums that are the same within broad population age-gender 
bands, or where variations in premiums are limited; 
• pre-paid capitation payments (a fixed fee by every enrolee that is weighted 
according to such characteristics as age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic 
status, health status) to health plans in order to encourage efficiency in the 
use of resources.  Below the level of the plan, payment arrangements with 
providers use a variety of approaches including capitation and fee-for-
service; Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 72 
• purchasing co-operatives to pool the risk of smaller health purchasers or 
plans, achieve economies-of-scale (eg, in administrative costs), and 
regulate the health purchaser/plan market, including provision of 
consumer information; 
• purchasing co-operatives to monitor the performance of health plans.  Such 
co-operatives are primarily a feature of the US health care market. 
How purchaser competition might operate in New Zealand 
We can now sketch the likely features of competitive purchasing for 
comprehensive health and disability care coverage in New Zealand. 
This model assumes that the current public financing arrangements, and the 
total level of public financing, for health and disability care services in New 
Zealand remain the same, (that is, financing is predominantly by the 
government through general taxation, with out-of-pocket payments for some 
services, particularly primary care, and scope for people to take out private 
health insurance).  However, the relationship between public and private 
insurance could change under purchaser competition.  At present, private 
health insurance is predominantly ‘double cover’ insurance to provide faster 
access to services also provided in the public system (eg, elective surgery).  If 
health plans competed for individual patient enrolments, a “core” range of 
publicly funded services would have to be defined to ensure fair competition 
and fair coverage.  At this point it would be possible to allow patients either to 
pay out of pocket or to insure privately for services not in the “core”.  Allowing 
‘topping up’ for services which the purchaser would be expected to make 
available to all patients (the ‘core’) would be inadvisable since it would greatly 
increase the attractiveness of better off patients to the purchasers and reduce 
equity of access to the ‘core’.  The extent to which existing financing 
arrangements can or should remain completely unaffected and the relation 
between public and private financing would require further investigation if 
regulated competition were to be introduced.  However, the main benefits (or 
efficiency gains) from the model are, therefore, expected to be in terms of 
improvements in the delivery of health care services, improvements in the 
volume of services and financial savings, rather than changes to overall funding 
levels. 
Competitive Purchasing Model 
The key features would probably include: 
• competing purchaser organisations operating across the country that 
provide comprehensive health and disability services coverage, similar to 
the current publicly-funded coverage, but possibly excluding some services, 
(eg, national purchasing of tertiary health care services might continue); 
• a standard or “core” service coverage offered by all purchasers to enrolees 
(to prevent risk selection and promote meaningful consumer choice of 
purchaser).  The standardised package of services would most probably be 
determined by a regulatory agency.  The extent to which purchasers should 
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basic package, or ‘double cover’ to provide preferential treatment for 
services within the “core” package or, indeed, other products (eg, car 
insurance) would have to be determined, as would the ability of the 
purchaser to levy patient co-payments; 
• individuals and/or families would enrol with a purchaser of their choice, 
and arrangements to ensure “open enrolment” would be necessary (see 
section on risk selection); 
• national purchasers would sub-contract with providers for the delivery of 
health and disability services.  Contracts between some (possibly many) 
providers and more than one purchaser would be necessary to promote 
competition.  The potential for vertical integration of secondary and tertiary 
health care services (ie, purchasers and public hospitals) is likely to be 
extremely limited as different purchasers would require access to the same 
providers of hospital services, which are largely local monopolies.  The 
extent to which purchasers could therefore own or exclusively contract 
with, or employ, a specific provider would need to be carefully evaluated; 
• purchasers could be paid by the government on a needs-based (ie, 
weighted) capitation basis.  In this situation, the value of the payment 
would not be visible to the enrolee and hence they would not be price 
sensitive.  An alternative might be to provide enrolees with a voucher which 
they then paid to a purchaser.  Either way, competition would be on quality 
grounds, not price; 
• the government would need to regulate the market for health care 
purchasers, including such aspects as registration of purchasers, 
monitoring and evaluation of purchasers, regulation of purchaser 
marketing and production of standardised consumer information.  This last 
would be particularly important if patient choice were to lead to efficiency 
improvements (see below). 
Key pre-requisites for this model would include: 
• the willingness of potential purchasers to enter the market and provide 
comprehensive service coverage, preferably on a national basis (eg, a 
potential purchaser might be prepared to enter the market in large urban 
areas, but not provide coverage in smaller towns or rural areas);  
• sufficient purchasers to sustain competition; 
• providers contracting with all purchasers; 
• the HFA acting as a purchaser of last resort, or as an alternative purchaser 
with whom patients could enrol (eg, as in the accident compensation 
insurance market from July 1999) if private purchasers proved unable to 
offer a health plan in particular parts of the country on a competitive basis; 
and 
• a risk-adjusted capitation payment method capable of mitigating the 
incentives to risk selection and under-service in a competitive model of 
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Competitive purchasers are most likely to be nation-wide non-governmental 
organisations in a New Zealand context.  To offer comprehensive coverage to 
any potential enrolee, purchasers will need to have a national presence or 
identity, and will have to contract with providers throughout the country. 
Purchasers are also likely to be relatively large organisations if they are to be 
effective purchasers of health care.  Purchasers will have to be of sufficient 
scale to have the expertise and infrastructure to contract successfully and to 
monitor/evaluate provider performance, as well as invest in information 
systems to support these activities and monitor enrolees’ health status (see 
Light 1998; Cumming 1998). 
Purchasers will also require a minimum critical enrolee membership to enable 
them adequately to spread the financial risk associated with providing 
comprehensive service coverage.  The small size of New Zealand’s population 
(approximately 3.8 million people) and its geographical dispersion is likely to 
limit the potential for competition where purchasers are required to provide 
comprehensive coverage. 
Number of Competitive Purchasers 
At least three national purchasers or ICOs are likely to be required to promote 
purchaser competition (Cumming 1998; Kronick, Goodman, et al.  1993).  A 
United States study used the ratio of physicians to enrolees in large staff-
model HMOs to estimate the population required to support health 
organisations with various types of health care services (Kronick, Goodman, et 
al 1993).  The study assumed US levels of health care spending and three 
health care plans to facilitate competition.  It concluded that: 
• a health care services market with at least 1.2 million could support three 
fully independent plans (ie, each plan would own its hospitals and 
exclusively employ all its own staff); 
• a population of at least 360,000 people could support three plans that 
independently provided most hospital services, but they would have to 
share hospital facilities and contract for tertiary services; 
• a population of 180,000 people could support three plans that provided 
primary care and many basic specialty services, but which shared inpatient 
cardiology and urology services and engaged in substantial sharing of 
inpatient facilities with other plans. 
Using these figures, Cumming (1998) estimated that: 
• only the Auckland region (about 27 per cent of the population) could 
sustain competition of the first and second kinds.  However, individuals 
would potentially face significant travel times to providers; 
• Christchurch and Wellington fall just below the 360,000 population mark, 
so may also be able to sustain competition of the second kind (increasing 
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• populations between 140,000 to 180,000 might also allow competition in 
the Hamilton-Cambridge-Te Awamutu region (adding a further 4.4 per cent 
of the population).  Reducing the level to 100,000 would also add Napier-
Hastings and Dunedin (a further 6 per cent). 
At most, New Zealand could sustain competition of the third kind (ie, three 
competing plans providing primary care and basic specialty services) for only 
56 per cent of the population.  One implication is, therefore, that the HFA or 
franchised local monopolies might have to purchase for the remaining 44% of 
the population and for the remaining services. 
These are rough estimates and, further work would be required robustly to 
establish the enrolee membership necessary to spread financial risk 
adequately, and the number of purchasers necessary to facilitate competition.  
These calculations are crucial for the future development of any model of 
purchaser competition.  Better estimates would need to include the likelihood 
that New Zealand health plans would be required to offer DSS as well as 
Personal Health Services.  However, it is unlikely that the wider scope of New 
Zealand health plans would enable them to function on a smaller population 
base than the rough estimates indicate.  Thus the provisional conclusion is that 
only greater Auckland could sustain three health plans offering broadly 
comprehensive health and disability support services. 
Provider Competition 
The likely extent and effect of provider competition is also a key consideration 
in examining the scope for purchaser competition. 
New Zealand has a large number of health and disability care providers, 
predominantly providers of primary or community-based health and disability 
services.  However, the number of providers of secondary health care services 
is relatively small in comparison, and there are very few providers of tertiary 
health care services (both of which are predominantly government-owned).  In 
some instances there are also few providers of health and disability services in 
rural or provincial localities (eg, West Coast).  To some extent this reflects the 
small size of New Zealand’s population, which means that only a limited 
number of secondary and tertiary health care service providers will be clinically 
viable.  The small size of the population means that incident rate of conditions 
requiring specialised clinical procedures is low and the subsequent clinical 
throughput may only support a limited number of clinicians. 
This raises questions about the likely extent of provider competition and the 
degree of influence that purchasers may have over some providers’ behaviour.  
It is highly likely that most providers would have to contract with more than 
one purchaser (at least for some specialties and in smaller towns), as a 
prerequisite to encouraging competition between purchasers.  Under such 
circumstances, people in smaller towns might have a choice of plan for a less 
than comprehensive range of services, but little choice of provider given 
current provision arrangements.  This would also weaken the ability of the 
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One response to the lack of hospital competition is to break the hospital into 
competing units or clinical teams either by direct physician contracting or by 
splitting the hospital’s facilities from the clinical services which it provides and 
tendering for those services either as a whole or in parcels related to clinical 
teams.  There may be scope for pursuing such options in order to give 
purchasers greater opportunities to make efficiency gains.   
However, there may be higher transaction costs where competing purchasers 
contract for comprehensive care with individual clinical teams (unless there is 
further integration of providers).  The HFA entered into 4580 contracts with 
providers in 1997/98.  A similar or higher level of contracting may, therefore, 
be necessary for each purchaser or ICO to buy comprehensive coverage for its 
enrolees (ie, a total of over 13,000 contracts at a minimum for three 
purchasers). 
The above discussion suggests that setting policy objectives for purchasing will 
involve important trade-offs, for example between: 
• opting for large-scale purchasers that can adequately manage the risk 
associated with providing comprehensive health care coverage; 
• the scope for more significant competition where the service coverage 
offered by competing purchasers or ICOs is more limited; 
• the efficiency gains which may result from demand and supply side 
competition versus the costs of bringing this system about. 
Advantages of Purchaser Competition 
The potential benefits of purchaser competition in New Zealand are difficult to 
gauge.  The design features of any model of purchaser competition are likely to 
have an important bearing on how well competing purchasers perform.  The 
extent to which purchaser competition promotes efficiency, innovation and 
choice for consumers will depend not only on how purchasers compete and 
how they contract with providers, but on the extent to which competition can 
develop for different population groups, including high risk groups and those in 
geographically isolated communities, and how much freedom purchasers have 
to vary what they provide (within national parameters) to meet the needs of 
specific population sub-groups. 
Most of the experience and evidence about purchaser competition comes from 
the United States.  This evidence largely compares the performance of MCOs, 
which attempt in a wide variety of ways to avoid the ‘moral hazard’ problems 
of third party insurers, compared with traditional fee-for-service private 
indemnity insurance in the US.  Consequently, it does not directly tell us how 
purchaser competition in New Zealand might compare with the status quo (ie, 
mainly tax finance, macro cost controls, a national monopoly purchaser and 
mainly salaried professional providers), or how competing health care plans 
and providers compare with the current situation of many bilateral monopolies 
(ie, between the HFA and HHSs).  Any extrapolation of the benefits of regulated 
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The traditional US insurance arrangements are widely considered to have 
generated excess capacity (ie, over-supply of hospitals and clinicians) and 
supplier-induced demand.  Managed care has achieved results through the 
introduction inter alia of techniques such as capitated budgets and a clinical 
“gate-keeping” function.  New Zealand is already well advanced with respect to 
such arrangements (eg, publicly-funded health care has a capped budget, gate-
keeping is well-established, 25% of GPs are capitated for GMS and virtually all 
IPAs budget-hold for laboratory tests and pharmaceuticals), and, therefore, the 
benefits from their introduction in the US cannot be expected to accrue in New 
Zealand where they already exist (Robinson & Steiner 1998). 
Furthermore, most of the evidence about managed care examines the effects of 
managed care organisations and does not isolate and analyse the influence of 
specific financial and other management techniques used in managed care.  As 
Robinson and Steiner note, it is, therefore, uncertain “what precisely it is about 
managed care that has had the strongest impact on utilization and quality of 
care” (Robinson & Steiner 1998).  Consequently, specific management 
techniques (eg, utilisation review) may yield benefits in the absence of 
competition between purchasers / managed care organisations. 
We can, nonetheless, make some judgements about the potential advantages of 
the model of purchaser competition outlined above.  The potential advantages, 
none of which are necessarily exclusive to this model, include: 
• incentives on health plans to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
of health care services since they have to attract and retain patients while 
maintaining financial viability (unlike monopoly purchasers for whom 
patients and budgets are guaranteed); 
• consumer choice of purchaser; 
• risk-rated payments (ie, weighted capitation) which more accurately reflect 
the costs of consumers’ health care;  
• further integration of the existing publicly-funded budgets for health and 
disability services (ie, personal health, disability support services and 
public health services), as health plans take a “voucher” for all or a wide 
range of health care needs for each enrolee. 
Improvements in Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness 
Robinson and Steiner (1998) have undertaken the most recent and systematic 
review of the performance of managed care organisations (compared with fee-
for-service indemnity insurers) on a number of key performance dimensions 
(see Table 5).  They show that the evidence is broadly favourable with respect 
to MCOs, but that findings for some indicators, are difficult to interpret.  
Public opinion is largely hostile and users’ views seem to be less positive than 
for fee-for-service plans.  It appears that patients value additional services even 
if these do not contribute to better quality of care or outcomes.  Their findings 
together with a recent update (Robinson, 1999) are summarised in Table 5. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Assessment  Summary 
Utilisation  Evidence suggests MCOs achieve lower levels 
of utilisation.  Reductions in hospital 
administration, length of hospital stays, and 
use of expensive tests, procedures and 
treatments.  Inconclusive evidence about 





Evidence on the relative performance of 
MCOs is highly inconclusive.  A consistent 
pattern is no difference between MCOs and 






Evidence strongly indicates MCOs perform 
better, ie, deliver more preventive care.  
Evidence supports the assumption that MCOs 
have an incentive to keep patients well 
through preventive care and promotion. 
Positive 
Quality of Care  Evidence suggests no significant difference 
between MCOs and FFS plans.  Important 
finding as the a priori expectation is that 
reduced resource use would result in lower 
quality outcomes or satisfaction with care. 
Neutral 
Enrolee Satisfaction  Evidence indicates that MCOs performance 
poorly on enrolee satisfaction (constantly 
lower ratings than FFS), but evidence is of 
poor quality. 
Negative 
Equity of Care 
(between specific 
groups) 
Evidence is either inconclusive or suggests 
no difference between MCOs and FFS plans 
for children, low-income women or elderly. 
Neutral 
Source: Robinson and Steiner (1998); Robinson (1999) 
Consumer Choice of Purchaser 
A key question is what effects (including benefits) will consumer choice of 
purchaser have, given standardised service coverage and third-party payment? 
From a policy perspective, the question is about the potential effects of 
consumer choice on improving purchaser efficiency.  However, choice can also 
be valued for itself, irrespective of its consequences, on the theoretical grounds 
that consumers must know better than the government or health professionals 
what their health needs are. 
For consumers to make choices based on efficiency, they will require 
information about the cost-effectiveness of the purchaser (ie, the level of 
outcomes produced given the resources available), the quality of care offered 
(including the appropriateness of care, the cultural acceptability of care, the 
quality of facilities, the availability of services) and the value of the particular 
quality of care (ie, how quality relates to the outcomes deemed important by 
the patient).  Assuming that consumers will not be paying directly for their Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 79 
care, but bringing an implicit government “voucher” upon enrolment, 
consumers will not require to know the price of the services.  Instead, the 
government or its regulator will need to set fair prices to enable plans to offer 
services to different types of users, while subject to some pressure to contain 
cost. 
High quality information about the relative quality and cost-effectiveness of 
purchasers will need to be provided, probably by an independent agency, 
otherwise consumers will only have access to proxies such as the physical 
quality of facilities which may do little to help them drive efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of services.  The model presumes that purchasers/plans will be 
at risk financially in a way which HFA/RHAs could never be and will, therefore, 
have underlying incentives to control costs and improve efficiency. 
Risk-rated payments and budget integration 
Risk-rated payments (weighted capitation) to purchasers for enrolees will 
encourage: 
• payments that reflect the actual financial risk associated with providing 
comprehensive care for types of consumers, rather than payments for 
individual services based on historic costs; and 
• purchasers to compete on the basis of efficiency and quality (rather than to 
engage in risk-selection). 
Weighted capitation payments for enrolees will also integrate the existing 
personal health, disability support and public health budgets, thereby allowing 
purchasers greater flexibility in determining the most cost-effective mix of 
services, within the coverage they are required to provide. 
Role Clarity 
Proponents of ‘regulated competition’ argue that it would have the advantage 
of taking government entirely out of both purchase and provision of health 
care.  This would enhance role clarity, enabling government to focus on more 
appropriate tasks of financing, regulating and monitoring health services 
(Blair, 1999) and avoid the conflicts of interest which dog government 
purchaser-provider relations at present.  It is also argued that role separation 
would also allow for the introduction of non-government purchasers/health 
plans that were fully at risk financially for the performance of their plan.  This 
is contrasted with the public purchasers that are said to lack clear incentives 
to perform well since they are unable to go out of business and would prefer to 
argue for more money rather than improve cost control and efficiency of their 
providers. 
Disadvantages of Purchaser Competition 
The potential disadvantages of the model of purchaser competition outlined 
above are more apparent.  However, some of them exist under current 
arrangements too.  The potential drawbacks include: 
• higher transaction costs (eg, from contracting); 
• higher regulatory and administrative costs; Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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• risk selection or “cream skimming”; 
• ineffective patient choice; 
• cost shifting;  
• reduced purchaser influence over providers (ie, reduced bargaining power); 
and 
• likely pressure for higher than planned spending due to individual 
entitlement to coverage driving up utilisation. 
Higher Transaction Costs 
As noted above, many providers will require multiple contracts with all 
purchasers, if purchasers are expected to provide comprehensive coverage on 
a national basis compared with the current arrangements with a single 
purchaser.  Higher overall health system costs are likely, therefore, to result 
from the duplication in administrative and contracting arrangements.  
Significant benefits (efficiency and health outcome gains) from a system of 
competing purchasers will be necessary to off-set such costs together with the 
other regulatory and administrative costs needed to make the market work 
efficiently (see below).  Similar additional transaction costs are likely with the 
other forms of primary care-based purchasing discussed above.  There are 
currently no estimates available of transaction costs under different forms of 
purchasing in New Zealand. 
Regulatory and Administrative Costs 
There are likely to be higher costs from the administrative and/or regulatory 
arrangements required to make a competitive purchaser market work 
effectively and efficiently. 
For example, consumers need good quality, independent information on the 
quality of services offered by different plans.  Government has to establish 
market structures and rules.  Plans have to advertise and market their services 
to consumers.  These costs result from arrangements to prevent risk selection, 
cost-shifting and poor purchaser performance.  These are briefly outlined 
below. 
Risk Selection (or “cream-skimming”) 
Risk selection occurs when purchasers or providers (either deliberately or by 
chance) enrol a favourable mix of members, ie, individuals with a lower risk of 
making a claim or needing care than the average person within any broad risk 
pool (eg, a particular age-gender pool).  This is likely to be more of a problem 
where capitated payments are made to purchasers competing for individual 
patient enrolments and these payments for an individual’s care do not 
necessarily equate with ex ante or ex post financial risk (ie, there is an 
opportunity for the purchaser to make profits/surpluses from selecting 
patients, rather than competing on the basis of efficiency or quality). Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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• contracts with providers are on a capitation or budget-holding basis and 
the capitation rates used to calculate the capitation payment do not equate 
with the financial risk associated with the individual; and 
• there is competition between providers or ICOs.  The extent of the problem 
will depend on the degree of competition between purchasers and the 
extent to which purchasers are unable to manage the costs of high risk 
patients. 
The strategies by which purchasers might risk-select, and the approaches to 
addressing risk selection are summarised in the Annex.  In general, proposals 
for competitive purchasing, in publicly financed systems where equity of 
access is a prime goal of policy, will require purchasers to: 
• cover all pre-existing conditions, or at least limit the time period during 
which pre-existing conditions are excluded from coverage (eg, to say six 
months after enrolment); 
• take on all those who apply for care to be covered by any particular plan 
(known as open enrolment); 
• market their plan(s) throughout the country, not just in affluent areas; 
• guarantee that all individuals may remain with a plan even if their 
utilisation or costs rise or their health status deteriorates (known as 
guaranteed renewal); 
• monitor and publicise rates of disenrolment, consumer complaints and 
consumer satisfaction; 
• allow the monitoring of plan performance and publication of information 
about the quality of care provided by purchasers; and 
• provide a standard benefit package which is intelligible to users so that 
purchasers compete on quality of services and outcomes, not selective 
coverage. 
Some degree of risk sharing rather than transfer of total financial risk to the 
purchaser by the funder, is also generally recommended as a means of 
mitigating the tendency to risk selection. 
Ineffective patient choice 
It is fundamental to the model of purchaser competition that individuals have 
the ability to make choices between health plans which are likely to be in their 
best interests.  Economists tend to assume that consumers know what they 
want and can pursue what they want in a rational manner (two significant 
assumptions).  The only barrier to this, which is typically conceded to exist, is 
the possibility that there may be inefficiently low levels of information in 
particular markets, especially those for health services.  The solution is to give 
patients more information, thereby permitting efficient competition.  Assuming 
that information and choice are available, do consumers use them? Most 
studies to date, even in the USA, suggest that there is remarkably little 
‘consumerist’ behaviour in health care markets (Hoerger and Howard, 1995).  
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care use and expenditure is generated by a small minority of the population.  
In the USA, approximately 40% of costs are devoted to less than 2% of the 
population.  Most people, most of the time, are not health care consumers (in 
contrast to their consumption of retail electricity and food, for example). 
People tend not to use information in selecting their source of care.  
Furthermore, even when given information, for example on the extent of cost - 
sharing (ie, user charges) between insurance plans, this does not appear to 
influence behaviour.  Hibbard and Weekes (1989) found that cost information, 
even among those who claimed that costs were a financial burden, had no 
effect on behaviour, or costs incurred, in their sample of government 
employees and Medicare beneficiaries in Oregon in the mid 1980s. 
Rice (1998) argues: 
‘The increased importance of managed care and capitation in the U.S.  health 
system brings with it many challenges for consumers.  To make the most 
appropriate choices about health plans, consumers need to understand such 
concepts as primary care gate keeping, financial incentives to providers, and 
other plan characteristics that affect the type of care patients receive.  
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that consumers do understand these 
concepts.’ (page 71) 
This is even more likely to be the case in New Zealand, where patients are 
unfamiliar with having to make such choices. 
One potential solution to such difficulties is to set up an independent agency to 
prepare standardised “report cards” on each health care plan.  Much is made 
by advocates of purchaser competition of the US National Committee on 
Quality Assurance’s Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) 
which measures plan performance in areas such as patient satisfaction, 
appropriateness of care for particular conditions and extent of preventive 
services.  Yet, research on HEDIS suggests that consumers rely heavily on the 
user satisfaction indictors which they believe they understand and ignore the 
more technical measures of the quality of care for particular conditions (eg, 
rates of eye examinations among diabetics) (Hibbard and Jewett, 1997).  This 
indicates that, beyond information dissemination, consumers will need 
education about the type and quality of care offered by different plans.  For 
this, there would need to be an organised consumer movement in health care, 
which does not currently exist in New Zealand. 
If individuals find choice difficult, how will health plans fare in New Zealand? In 
brief, they are likely to face many of the same restrictions on choice of 
provider, especially in the acute hospital sector, currently faced by the HFA.  
There are many natural monopolies given the population size and geography of 
the country.   
Cost-Shifting 
Cost-shifting occurs when costs are charged against a budget which differs 
from that intended, or from that traditionally charged.  The risk of cost shifting 
increases, the less comprehensive the budgetary responsibility of a purchaser 
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The key risks associated with purchaser cost-shifting are also potentially 
numerous and include: 
• increased government expenditure on votes other than Vote: Health; 
• increased expenditure for publicly-owned purchaser and provider 
organisations where costs and patients are shifted to other publicly-owned 
purchasers and providers; 
• increased private expenditure and resource use where purchasing 
authorities make decisions which shift responsibility for financing on to 
private budgets; and 
• shifting costs to society by under-investment in preventive care if health 
plans judge that individuals are unlikely to be enrolled for a substantial 
period of time. 
If the competing purchasers are required to cover a reasonably comprehensive 
range of services, cost-shifting will be less of a risk.  However, in the New 
Zealand context, there will be inevitable efforts by health plans and accident 
insurers to cost shift across the Vote: Health-accident compensation budget 
boundary.  In addition, health plans will have an incentive to ‘re-badge’ 
activities as either outside the ‘core’ or as non-health care and, therefore, 
directly chargeable to patients.  This raises questions as to whether health 
plans should be permitted to charge patients and/or to encourage them to ‘top 
up’ their publicly financed ‘vouchers’ and, if so, whether the cover resulting 
can be used for any services already contained in the publicly financed ‘core’. 
Reduced Purchaser Bargaining Power 
Current purchase arrangements mean that the HFA wields substantial market 
power in negotiating with providers as the dominant or monopoly buyer of 
many health and disability support goods and services.  Multiple purchasers 
may wield less bargaining power, in some instances, particularly where 
providers are market-dominant or constitute local or national monopolies, or 
alternative providers take time to emerge.  This is particularly likely to be the 
case in relation to large acute hospitals. 
Individual Entitlements 
Purchase (or insurance) arrangements in the United States are traditionally 
characterised by individual entitlement, ie, once covered by an insurer, 
individuals can expect to receive services relatively quickly, including elective 
surgery (ie, there is a fundamental difference in health system goals – health 
gain versus responding to individual demand).  This differs from the New 
Zealand situation in which individual access to publicly funded health care 
services is rationed through gate-keeping mechanisms, and individual priority 
for services, such as elective surgery, is determined by clinical priority criteria.  
Purchaser competition raises issues about whether health care can continue to 
be rationed in this way.  The risk is that competing purchasers will use the fact 
that budgets are finite to shift costs on to, or under-service, consumers rather 
than improve efficiency.  Alternatively, health plans may turn to government for 
more money arguing that they cannot offer comprehensive cover for the 
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likely to be backed up by a new patient expectation that patients should 
receive the specified coverage of services in a timely manner at a particular 
level of quality.  While this may be good for patients, it could impose major 
strains on the agreed health budget and crowd out other social spending. 
Conclusions on purchaser competition 
Competing purchasers or ICOs will constitute a very different health care 
system from the current internal market, and would require major development 
of new arrangements and regulatory systems before such a system would be 
feasible.  Given the extent and pace of change in the health sector in recent 
years, it seems unlikely that there would be support for a shift directly from a 
single national purchaser to purchaser competition.  In practical terms, 
demand side competition is only likely to develop if New Zealand were to move 
initially towards an intermediate system of devolved purchasing in which the 
national purchaser passed its responsibilities progressively to other 
intermediate organisations.  If these devolved purchasers were non-
governmental and particularly if they involved insurers (eg, accident 
compensation insurers), they might provide the basis for the evolution of health 
plans.  However, such a development is not inevitable and would require an 
explicit policy decision by government. 
It would also take time before any gains would be realised from a system of 
demand side competition.  These gains would have to be set against the 
considerable upfront and continuing costs of running a regulated competition 
system for publicly funded services.  The weakest aspects of the model in New 
Zealand relate to competition; both that driven by individual patients between 
plans on grounds of quality; and that driven by providers competing for the 
business of health plans.  The strongest aspects, in theory, concern the 
consequences of permitting non-governmental organisations to accept major 
responsibility for purchaser risk as an alternative to the former RHAs or HFA.  
If competition in the market is a non-starter, the model might be more 
accurately seen as a periodic tendering of the purchasing function, with 
competition between a residual public purchaser (necessary if private 
purchasers get into financial difficulties) and a range of private purchasers to 
purchase for defined populations.  Government would need to regulate and 
monitor the performance of these private monopolies.  Though this system 
would distance government still further from the purchasing role, it would not 
protect it from lobbying by the purchasers concerning the level of funding 
available.  It would still be in the interests of purchasers to argue for higher 
levels of funding rather than to restrict the spending of influential clinician 
groups.  At present, government only has to deal with a single state-owned 
purchaser.  Under a model of competing purchasers, it would have to deal with 
several. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Specialist Purchasers 
Rationale 
Purchasers that specialise in providing coverage for specific types of services 
(eg, mental health services) or specific population groups (eg, Maori) are 
potential alternatives to organisations that purchase a comprehensive range of 
health and disability services for their membership.  Such purchasers might 
compete with others, eg, multiple purchasers of support services for older 
people.  Alternatively, there might be only one purchaser, for example, a single 
purchaser of oncology services within a geographical region.  The potential 
options are wide ranging, but specialist purchasers would need to be of 
sufficient scale and benefit to justify the likely additional costs of such 
arrangements.  One justification is that a specialist purchaser, for example, for 
a patient group with a specific chronic condition such as diabetes, could 
purchase across the full range of services required for the effective 
management of the condition, thereby, for example, integrating drug therapies 
with other treatment and disability support in new ways.  The purchaser would 
also build up expertise in the field sufficient to negotiate contracts with 
providers on more equal terms than generic purchasers. 
Pharmac is an obvious current example of a specialist purchasing organisation 
covering a specific set of pharmaceutical technologies rather than services or 
populations. 
How specialist purchasing might operate in New Zealand 
Given New Zealand’s current purchase arrangements, the likely scenario for 
specialist purchasing would involve: 
• the Health Funding Authority sub-contracting with, or delegating its 
responsibilities to, other organisations to provide specific service coverage 
for a particular population.  The HFA would, therefore, act as regulator of 
the specialist purchaser through a contract with, or delegation to, the sub-
purchaser.  Alternatively, the Crown could choose to contract directly with 
specialist purchasers by using the Health and Disability Services Act to 
establish “alternative funders”; 
• the population to be covered by the sub-purchaser would need to be clearly 
defined.  This may require individual enrolment with purchasers, 
particularly where there is choice of competing specialist purchasers.  
Enrolment may be unnecessary where a purchaser is a geographical 
monopoly; 
• the service coverage to be offered by a sub-purchaser would need to be 
clearly specified to: provide a basis for monitoring purchaser performance 
and prevent under-servicing of patients; and to prevent sub-purchasers 
from shifting costs to other purchasers (including the HFA) and providers.  
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• specialist purchasers would be paid by the HFA on a risk-rated (ie, 
weighted) capitation basis, rather than historic cost, to reflect the financial 
risk associated with the population to be covered by the sub-purchaser.  
The value of the payment might be revealed to individuals so that 
consumers could choose between sub-purchasers and price competition 
might be encouraged.  However, this variant would need careful design.  
(For example, if a client chose a low cost purchaser, should they be allowed 
to keep the ‘savings’ made to spend on something else or could they only 
buy more health care?); 
• the HFA would monitor the performance of sub-purchasers, including 
(dis)aggregated outputs and health outcomes; and 
• the HFA would continue to purchase all other publicly funded health and 
disability services for the New Zealand population. 
New Zealand Examples 
In addition to Pharmac, the HFA is currently purchasing various integrated care 
projects that have the potential to be specialist purchasers, but at this stage 
they only exist in embryonic form.  The current pilots are provider 
organisations, focusing on co-ordination of services rather than taking full 
budgetary responsibility for meeting all the needs of a population with a 
specific condition.  These include Eldercare Canterbury, an integrated care 
project that co-ordinates all services for older people within Christchurch, and 
Tui Ora, a network of providers covering a specific Taranaki population, with a 
lead provider influencing the nature of service provision. 
Advantages of Specialist Purchasing 
Purchaser Expertise 
An obvious advantage relates to the extent to which specialist purchasers 
possess greater expertise to purchase services for a specific population or a 
particular condition.  It is assumed that this would result in better health 
outcomes at an individual and population level than would be the case with a 
generic purchaser like the HFA.  This presumes that specialist knowledge is a 
key factor in effectively purchasing specific services for a particular population.  
There is some experience to back this up (Light, 1998). 
Co-ordination/Integration of Services 
Specialist purchasing offers the potential for greater horizontal and vertical co-
ordination and integration, both between individual providers and between a 
purchaser and providers, ultimately leading to specialised ICOs for particular 
disease conditions like cancer, or even for population groups such as Maori.  In 
the case of Maori, the attraction is to be able to integrate health care with a 
wide range of other social services to tackle some of the wider determinants of 
poor health, rather than in order to develop specialist expertise in relation to 
particular health problems.  The benefits will depend on the extent to which 
greater co-ordination and integration result in improved efficiency or cost-
effectiveness in the delivery of services.  (For example, through more timely 
and appropriate patient diagnosis and treatment). Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Risk Sharing 
Specialist purchasers present the opportunity for the HFA to share the financial 
risks of specific service coverage with other parties, both purchasers and 
providers, and, thereby, improve specialised purchaser and provider focus on 
the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of health and disability care services.  The 
scope for risk sharing with specialist purchasers may be limited due to the 
potentially smaller number of consumers/patients over whom they would be 
able to spread financial risk. 
Consumer Choice 
Consumer choice of specialist purchaser will depend on the extent to which 
competing specialist purchasers that offer the same coverage are possible.  
Many of the issues outlined in the section on competitive purchasers (above) 
would then arise. 
Disadvantages of Specialist Purchasing 
The potential disadvantages of specialist purchasing include the following 
risks: 
• cost-shifting from specialist purchasers to both the HFA (or other 
purchasers) and providers; 
• under-servicing of patients;  
• risk selection where there are competitive specialist purchasers (and they 
are paid on a weighted capitation basis); 
• potential fragmentation of care where patients/consumers require 
integrated sets of services beyond those provided by a specialist 
purchaser.  This is more probable where a specialist purchaser only buys a 
narrow range of services.  For example, despite the good work that 
Pharmac has undertaken to select for subsidy only the most cost-effective 
drugs within broad therapeutic categories, including assessing the 
opportunity costs to the health sector as a whole of particular drugs, it is 
not able to make its own substitution decisions between pharmaceutical 
and non-pharmaceutical responses.  IPAs that hold drug budgets are in a 
better position to begin this task, but they are partially constrained by the 
range of drugs which Pharmac is prepared to subsidise; and 
• greater market concentration where provider and/or purchaser integration 
leads to greater market dominance or monopoly. 
The first three risks will not result exclusively from specialist purchasing per 
se, but rather from the incentives generated by payment arrangements (ie, 
weighted capitation) and the extent of competition between specialist 
purchasers.  However, specialist purchasing organisations would exacerbate 
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or inadvertently to shift costs onto other agencies and budgets.  As outlined in 
the previous section on competing purchasers, these risks can be ameliorated, 
but not removed, by the extent to which: 
• service coverage boundaries (eg, between the HFA and specialist 
purchasers) are clear; 
• weighted capitation reflects the financial risk associated with the covered 
population; and 
• HFA monitoring prevents under-servicing.   
Conclusions on Specialist Purchasing 
Specialist purchasing for specific services would be likely to lead to excessive 
fragmentation of service delivery and cost shifting between purchasers.  It 
could make it difficult for patients to identify who was responsible for 
purchasing the services which they needed and could make it difficult to 
establish the responsibilities and, therefore, the funding to be allocated to 
each purchaser.  Providers would have to have multiple contracts, sometimes 
for the same services, depending on the identity and other needs of the 
patients being served.   
The strengths of the model would appear to relate to specialist purchasing of 
high cost, low volume services on a national basis (eg, organ transplants), on 
the one hand, and, on the other, specialist purchasing of services for specific 
ethnic groups with distinctive requirements for services, such as ‘for Maori by 
Maori’ organisations.  The latter approach overlaps with the model of 
purchasing based on primary care organisations, discussed above.  The former 
could exist in conjunction with any of the options for devolved, sub-national 
purchasing.  Smaller, more local purchasing agencies than the HFA might 
spontaneously wish to collaborate to set up a specialist agency to procure 
highly specialised or rarely required services. 
Abolishing the Separation of Purchaser and Provider – 
Vertical Integration through Territorial Health Services and 
the Role of Local Democracy 
Rationale 
Critics of the attempt to use quasi-markets in publicly financed health services 
argue on theoretical and practical grounds that more traditional hierarchical 
bureaucratic relationships should replace the experiment with a separation 
between purchase and provision.  On theoretical grounds, following Williamson 
(1975), they argue that most, if not all, health care is a weak candidate for 
purchaser-provider contracting.  Health services tend to be complex, are 
difficult to define in clear contractual terms, exhibit marked information 
asymmetries between buyer and seller, involve the exercise of professional 
discretion, require lengthy training to deliver, frequently rest on long term 
relationships between patients and professionals and, for some services, are 
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would tend to increase the costs of purchaser-provider transactions in health 
care and favour forms of vertical integration (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993).  
This insight suggests that the core rationale for quasi-markets in health care 
lies rather in the desire to set up separate purchasers as a counter-weight to 
the traditionally dominant professional suppliers of health services, despite the 
difficulties inherent in this approach.   
For services such as those of large, near-monopoly public hospitals, it is 
argued on empirical grounds that the attempt to simulate market conditions by 
a strict separation between public purchase and public provision along the 
lines of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has been insufficiently successful to 
justify the additional transaction costs involved.  If eventual privatisation is not 
intended (SOEs in other sectors were set up with eventual private ownership in 
mind), it is argued that the setting up of hospitals and related services as 
Crown Companies is unnecessary and simply increases the complexity of 
reconciling purchaser and producer interests in the health sector.   
One approach to abolishing the strict separation of purchasing and providing 
would entail rolling the HFA’s planning responsibilities into the Ministry of 
Health and setting up territorial health service organisations across the country 
which would embrace both local purchase and delivery functions and 
incorporate the current HHSs.  A distinction within the organisation of the 
territorial health service could continue to be made between managers 
responsible for purchase and those responsible for service delivery.  Most 
moves to return to a vertically integrated health system would also include an 
increase in the level of public involvement in heath services’ decision making 
by introducing some form of elected local representation on the boards of any 
new territorial organisations.  However, this is not an intrinsic part of any shift 
back to a more vertically integrated health system.  Both vertical integration 
and local democratic control are discussed in this section. 
While it is relatively clear what an advocate of vertical integration would do 
with the current HHSs, this does not necessarily indicate that vertical 
integration is suitable or politically feasible for all health and social care 
services.  The development of the ‘mixed economy’ of public and private 
provision in the 1980s and 1990s will be difficult to reverse even if it were 
regarded as desirable to do so.  Presumably, for example, any new territorial 
health services organisation would have to develop a new contractual 
relationship with GPs, and possibly other primary care providers, in order to 
manage an integrated budget for Personal Health Services.  However, it is less 
clear what effect the abolition of the purchaser-provider split would have on 
most DSS and many mental health services, which are currently provided by 
non-governmental organisations, both for-profit and not-for-profit.  
Presumably, the territorial health service body would need to continue to 
purchase these services from largely the same providers and negotiate legal 
contracts to do so.  About half the resources of Vote: Health is currently 
contracted to private providers, including GPs. 
Thus one justification for the abolition of the purchaser-provider separation is 
that it saves on transaction costs, but it is likely that not all of these costs can 
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the costs of running a system of integrated purchase and provision in a single 
organisation are lower than those incurred in more formal arm’s length 
relationships.  Abolition can also be justified when services are difficult to 
specify, are tailored to individual needs on a discretionary basis, and where 
providers tend to have a higher level of expertise than purchasers.  In these 
circumstances, formal contracts are a blunt tool for determining the pattern of 
service and the case for vertical integration is strong, though longer term and 
‘relational’ contracting are one possible way of retaining the advantages of 
contractual relations in such a context.  Likewise, where local monopolies are 
the norm and the costs of entry to the market are high, the supply side 
competition sought by the separation of purchase and provision becomes only 
a remote possibility.  Many acute hospital services exhibit all these features.  
Other services, such as residential care for the elderly, certain aspects of 
primary care (eg, immunisation) and elective surgery may be more suitable for 
purchaser-provider contracting.   
If the above analysis is correct, it would tend to indicate that the case for 
vertical integration cannot necessarily be made on a blanket basis.  Each 
service area and each local context should be treated flexibly on its merits.  
This sort of thinking was largely absent from the critique of the status quo 
which led to the current purchaser-provider split in 1993 and is in danger of 
being absent from proposals to ‘abolish the internal market’.  Instead, there is 
a tendency to argue in general terms either for or against a split and propose 
changes accordingly, as if all the services provided from the resources within 
Vote: Health exhibit the same properties. 
The public hospital and related community health services were managed on a 
vertically integrated basis by the former AHBs until 1993 and lessons can be 
drawn from this experience to assess the merits of different forms of vertical 
integration.  However, future vertically integrated arrangements need not 
embody a literal ‘return to the AHBs’.  Indeed, there are good reasons why they 
should not, as discussed below. 
The problems of the Area Health Board era 
The structure, governance, funding and role of the AHBs were described in 
Part 1 above (see section on the rationale for the New Zealand purchaser-
provider split).  The experience of the period was also discussed, in the section 
on sub-national monopoly public purchasing agencies.  It is important when 
considering New Zealand’s most recent experience of managing a more 
vertically integrated publicly funded health system to distinguish clearly 
between the different sorts of problems which AHBs encountered and 
generated in order to be able to distinguish between those which are relevant 
today and those which have been resolved in other ways in the interim. 
The problems identified with the AHB model at the time fell into three types: 
those concerned with the lack of obvious incentives on the AHBs to secure the 
most cost-effective services for the patients within their boundaries; those 
related to the complex governance and accountability arrangements of the 
Boards; and those related to the fact that the AHBs did not have responsibility 
for GMS, other primary care subsidies or DSS.  There were other difficulties 
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distribution of costs and activity) and weak population needs assessment, 
which would not necessarily apply today and which were not intrinsic to the 
AHB model.  For example, it was difficult for central agencies to track where 
and how resources allocated to the Boards were being used.  Capital was also 
a ‘free good’ to AHBs which, it was claimed, led to poor investment decisions.  
Similarly, AHBs appeared to manage deficits by deferring maintenance of 
buildings and plant that would eventually need to be attended to.  These 
problems would be less likely to recur in the same way under vertical 
integration in the future because of reforms in public sector management and, 
particularly, in how public sector bodies account for their use of resources. 
Incentives 
The intention behind allocating each AHB a global budget determined from a 
needs-weighted capitation formula was that this would control health care 
costs while encouraging the Board to use its limited funds in the most cost-
effective way on behalf of the community.  Despite some evidence of efficiency 
gains, particularly in the early 1990s, this did not satisfy critics who were 
concerned about the lack of obvious incentives to improve quality and 
efficiency faced by the Boards.  The root of the incentive problem was 
perceived to lie in the twin facts that the Boards were responsible for both 
planning services and managing the provider organisations, and that they 
lacked clear rewards for improved performance.  Put another way, Boards 
would receive their budgets even if their performance were unsatisfactory, 
unlike firms in a private market.  In addition, there was little or nothing which 
individual patients could do to prompt the Boards to improve services.  Boards 
were geographic monopolies (as, of course, the RHAs and HFA and, in most 
cases, the HSSs turned out to be).  Boards were thus perceived to be more 
likely to administer the status quo than to drive improvements in quality and 
efficiency.  The link between planning (ie, deciding what to purchase) and 
operations meant de facto that the concerns of the public hospitals dominated 
the priorities of the Boards, particularly since the Boards faced legal obstacles 
to leasing facilities or tendering services to the private sector or other 
alternative providers.  In addition, a number of Boards had elected members 
who were also local health professionals, thereby reinforcing the tendency of 
the Boards to identify their interests with those of the local health care 
institutions. 
Hence, there was interest in distinguishing the Government’s ‘ownership’ 
interest in the health system from its interest in securing a particular pattern 
of health services.  As a result, over time, AHB contracts with the Minister of 
Health were developed, influenced by the example of the State Owned 
Enterprises Act, which began to distinguish more clearly the Government’s twin 
interests in the publicly funded health system. 
Despite these developments, it was unclear, from a central government 
perspective, what sanctions Ministers could wield in response to poor 
performance except to remove the Board members and replace them, appoint 
new Board members, issue directives or cut budgets.  Cutting budgets would 
harm patients not Board members.  Ministers did not have access to any 
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managing them a thankless one.  Monitoring performance against key 
indicators was regarded as costly, difficult to operate and open to ‘gaming’ by 
the Boards. 
Accountability and Governance 
Boards were defined geographically, thus having a local identity, which was 
greatly reinforced by the fact that a proportion of their members was locally 
elected.  This was justified on the grounds that Boards should be sensitive to 
local variations in population needs and that locally elected representatives 
would have better information and motivation to make decisions than central 
government agents.  Thus Boards saw it as their role to reflect the preferences 
of their local communities, as well as having to account to central government 
via the Minister of Health for their use of public money.  Their upward 
accountability was thus relatively broad, being concerned mainly with input 
controls since the quality of service was perceived to be a local responsibility.  
The system was moderately decentralised as a result and AHBs did not 
necessarily act in all cases to contribute to goals desired by Ministers, despite 
the fact that all AHB funding came from the centre. 
However, this behaviour did not necessarily mean that AHB performance was 
under strong local scrutiny.  The local accountability of AHBs to their 
electorates depended on the level of interest which local people exhibited in 
the actions of the Boards.  Since the resources managed by the Boards were 
not raised from the local electors, the local electorates did not show great 
interest in the performance of Board members.  Turn-out in Board elections 
was lower than for local authority elections, suggesting that local people were 
not closely involved in the affairs of their local Boards.  Central funding and 
upward accountability may have worked against strong local involvement. 
In the late 1980s, AHBs were placed under more direct accountability to the 
Minister of Health through contracts which began to specify the outputs which 
the Boards were to provide, thereby emphasising the fact that the Boards were 
upwardly accountable in crucial respects.  In return, they were given more 
freedom over their day-to-day operations.  The principal criticism of these 
arrangements was that the attempt to combine local (downward) and (upward) 
national accountability in a single body, and for many of the same functions, 
led to continuing confusion and conflict between central government and the 
AHBs, even when tighter contracts with Ministers had been introduced, since 
funding still came from central government.  This was likely to have been 
exacerbated by having locally elected representatives on Boards.  There were 
also criticisms that the objectives of the AHBs were not sufficiently clearly 
articulated, could potentially conflict with one another (eg, Boards were 
charged with protecting and promoting the public health as well as providing a 
range of health services) and were not necessarily within their control (eg, 
better public health was conditional on many factors outside the control of the 
AHBs), making upward accountability difficult to achieve.  In addition, AHB 
managers’ attempts to change practice in order to improve performance either 
financially or in service terms, appeared to be frustrated by local professional 
resistance.  Management did not seem to have the levers to manage the 
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Integration of Budgets 
AHBs were only responsible for planning and delivering hospital and 
community health services.  They had no responsibility for family practitioners, 
especially GPs, or for much of the social care (DSS) of older people and those 
with disabilities.  This reflected the historical divisions within the New Zealand 
welfare state with their roots in the 1930s.  The Boards were keen to broaden 
their responsibilities to include all locally delivered health services, including 
GMS subsidies, in order to be able to plan comprehensively for the needs of 
their populations.  However, the GPs were suspicious of any form of external, 
local control, but especially when this involved control by locally elected 
Boards.  This smacked of local government control which they had always 
resisted.  The low likelihood of the AHBs reaching an agreed settlement with 
the GPs counted against them when proposals for radical change were mooted.  
Similar issues could arise again if a return to vertically integrated district or 
area bodies is proposed. 
Learning from the AHB experience 
It is striking how familiar the problems of the AHB era are ten years later, 
despite the major structural changes of 1993 designed to tackle them.  This 
suggests that many of the issues faced by reformers in the 1980s are intrinsic 
to managing a health system financed through general taxation, delivered 
locally by influential professionals in response to local needs and accountable 
to Parliament for its use of public resources.  The intellectual elegance of the 
attempt to separate the Government’s ownership and purchase interests and to 
clarify lines of accountability could only ever be a partial practical solution to 
these sorts of issues. 
Governance and Accountability 
All health systems, which are centrally funded, but which have sub-national 
decision making bodies (as most do to avoid ‘span of control’ difficulties), face 
day-to-day central-local tensions.  If there were not, then there would be no 
point having any distinct regional or district organisations since these bodies 
would not be exercising any independent judgement, but simply ‘rubber 
stamping' central directives.  These tensions appear to exist equally in 
vertically integrated and quasi-market systems.  Rather than attempting to 
wish them away, the focus should be on managing the tensions while 
recognising that there will always be a gap between central government’s 
directives and the way in which they are translated into action at the periphery.  
The later history of the AHBs showed that central Government was able to 
express its wishes more clearly and more forcibly without necessarily resorting 
to quasi-market reform, but that there would always be limits to this process. 
The constitution of sub-national bodies, with executive authority to deploy 
resources, clearly influences the nature and degree of central-local tension.  
Since 1993, the emphasis in the health system has been on appointing both 
purchaser and CHE/HHS board members from the centre and recruiting board 
members with technical managerial skills and experience (eg, in business, law, 
accountancy, etc.) rather than members whose credentials are assessed in 
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served or the delivery of particular professional services.  It has been clearly 
stated that the current board members are not intended to be representatives 
of any particular group, but are appointed for their individual expertise 
according to a rational-technical conception of the role of their organisations.  
This broad approach tends to reduce the intellectual ‘distance’ between the 
centre and the periphery and to produce a more homogeneous style of decision 
making.  Although the HHS board has considerable day-to-day decision making 
autonomy, this broad approach is essentially one in which central government 
has delegated some of its responsibilities to a subordinate organisation, albeit 
one legally constituted as a company.  However, the decisions of the 
subordinate body are always potentially subject to central government veto.  
This contrasts with devolution in which central government hands responsibility 
for a defined set of functions and decisions to a regional or local body.  As long 
as the regional or local body confines itself to the agreed functions, generally it 
has complete freedom to make decisions as it sees fit without central 
government interference.  The latter form of decentralisation would seem to be 
more congruent with the presence of elected representatives on sub-national 
boards/authorities. 
Moving to more representative forms of sub-national decision making either by 
appointing some or all board members from local interest groups or by 
electing all or part of the board, alters the dynamic of the relationship between 
the centre and the periphery.  To work well, it may require a change of 
emphasis away from delegation towards devolution of responsibilities.  While 
current HHS board members are appointed to identify quite strongly with the 
interests of their particular organisation, they are held in check, to some 
degree, by the purchaser and are subject to the rules governing behaviour of 
company directors.  Local representatives are likely to be far more resistant to 
having their precise role in the system set in advance.   
It seems inevitable, therefore, that a greater emphasis on local representation 
at sub-national levels in a nationally financed and driven system with 
parliamentary accountability will increase the likelihood of conflict between the 
two levels.  It is also likely to increase the degree to which such conflict turns 
on issues of value rather than technical judgements.  Introducing locally 
elected representation will tend to further exacerbate any central-local tensions 
which arise, since locally elected representatives will be perceived as having 
greater local legitimacy than Ministerial appointees (see below for more on 
this). 
Local representation will also, inevitably, reduce the scope for central 
government to set detailed goals and targets, particularly in terms of how 
outcomes are to be achieved.  Government would have to be prepared to take 
criticism about local variations in the mix and style of services available across 
the country.  For example, it may be possible to put pressure on a local board 
to improve health outcomes from a particular service, but less feasible, without 
conflict, to prevent the board from tendering the service to the private sector in 
order to do so.  Yet, at Parliamentary level, the government may come in for 
criticism for permitting the ‘privatisation’ of the service since people care 
about how health services are delivered as well as what their outcomes are.  Ex 
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specific national policy settings (eg, a nationally consistent booking system for 
elective surgery). 
The lesson is that local representation (and even some form of local 
democracy) will tend to come at the price of greater tension between 
Parliamentary and local notions of accountability.  For this reason, for 
example, governments in the UK have resisted proposals to have elected health 
authorities rather than appointed bodies, or to turn the NHS over to local 
government control, on the grounds that this would confuse accountabilities, 
unless local authorities were permitted to raise some NHS revenue locally, 
which would, in turn, threaten the ideal of a national service. 
Central-local tensions can be mitigated by working to clarify and define the 
limits of local responsibility and national control through codifying the ‘rules of 
engagement’ between the two tiers.  For example, board members could be 
appointed from the local community, but with a clear job description setting 
out their responsibilities for the local implementation of national policies, 
taking account of the specific differences between areas recognised as 
legitimate through national policy making.  It is probable that more could have 
been done before abolishing the AHBs in this regard, but there was a strong 
conviction at the centre that quasi-market relations and contracts could resolve 
the accountability issues more effectively. 
The supposed confusion over the aims and objectives of the health system pre-
1993, in particular, the dilemma as to whether the AHBs could realistically be 
held to account for delivering certain health outcomes rather than a specific 
range of services (outputs), has been reduced, to some degree, with the 
development of accountability agreements based primarily on outputs 
hypothesised to bear some relation to health outcomes.  However, this tends to 
obscure the fact that there will never be a single, or even a small number, of 
mutually compatible measures against which the performance of the publicly 
funded health system can justifiably be assessed.  For example, Maori and non-
Maori concepts of health outcomes may differ.  Again, this is an aspect of 
health systems to be recognised and managed rather than wished away 
through structural change. 
Purchaser-Provider Relations 
It is apparent from the history of the AHBs that they were increasingly 
encouraged to distinguish their planning/purchasing function from their 
service delivery function.  However, the two roles were undertaken by separate 
divisions within a single organisation rather than by wholly separate bodies, as 
currently.  While vertical integration has the attraction of removing some of the 
transaction costs associated with the negotiation, specification, monitoring and 
enforcement of legally binding contracts, it is highly likely (and probably 
necessary) that purchase and provision responsibilities would be located in 
separate parts of any integrated health service organisation.  For example, the 
skills and experience required for day-to-day hospital management are 
different from those required to set priorities at the margin between competing 
new medical technologies.  As a result, vertical integration internalises 
purchase and provision interests within the same organisation.  While this may 
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two functions, it cannot conceal the fact that the provider side wishes to 
maximise its income and maintain its asset base while the purchaser wishes to 
maximise overall benefit at the lowest possible cost.  Thus it is to be expected 
that conflicts of interest will arise as they did under the AHBs, but that they 
may be less extreme and less public than currently. 
‘Local Democracy’ in Health Services 
The Case for More ‘Local Democracy’ 
All public funding for health care in New Zealand currently comes from general 
taxation.  Thus ‘upward’ accountability to the Minister of Health and to 
Parliament for the use of these resources is essential and inevitable.  Despite 
this fundamental principle of democratic control (which includes the 
involvement of locally elected representatives in the form of MPs), it is argued, 
here and elsewhere, that health systems constituted in this way suffer from a 
‘democratic deficit’ (Klein and New, 1998).  Though this term is rarely defined, 
it appears to relate to a cluster of concerns about the governance of health 
services by agents appointed by Ministers rather than by local representatives.  
It is also bound up with a rather different strand of thinking which sees 
government by elected representatives as inadequate because it fails to allow 
the people to exercise their influence directly.  It is argued that such a system 
makes it difficult for local people to participate in decision making and 
encourages remote and insensitive decision making.  As a result, the term 
‘local democracy’ used in this section is a portmanteau expression for greater 
representation of, and direct participation by, local people in health services’ 
decision making, over and above existing channels of democracy. 
There are thus two main strands of argument for greater ‘local democracy’   
the decentralist and the participationist perspective (Weale, 1998).  Both tend to 
move the health system towards systems of devolution rather than delegation 
(see above).  The decentralist position is based on the simple proposition that 
services are delivered locally to local populations and should, therefore, be 
controlled to some degree, locally, irrespective of how resources are raised.  
The participationist argument is typically made on the grounds that local 
democracy allows greater opportunities for public participation (which 
strengthens democracy in general).  In practice, the two arguments tend to be 
interwoven.  Thus local democracy is argued to increase participation, offer a 
counterweight to ‘centralisation’, be more responsive to local needs and wants 
(ie, the quality of public opinion brought to bear on issues will improve) and 
allow for innovation and diversity (ie, the development of justifiable variation in 
services between areas).  A more general argument for decentralisation (with 
or without local democratic input) is that central government suffers from 
‘overload’ and cannot exercise adequate scrutiny over all the services for which 
it is responsible.  Therefore, some form of local accountability is inevitable.  
This is accepted in many systems and exists on the HHS side of the quasi-
market in New Zealand at present, albeit without any local democratic input. 
Arguments against more ‘Local Democracy’ 
While it may seem perverse in a democratic society to argue against greater 
‘local democracy’, there are drawbacks, as there are for most policy 
developments.  At the simplest practical level, it may be difficult to recruit Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
A Review of Options for Health and Disability Support Purchasing in New Zealand Page 97 
sufficient well-qualified people prepared to stand for election as decision 
makers for a large number of local administrative units, thereby reducing the 
quality of decision making.  Experience also shows that voter participation in 
elections for specialist local bodies like health or education authorities is low, 
even when these are combined with other elections.  In part, this may be 
because at any one time, the vast majority of the population is not in regular 
contact with the health and disability support system.  This would tend to 
compromise the mandate of locally elected representatives.  Equally, it has 
been argued that representative bodies, which tend to be larger and more 
diverse in membership, find it difficult to take decisions, particularly in 
complex fields where there is no ‘right’ answer.  Representative bodies (eg, 
local councils) tend to be larger than the current board memberships.  
Similarly, the best health outcomes for certain conditions may require services 
to be organised for populations of several million rather than several hundred 
thousand, thus preventing any meaningful ‘local’ involvement. 
More fundamentally, it is argued that local democracy will not do away with 
political conflict, for example, about how limited resources should be 
allocated; rather these conflicts will be worked through in more different places 
than previously and in more diverse ways.  The decisions reached in each local 
area will differ and the ‘losers’ (ie, specific patients’ groups) will doubtless 
appeal to central government to arbitrate in their favour, pointing to the fact 
that other areas have made different judgements.  This is likely to reintroduce 
the centre into the decision making process as arbitrator, creating conflict 
between two sets of elected representatives. 
Equally fundamentally, local democracy implies a second line of accountability 
in addition to that which flows upwards to the political centre.  The local health 
authority or board will be faced with two sets of political masters, perhaps with 
different priorities – a recipe for conflicting policy directions and highly 
complex streams of accountability.  As long as central government provides the 
vast majority of local expenditure, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
formal accountability will always have to be upward to the Minister and to 
Parliament.  However, this then leaves a question mark over the status of the 
‘accountability’ relationship between the locally elected health authority and its 
community. 
Next, local democracy may come into direct conflict with other objectives 
which society holds to be important.  In certain circumstances, these may 
legitimately override the case for local democracy.  The most obvious are the 
notions of fairness and equity which are particularly salient in publicly financed 
health systems.  Variations in access to particular services already exist for 
historic and other reasons.  Strengthening local democratic control of the 
health system could make unfair variations more difficult to eradicate.  Indeed, 
if local democracy is really to be effective, it will result in different forms of 
service in different localities, even if each local authority is allocated a fair 
budget in relation to the ‘needs’ (however defined) of its population.  It is not 
necessarily the case that these variations will be justifiable in terms of 
nationally agreed policies.  This will pose a dilemma for Ministers at central 
government level as to whether to intervene or not in the decisions of locally 
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Finally, if the case for local democracy is made simply on the grounds of 
central government ‘overload’, there is no reason why this cannot be remedied 
by having more local agents or appointees of central government charged with 
oversight of local operations. 
Alternatives to Local Democracy: New Forms of Participation 
The above assessment shows that, in a centrally financed health system, which 
is already accountable to Parliament, local democratic control of health 
services by locally elected representatives brings with it a member of 
implementation problems, principally the risk that it would lead to confused 
accountability for the use of public funds.  On the other hand, this rebuttal is 
unlikely to satisfy ’participationists’ who come from a tradition of political 
theory which stresses the importance of the civic engagement of citizens in 
shaping their collective life through participation in tasks of collective decision 
making (Weale, 1998).  For them, leaving everything to political 
representatives, whether at national or local levels, is insufficient.  In turn, the 
standard critique of this form of participation is to point out that modern 
societies are simply too large to allow for participation on any significant scale. 
However, is there a way of accommodating these different perspectives? Is it 
possible to build new methods of consultation and public participation within 
the existing framework of parliamentary government? The answer appears to 
be, ‘Yes, within limits’.  Recently, ‘participationists’ have been developing new 
ways of getting samples of the local population together to discuss, deliberate 
and produce either recommendations or a firm decision to resolve contentious 
local issues in public policy.  The two principal methods used are 'citizens'
juries’ and ‘deliberative polls’.  In each case, the members of the public are 
involved, not so much to express an opinion, but to act as policy arbitrators.  In 
each case, members of the public are selected to form part of a sample rather 
than putting themselves forward for office and/or election in order to represent 
a particular point of view or interest.  Since each method involves a relatively 
smaller number of people at any one time, but in a focused way, they are 
designed to take into account the fact that most people, most of the time will 
rationally choose not to be involved in local health care politics.  Rather than 
reorganising the governance of health services to engineer local political 
involvement, it may be possible to make far greater use of these techniques, 
adapted for the New Zealand context. 
Citizens’ Juries 
A citizens’ jury is a small, randomly selected group of members of the public 
brought together for a limited time to deliberate on a specific policy decision.  
Juries hear evidence from experts, witnesses and other interested parties and 
are then expected to make a recommendation that is unanimous and 
consensual.  There is an expectation that the body organising the jury will take 
its recommendation seriously.  Experience to date in health services has shown 
that juries can tackle difficult and important issues in an intelligent way.   
As deliberative bodies, citizens’ juries are limited by the requirement to reach 
a consensus.  As consultative bodies, they suffer from the fact that with 12 to Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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16 members, they are not large enough to be able to make reliable inferences 
as to what the wider population might think. 
Deliberative Polling 
Deliberative polls overcome the two disadvantages of citizens’ juries, discussed 
above, in that they do not require a consensus and the number of participants 
is large enough, usually between 300 and 400, to allow statistical inference.  A 
deliberative poll takes place when a random sample of the electorate is 
removed from its normal environment and immersed in an issue by receiving 
carefully balanced briefing materials, taking part in intensive small group 
discussions and being given the opportunity to question experts, politicians 
and others.  The sample then votes on the issue at stake. 
For both citizens’ juries and deliberative polling a stratified random selection 
would be necessary to ensure that the sample was representative of the 
population.  Moreover, both mechanisms are likely to involve some 
commitment in time and efforts by participants.  This will have cost 
implications if all potential citizens’ are to be fairly offered an opportunity to 
participate, for example, payment for participants’ time and childcare costs. 
Conclusions on Local Democracy 
Both deliberative polling and citizens’ juries provide the local decision-maker 
with the benefit of input from an informed, representative group of local people 
that has had an opportunity to discuss an issue thoroughly.  It is presumed 
that this exposure will improve the quality of subsequent decisions.  This 
contrasts with the data derived from opinion polls and referenda.  Experience 
to date shows that exposure to information and debate via these two 
approaches does change people’s opinions.  On the other hand, neither method 
can answer the participationist’s yearning for the active Athenian involvement 
of all citizens in the making of decisions.   
However, ultimately, modern democratic societies are based not on random 
selection for political office, but on the electoral principle, or at least, 
delegated authority from those who have been elected.  As a result, techniques 
such as citizens’ juries and deliberative polls can only be supplements to 
established methods of decision-making.  They are ways of broadening the 
range of inputs to a decision, but not replacing the existing decision making 
process.  As long as the bulk of public funds for health services come from 
general taxation, there has to be clear upward accountability to the elected 
government of the day for the use of those resources, irrespective of the degree 
of local involvement in specific decisions.  The challenge is to be able to 
incorporate new ways of consulting and involving local people in decision-
making, without misleading them into thinking that there is an easy alternative 
to Parliamentary accountability.  Although the case for individual user choice 
of purchaser through a system in which each person brings a ‘voucher’ or 
agreed sum of public money with them upon enrolment with their chosen 
health care organisation, is usually promoted on grounds of consumer 
responsiveness, it is also another means for attempting to reconcile national 
and local/personal forms of involvement and accountability. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Issues in the Implementation of Purchasing Options 
General Issues 
The key policy issues associated with implementation of the purchasing 
options described above are: 
• service coverage (ie, scope of services to be included in the budget of the 
purchaser, including access/entitlement conditions); 
• enrolment and other means of defining the population to be served; 
• pricing of payments to purchasers (including risk-adjustment methods); 
• public ownership issues, particularly in relation to public hospitals, but 
also relating to the identity of the purchaser and whether for-profit, or not, 
if independent of government; and 
• monitoring and evaluation of purchaser performance. 
The technical complexities of these policy issues, and the extent to which 
Ministers and officials, in addition to the HFA, may need to be involved in 
decisions about them, will vary depending on the purchasing option in 
question.  In practice, it has proved to be very difficult to separate decision-
making about health care policy from health care purchasing.  Decisions about 
the strategic direction of health care purchasing - for example, about major 
integrated care proposals - are invariably also decisions about the direction of 
national health care policy. 
It seems likely that Ministerial involvement in decision-making about 
purchasing arrangements will increase as the welfare, financial and political 
risks associated with the proposed purchasing arrangement rise.  This 
spectrum of involvement is represented in Figure 2, below.  In this context, 
decisions about specialist purchasing arrangements would be likely to be made 
primarily by the HFA, operating within its existing accountability arrangements 
to government.  With sub-national monopoly purchasing arrangements, we 
would expect the Crown to take an increasingly close interest, particularly 
where private entities are involved.  Ideally, under current purchasing 
arrangements, the HFA should take the lead in developing such proposals, with 
appropriate consultation with departments (eg, the Ministry of Health, Treasury 
and CCMAU). 
Figure 2: Level of likely Crown involvement in developing and regulating 
different models of purchasing 
Crown Involvement 
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Issues Specific to Competing Purchasers 
The option of competitive national (or sub-national) purchasers driven by 
patient choice (vouchers) and covering all services presents significantly 
greater design and implementation issues than the other options, greater 
uncertainty about net benefits and much greater risk of unmanageable failure if 
private purchasers should fail.  Such an approach represents a significantly 
different type of health system compared with current arrangements since it 
relies heavily on individual user choice to drive purchasing.   
There are additional policy issues that would need specifically to be considered 
to implement a system of competitive national or sub-national purchasers.  
These include:  
• registration or accreditation of purchasers (who may enter the market); 
• agreement on appropriate forms of purchaser marketing to consumers; 
• agreement on the specified package of services to be made available at a 
minimum; 
• protection of access for vulnerable groups and ‘default’ purchaser for these 
groups; 
• ethical standards (eg, freedom for clinicians to ‘speak out’ on quality of 
care issues); 
• consumer information about purchasers (this is vital for success); and 
• the Health Funding Authority’s role (ie, regulator and/or residual 
purchaser). 
The Crown is likely to have to take a pro-active role where private purchasers 
are involved and/or there are competitive arrangements, including having to 
define service coverage through regulation.  This reflects the fact that service 
coverage issues need to be more explicitly defined where there is no longer 
government ownership of the purchaser. 
Other Issues Raised by Changes to Current Purchasing Arrangements  
Financing 
More broadly, the financing of health care in New Zealand, in particular the 
relationship between public and private financing and the targeting of public 
subsidies, would need to be re-considered with both competitive purchasers or 
sub-national, monopoly purchasers that offer significant or comprehensive 
service coverage (eg, all primary; all primary plus some secondary; all primary 
and secondary health care services) for their populations.  For example, it 
could be left to purchasers to decide how to use the money currently available 
for targeting through the CSC and HUHC as part of their capitation payments.  
Limitations might need to be placed on GPs’ freedom to charge their patients 
what they judge appropriate to prevent cost-shifting and widening inequities 
between areas or purchasers. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Legal Dimensions 
Under the Health and Disability Services Act 1993, the intention of Parliament 
is that the HFA should be the dominant purchaser of publicly funded health and 
disability services, and will have purchase agreements with HHSs.  
Consequently, a key constraint on any alternative purchasing arrangements will 
be the extent to which other purchasers could detract from the HFA’s role in 
the purchasing of publicly funded health and disability services, or prevent it 
from contracting with HHSs.  The wording of the H&DS Act, therefore, presents 
the risk that alternative purchasing arrangements (for example, a sub-national 
public monopoly) might be challenged in the Courts.  Legislative change may, 
therefore, be required to facilitate most of the purchasing options discussed 
above, with the exception of specialist purchasers. 
Monopoly purchase and provision issues will also have Commerce Act 
implications.  Some of the purchasing options outlined earlier may increase 
market concentration through horizontal and vertical integration, thereby 
reducing market competition or contestability, which is counter to the 
intentions of the Act.  The Commerce Commission may grant exemptions from 
such Commerce Act requirements having reviewed a specific proposal on the 
grounds that they were likely to improve the efficiency of health services, etc., 
albeit through non-competitive means.  Consequently, the merits of specific 
purchase arrangements would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Enrolment 
Under current purchasing arrangements, this issue could largely be left with 
the HFA, within the monitoring arrangements administered by the Ministry of 
Health.  With competing purchasers, there is an issue about ensuring that all 
New Zealanders are registered or enrolled with a purchaser, or that there is a 
purchaser they can fall back on.  One way of making this happen would be to 
‘fine’ competing purchasers for the number of unregistered consumers who 
require care. 
Crown Ownership Issues 
The role of the HFA, in particular, would have to be re-considered by the 
Government under different purchase arrangements.  Would it be encouraged 
to be a competitive purchaser, a residual or last resort purchaser, or a 
regulatory body or some combination? 
Responsibilities for Implementation 
With the caveat that responsibility for the publicly funded health system will 
ultimately reside with the Crown, principally through the Minister of Health, we 
can nonetheless describe: 
• to what extent the HFA is likely to take lead responsibility for the policy 
issues associated with each purchasing option; and 
• the key mechanism(s) by which that policy issue could be implemented. Part Two: Review Of Purchasing Options 
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Table 6, overleaf, attempts to address these two issues by mapping the policy 
issues to purchasing options.  The table excludes the option of vertical 
integration.  In each intersecting box of the matrix, the lead agency or agencies 
are described in the top left-hand corner, either as “HFA”, “HFA / Crown” or 
“Crown” (Crown includes both Ministers and departments, currently the 
Ministry of Health, Treasury and CCMAU).  In the right-hand corner of each 
box, the key mechanism by which the policy issue could be implemented is 

































































































Table 6:  Summary of responsibilities for policy elements and mechanisms for their implementation under different 
purchasing options 
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Conclusions on the Options 
This paper has reviewed the rationale for purchaser-provider separation, recent 
experience, the range of options available in New Zealand and their potential 
costs and benefits.   
Experience with the purchaser-provider split in New Zealand 
The benefits 
The analysis has shown that there are benefits from the separation of 
purchaser and provider within the publicly financed system.  The separation of 
purchase from provision has allowed a range of new non-governmental 
providers to enter the system, mostly providing services to deprived Maori and 
Pacific populations.  Although there was some shift in this direction before 
1993, these providers would have found it far more difficult under the previous 
vertically integrated regime to obtain funding.  Indeed, the entry of new 
providers appears to be one of the most unequivocal benefits to government of 
purchaser-provider contracting – it breaks the link between the purchasing or 
planning function and the particular, inherited institutional form of provision.  
This allows the government, in certain circumstances, to take strategic 
decisions that would otherwise be extremely difficult.  However, it is 
undoubtedly the case that the entry of new providers has been almost 
exclusively outside the hospital sector.  The purchaser-provider separation has 
also produced greater clarity and better information about what is being 
provided at tax payers’ expense. 
The limitations 
On the other hand, the experience to date in New Zealand and elsewhere has 
shown that monopsony purchasers in quasi-market systems generally have 
fewer levers and incentives to influence health and social care providers than 
the architects of such systems may have expected.  For contracting out to work 
well, the purchaser has to be able to specify and monitor the cost and quality 
of the service at reasonable cost.  This is difficult to do in many health and 
disability support services.  Providers tend to have superior knowledge about 
‘best practice’ (particularly in relation to hospital medical and surgical 
services) and, again, in the case of the public hospital sector, monopoly power.  
In the case of public hospitals, entry to the market is extremely costly with 
high asset specificity and incumbents have major advantages.  Hospital staff 
also tend to have greater perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the public than 
public or non-governmental purchasers and hospitals are motivated and 
effective lobbies for additional public spending on health care.  By contrast, it 
is difficult to identify the direct incentives operating on monopsony purchasers 
which would motivate them to take decisions which might be unpopular with 
established providers in order to improve the performance of the system.  
Purchasers are further handicapped by the inevitable pressures on publicly 
financed systems in democratic societies to pursue multiple, complex and 
sometimes incompatible goals on behalf of the public (see below). Conclusions on the Options 
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Purchasers appear to stand a better chance of exercising influence over 
services such as residential and domiciliary care for older people than over 
most hospital services.  This is principally because market entry and purchaser 
choice are easier to accomplish and the purchaser is in a reasonably good 
position to assess the quality of care delivered at reasonable cost.  This 
observation would tend towards a conclusion that the purchaser-provider 
separation should be determined on a service-by-service basis by those best 
able to determine the balance of advantage between vertical integration or 
quasi-market relations between purchaser and providers.  A private firm would 
reach a series of judgements about in-house versus contracted out services.  
However, the quasi-market system compels the purchaser to opt for a strict 
separation of purchase from supply, irrespective of the nature of the service.  
Indeed, a single, national purchaser is probably unable practically to do 
anything else.  Under a more flexible system, with more local purchasers, 
individual purchasers might decide to reintegrate with acute hospitals for non-
elective services, for example, while tendering or operating a ‘spot’ market for 
some or all electives and purchasing all or most DSS from the private and/or 
voluntary sectors. 
The position of monopsony purchasers in New Zealand has been further 
complicated by the fact that they have been negotiating hospital contracts with 
firms that are also Crown owned, but operating as if they are private 
companies.  Having the Government on both sides of the relationship between 
purchaser and provider may have reduced the ability of the purchaser to make 
the market contestable since the Government has wished to avoid putting 
public hospitals into financial difficulty.  Deficit funding of public hospitals has 
also reduced the power of purchasers dramatically.  On the other hand, even in 
countries where hospitals are not publicly owned, governments find it 
politically difficult to alter their patterns of funding.  Private ownership of 
assets is no panacea for public purchaser freedom of decision making (see 
below for more on this). 
It is also intrinsically difficult to trace the direct contribution to health and 
social care quality or efficiency brought about by the separation of the 
purchasing function from the providing function.  In addition, the separation of 
purchase from provision, especially where this involves legal contracts, is likely 
to increase transactions costs compared with vertically integrated health care 
arrangements.   
The Interaction of Purchasing with Crown ownership of HHSs 
One theoretical solution to the weakness of the purchaser role is 
simultaneously to reform both purchase and provision by privatising the public 
hospitals.  In this way, hospitals would be directly at financial risk, at least in 
theory, if they did not satisfy the needs of purchasers.  The argument is that 
public purchasing can never be effective in a publicly funded health system 
when the government simultaneously discharges ownership responsibilities in 
respect of the hospitals, which consume around half the current public 
spending.  Under this analysis, the New Zealand quasi-market system may 
represent the worst of all possible worlds in that many of the transaction costs 
of private markets have been incurred through the sharp separation of Conclusions on the Options 
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purchase and provision allied to the company status of hospitals, but few of 
the supposed benefits.  A case can be made that the pre-conditions for 
effective purchasing are systematically undermined by the current 
arrangements for ownership which fuel political and public identification with 
the institutions of the system rather than the goals of the system.  Current 
ownership gives hospitals implicit Crown guarantees of their future incomes 
and their ability to repay loans.  This weakens the ‘hard’ budget constraint 
under which they are supposed to operate and encourages them to use over-
spending as evidence of under-funding in future contract negotiations.  
Privatisation would, in theory, remove the financial guarantees and incentivise 
the hospitals to be responsive to the needs of the purchasers.  Even 
monopsony purchasers would be empowered by this arrangement, it is argued. 
However, whether ending public ownership of all health care providers is 
desirable in itself, or indeed, practical politics is quite another matter.  Many 
countries with health systems which pursue similar overall goals are already in 
the apparently fortunate position (from a New Zealand perspective) of not 
owning many or any of the hospitals.  This is the case, for example, in the 
Netherlands and Canada.  However, it would be untrue to suggest that this, in 
itself, has encouraged inter-hospital competition, given purchasers a free hand, 
or removed government from involvement in the hospital sector.  Hospitals still 
put pressure on governments and/or social insurers for more resources.  As 
long as the government intervenes in the financing of health services, it tends 
to become involved in the welfare of the providing institutions as the 
embodiment of its commitment to protecting the public’s health (Tuohy, 
1999).  In addition, a change of ownership of the hospitals is likely to replace a 
public monopoly with a private one in most parts of New Zealand.  Thus there 
may be more potential for improving the effectiveness of purchasers in 
measures designed to increase the contestability of services such as direct 
physician contracting rather than changes to the ownership of hospitals (see 
below). 
General issues relevant to assessing future options 
In sum, the strictly economic case for a sharp purchaser-provider separation 
and contracting for publicly financed health services does not appear to be 
especially strong, especially for non-elective, hospital services.  It appears 
stronger for community health services, primary care and disability support 
since these are generally provided in a decentralised way.  The overall case for 
the separation appears to rest more heavily on the greater explicitness about 
what can be afforded, the higher level of information on the use to which public 
funds are put and the clearer accountability systems, which are associated 
with the purchaser-provider approach, than on its ability to encourage greater 
contestability between suppliers of services.  On occasions, the distance 
between purchaser and provider may also enable government more easily to 
take tough decisions affecting professionals’ self-interest, which are virtually 
impossible to take when purchase and provision are integrated in a single 
public body.   Conclusions on the Options 
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Thus the purchaser-provider split cannot be rejected out of hand.  In addition, 
it may be possible to improve its working either by modifying the current 
arrangements, or by adopting one of the options for purchasing discussed 
above.  However, before assessing the main options, in turn, against the status 
quo, there are a number of general points which should be borne in mind when 
trying to determine which model is preferable and why.   
It appears from the foregoing analysis that there is no single model of the 
relationship between health and disability support services’ delivery and 
planning/purchase which is likely to offer all the attributes desired by 
proponents of system change.  The preferred model depends on trade-offs 
between goals such as local responsiveness to variations in need and 
consistency of access to services across the country.  Other choices depend on 
the value attributed to individual user choice versus ‘expe
purchasing/planning agencies, or equity of access, as against other goals such 
as technical efficiency.  Other considerations for central government include 
the trade-off between cost containment via a single national agency and the 
existence of a larger number of purchasing agents, each of which risks 
becoming a lobby for additional resources in pursuit of its ‘fair’ share of 
current resources.  The full range of criteria which have been used at various 
points in this report to assess each of the potential options are set out in the 
left hand column of Table 7, below.  The table then summarises an attempt to 
apply the criteria to each of the three most promising models of purchasing.  
Each model is assessed in comparison with the status quo (ie, it scores 
positively on a criterion if it is likely to improve the quality or effectiveness of 
purchasing and negatively if the reverse, compared with the relation between 
the HFA and the HHSs).   
All models of purchasing publicly financed health services depend on the 
government being able to express the goals of the health system in a 
reasonably internally consistent and stable fashion over time so that the 
purchasers can identify a robust set of aims and objectives to pursue which are 
within their capacity to achieve.  Irrespective of the model chosen, the 
experience of the OECD countries is that governments find this task extremely 
difficult and expect their purchasers to pursue a range of aims and objectives 
simultaneously, not all of which are mutually compatible if taken to their 
logical conclusion (the long list of assessment criteria in Table 7 underlines 
this point).  Some of these objectives, such as technical and allocative 
efficiency, cost containment, public acceptability, responsiveness to individual 
patients’ needs and equity of access, and the tensions they create for 
purchasing, were described earlier in this paper.  For example, the current 
focus on using the elective surgical booking system to establish a single set of 
national thresholds for access to publicly financed surgery points towards a 
highly centralised approach to purchasing based on equal opportunity of 
access for equal need.  By contrast, the policy to develop a range of integrated 
care pilots linking services and providers in innovative ways at local level in 
response to local conditions, points towards an increasingly devolved approach 
to purchasing for services other than elective surgery, which may or may not 
fulfil equity goals. Conclusions on the Options 
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Whichever choice is made, it is extremely difficult to determine which model 
offers the best chance of directly contributing to improved population health 
outcomes.  This is because the relation between the organisation of the 
purchasing or planning system and health is indirect and mediated by 
numerous other variables.  Instead, choices about the best way of organising 
the demand side of the health system have to be taken on the balance of 
probability of reaching a range of valued intermediate outcomes and process-
related goals, together with the risks inherent in each approach.  As a result, 
Table 7, which summarises the assessment of the most convincing three broad 
options, does not include the contribution of each to improved health and 
disability outcomes as one of the assessment criteria. 
Different approaches to organising the purchasing side of the health and 
disability support system also present different degrees of novelty, technical 
difficulty and, therefore, of risk.  For example, there is little doubt that 
organising geographic monopoly purchase arrangements at regional or area 
level is a great deal more straightforward and predictable in a system devoted 
to equity of access to health services than developing arrangements based on 
individual enrolment and patient choice of purchaser.  The former is familiar 
from the recent past and from the experience of many other countries.  The 
latter has theoretical advantages in that it should generate both demand and 
supply side competition in the health system, but is largely untried (even in the 
Netherlands which has flirted with the approach) and requires a high degree of 
regulation to preserve equity of access to services.  As a result, worldwide, the 
dominant trend in developing the purchasing or planning side of publicly 
financed health systems has tended in recent times towards trying to develop 
agencies which face clearer incentives to tackle embedded inefficiencies and 
inequities in health systems, but without sacrificing the equity goals on which 
most systems are based.  A series of related steps has typically been taken: 
• attempting to integrate formerly separate budgets, particularly those 
allocated to primary (non-hospital) and secondary (hospital) care; 
• allocating the resulting comprehensive budget using some form of needs-
weighted capitation formula; and  
• expecting the purchaser/planner to manage within its budget, with some 
form of risk-sharing arrangement with government in order to encourage 
efficient use of resources. 
This pattern of development explains the interest in a number of countries, 
including New Zealand, in basing some or all of the health care purchasing or 
planning function upon organisations with responsibility for primary care where 
services can be developed which may help in the management of the system as 
a whole.  Integrating primary and secondary care and shifting the emphasis 
away from the hospital can be pursued both under internal market and more 
vertically integrated systems.  However, given the level of change and change 
fatigue in the New Zealand Health system over the last decade and the relative 
newness of current arrangements put in place after the Coalition Health 
Agreement of 1996, any change to the structure and organisation of the health 
system needs to be carefully justified and introduced in the least disruptive 
way possible, preferably building on existing trends. Conclusions on the Options 
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The final general observation is that some models of purchaser organisation 
can exist with others.  Although the analysis in this paper has tended to treat 
each option in isolation, for clarity of exposition, there are potentially feasible 
combinations.  The most obvious would be to combine devolved purchasing of 
the majority of frequently used services with a national agency to purchase or 
organise high cost, low volume tertiary services.  Another combination 
discussed in a number of countries would be to establish a separate purchaser 
for mental health services and generic purchasers for the remaining health 
services.  Similarly, if competition on the purchase side of the quasi-market 
were desired in New Zealand, it might be introduced, where feasible, in the 
main centres of population, with monopoly geographic agencies operating 
elsewhere.  Perhaps the most likely combination of specialist and non-
specialist purchasing agency in New Zealand would relate to Maori.  It might 
well be desirable, in conjunction with each of the main options discussed 
below, to allow for the development of specialist sub-purchase organisations 
operated by and for Maori. 
In general, it would appear that the case for specialist purchasing agencies 
rests on their ability to complement other models of purchasing rather than as 
a stand-alone option.  Specialist purchasers for all the main diseases or for 
each specialty would appear impracticable since this would generate a large 
number of overlaps of responsibility and budget boundaries ripe for cost-
shifting, not to mention the complexity for providers and patients.  For these 
reasons, the option of specialist purchasing is not separately considered in 
what follows. 
The main options for change are now discussed, in turn, followed by some 
ways in which a single national purchasing agency could be made to work 
better. 
National or sub-national competing purchasers 
This model has strong theoretical advantages for efficiency over systems based 
on monopoly purchasing and was the preferred destination for the New 
Zealand health system set out in the Green and White Paper of 1991 (Upton, 
1991).  In theory, the purchaser should be motivated by competitive pressures 
to respond to the needs and wants of consumers, thereby leading to improved 
individual accountability and gains in efficiency.  At the same time, there 
should be a strong element of national accountability, since a political decision 
would have to be taken to determine the scope and value of the entitlement 
associated with the publicly financed voucher, which each patient takes to 
his/her chosen purchaser upon enrolment.  It is argued that the voucher will 
bring greater explicitness as to what is and is not covered by the publicly 
financed health system, which will, in turn, improve the quality of debate and 
decisions about the proportion of national resources to be applied to financing 
health services in the public sector. 
However, its implementation raises thorny equity issues relating to potential 
risk selection, calculating risk-adjusted capitation payment rates to mitigate 
risk selection, whether individuals should be permitted to ‘top up’ their public 
voucher, the permissible nature and likely extent of purchaser competition and Conclusions on the Options 
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enrolment policies.  Such difficulties either do not apply, or apply far less 
acutely, to the geographic and/or monopsony models in which purchasers 
largely do not compete with one another for patients.  For example, under the 
geographic model, a formula is required to determine the fair expenditure 
share of the relevant purchaser’s population, but it does not need to be as 
sophisticated as when funding depends on individual patient enrolments 
(Hurley, Hutchison, Giacomini, Birch, et al.  1999).  The potential gains in 
efficiency and user responsiveness may be greater under competing purchase 
arrangements, but the risks of disadvantaging particular types of patients are 

































































































Table 7: Summary assessment of potential purchasing options in terms of the features of a good purchasing system, 
compared with the current arrangements (HFA purchasing) 
Features of a good purchasing 
system/purchaser of publicly financed 
health services1 
Purchasing option scored versus current arrangements2 
  Devolved to non-competing 
PCOs 
Devolved to competing 
purchasers (health plans) 
Vertically integrated 
(territorial health services) 
Bargaining power/strength vis-à-vis 
providers 
–3 
Assuming similar size to 
territorial health services 
–1  –3 
Assuming similar size to 
PCOs 
Good relationships of trust with providers  +2  –2  +2 
Willingness to stimulate 
competition/change providers if necessary 
+2  +4  –2 
Decisions command public and 











Access to good information on cost and 
quality/benefits of services 
+1 
Assuming clinician input 
+2 
Assuming incentive to do 
this 
0 
Understanding of population needs and 
sensitivity to population diversity 
+3  +2  +3 
Expertise to develop a purchasing plan  –2 
Current expertise spread 
more thinly 
0  –2 
Current expertise spread 
more thinly 
                                            
1 Features derived from Light (1998) and Mays and Dixon (1996). 
2 Explanation of scores: A score of zero represents no change from the current arrangements.  A positive score represents an improvement and a negative 

































































































Features of a good purchasing 
system/purchaser of publicly financed 
health services1 
Purchasing option scored versus current arrangements2 
Knowledge to specify, negotiate and 
monitor range of contracts 
+2 
Assuming clinician input 
0  –2 
Assuming bureaucratic 
approach 
Techniques to monitor outcomes, 
efficiency and equity of access 
0  +2 
Incentives to do this 
0 











Acceptance of ‘hard’ budget constraint 
(no incentive to ask for more money rather 
than make the best of available resources) 




Especially if democratically 
elected 
Ability to manage clinical and financial 
risk across a wide range of services 
(except for defined ‘high cost – low 
volumes cases) 
+1 
Assuming similar size to 
territorial health service but 
clinician involvement 
–1 
Smaller than HFA and 




Assuming similar size to 
PCO 
Incentives to purchase highest quality 
services at lowest cost 
+2 
Assuming their surpluses 







Avoidance of “cream skimming” and 
“adverse selection” 
0  –4 
Assuming competition 
0 
Focus on public health as well as curative 
services 
+2 
Assuming GPs and public 
health physicians can work 
together 
–1 
Assuming short-term focus 



































































































Features of a good purchasing 
system/purchaser of publicly financed 
health services1 
Purchasing option scored versus current arrangements2 
Individual user choice and responsiveness 
to individual needs/wants 
+1  +5  0 
Consistency of decisions between 
purchasers and across time (national 
standards, eg of access in relation to 
patient need) 
–3 
More scope for local 
idiosyncrasies 
–2 
Plans will wish to 
differentiate themselves 
–2 
Local boards will vary in 
their priorities 
Upward accountability (to central 
government) 
–2  –1  –3 
Involvement of/accountability to 
population served 
+1  +3  +2 
Representation of wider public (not just 
users) 
+1 
More local then HFA, but 
depends on requirements 
placed on PCOs 
–3 
Will not occur unless 
mandated 
+4 
Assuming local democratic 
representation on boards 
Low transaction costs  –2  –3  –1 
Low central government regulatory costs  –3  –5  –2 
Feasibility/disruption (versus status quo)  –1  –5  –3 
Public acceptability  –1 
Assumed scepticism of GPs’ 
motives particularly 
–5 
Judged that public not in 
tune with this model 
+3 
Public dislike of central 
bureaucratic agencies 
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In addition, the evidence available on how patients choose health insurers and 
health plans, particularly from the USA, indicates that there is little likelihood 
that unsupported individual choice would, in practice, prove capable of driving 
improved purchaser performance.  Table 7 summarises the overall pros and 
cons of the model.  The model may also threaten cost containment, which is 
important from a government perspective, since it would tend to encourage a 
view that each enrolee had an entitlement to a defined package of health care, 
regardless of cost, based on the publicly financed ‘voucher’ which he/she 
brought to the health plan.  This contrasts with the current management of the 
health system’s finances which is based on trying to prioritise the most ‘needy’ 
patients in as transparent and fair a way as possible within a budget set in 
advance on the basis of broad political priorities between health services and 
other uses of public money. 
The model suffers from the further drawback that it would only seem feasible 
to implement it for approximately half the population in the main centres of 
population.  This does not rule out such a possibility, as long as people in the 
areas concerned were convinced that the chosen model suited the 
characteristics of their area.  In the main centres, there could be competition 
in the market and, elsewhere, periodic competition for the market.  However, 
this weakens its appeal in any health system aiming for national consistency.   
The model of competitive purchasers is highly likely to generate higher 
administrative costs than monopsony purchasing since all or most providers 
would need to negotiate contracts with, or claim reimbursement from, all the 
purchasers.  This would be similar to the arrangements for treatment of 
accident-related injuries since July 1999 in which health services providers 
have to claim reimbursement from a range of different private and public 
insurers.   
Finally, to bring the model into being would involve major structural change 
and a further prolonged period of upheaval in a system which has been dealing 
with significant externally generated change since the early 1990s.  This and 
the other disadvantages of purchaser competition would seem to rule out the 
option of moving directly to a health system driven by individual patient choice 
of health plan. 
This leaves two basic options for change: either to develop a range of delegated 
or sub-purchasing organisations, contracted by the government (eg, by the HFA 
or, conceivably, the Ministry of Health); or to abolish the purchaser-provider 
separation in order to develop a series of territorial health and disability 
support services’ organisations.  The latter would most likely integrate HHSs 
with primary care services, such as those of GPs, in line with trends already 
visible in the New Zealand health sector.  The latter would rule out any further 
development of individual choice of purchaser, while the former could evolve in 
time, if government so wished, into a system based on patient choice of 
purchaser or health plan.  Devolved purchasing organisations would choose 
whether, and which services, to sub-contract for.  This would enable some 
forms of specialist purchasing to occur, particularly by and for Maori.   Conclusions on the Options 
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Since the most taxing purchasing role relates to managing the demand for 
public hospital services, it would be highly desirable for both the territorial 
health services and the devolved sub-purchasers either to be based in primary 
care or to have responsibility for primary and secondary care services so that 
they could manage or purchase a comprehensive range of services inside and 
outside the hospital.  Both the vertically integrated and primary care-based 
purchasing options thus depend crucially on establishing clear funding and 
accountability relationships with GPs and other primary care providers, a 
currently unresolved issue.  Each of these options is now discussed in turn (see 
Table 7 for a summary of the assessment of each). 
Primary care-based devolved models 
The case for building on and continuing with experiments to devolve 
purchasing responsibility to risk-sharing sub-purchasing organisations with 
fully integrated, needs-weighted capitated budgets for Personal Health, 
Disability Support and Population-based (ie, public health) Services is strong, 
particularly if such organisations have a basis in primary care.  This approach 
could be accommodated without major, system-wide upheaval since it would 
be building on trends already under way towards primary care-based budget 
holding by a range of different primary care organisations.  It would allow 
individuals to continue to choose their own first contact care giver within the 
local area, but not their purchasing organisation.  This mirrors current 
arrangements (eg, IPAs and Maori primary care organisations).  It could even 
be reconciled with a shift to a more vertically integrated system if the resulting 
integrated purchaser-provider organisations included responsibility for primary 
care (see below).   
A national purchaser may be regarded as too remote to be able to purchase 
local packages of Personal Health and Disability Support Services designed to 
keep elderly people out of hospital or residential care and, instead, supported 
in their own homes.  Primary care providers could do this.  Yet, at present, 
primary care providers have no reason to ensure that their elderly patients 
receive the most appropriate pattern of support for their personal needs since 
they cannot manage patients and resources across the primary-secondary care 
inter-face, nor do they have the ability to access the other supportive services 
necessary to maintain their frailer patients in the community.   
Under this option, primary care-based purchasing organisations could have 
overall responsibility for managing all the public resources available for the 
health and social care of their enrolled patients in the most cost-effective 
manner possible (Glennerster, 1996).  One way of implementing this approach 
would be for care managers to work at general practice level, taking advantage 
of the fact that GPs and practice nurses are in very frequent contact with their 
older patients.  Practices could be required to assess their elderly patients 
periodically to prevent crises leading to admission to residential care.  This 
could help in the management of the likely rising demand for disability support 
generated by an ageing population.  These purchasers could also take 
responsibility in certain circumstances for budgets that extended beyond Vote: 
Health in order to influence the causes of ill-health which lie outside the health 
system and to facilitate collaboration with education, housing and other local Conclusions on the Options 
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agencies.  In addition, budgetary devolution to primary care organisations 
would be a means to develop primary care itself so that it could share in the 
better management of the overall health care budget. 
Primary care provider organisations (importantly, not just groups of GPs) 
which are given the ability to make ‘savings’ by better use of their budgets are 
likely to be more powerfully motivated, have better knowledge and have better 
opportunities to alter the inherited use of resources by other providers than 
government purchasing agencies.  There is considerable attraction to policy 
makers in encouraging one group of influential clinicians to shape the activities 
of other clinicians, given that both groups directly shape the deployment of 
resources in ways which managers and planners can rarely do.  The evidence 
from experiments such as GP fundholding and total purchasing in the UK 
indicates the potential which this approach can offer, particularly if primary 
care purchasers are large enough to act as a counter weight to hospital 
providers.  On the other hand, it has to be recognised that the culture and 
funding of general practice in New Zealand is different from the UK.  Budget-
holding at individual practice level has not been attempted and the existence of 
user charges provides an opportunity for cost-shifting to patients in ways which 
are not possible in the UK NHS.   
However, in theory, models that involve giving budgets to clinician groups 
working in primary care, have the potential partially to redress the information 
and legitimacy imbalance, which currently exists between other more 
bureaucratic forms of purchasing and providers such as acute hospitals, 
particularly if changes can be made in the way GPs are paid.  Primary care 
clinicians may be able to exert a stronger influence over, say, the public 
hospitals than the former RHAs or HFA have been able to achieve, but without 
the need for privatisation of the hospitals (see above).  Primary care-based 
purchasers could employ staff with the expertise to purchase and/or organise 
disability support as well as personal health services. 
Ultimately, the resource allocation decisions in health care are made by teams 
of clinicians.  It is generally extremely difficult for others to do more than 
shape the broad resource limits in which they work.  For example, the decision 
by a leading US managed care company in November 1999 to abandon micro-
management of its clinicians and wind up its utilisation review (UR) 
department was prompted, among other things, by the fact that the 
department approved 97% of the requests from clinicians for resources to 
manage individual patients.  Thus it is appropriate for responsibility for 
purchasing services within a budget to lie with organisations which are 
clinically led, but which operate within a national framework of objectives and 
quality standards.   
GPs would not automatically lead such organisations.  The current Integrated 
Care Pilots are small-scale, far from comprehensive prototypes for the sorts of 
organisations envisaged.  Devolved, primary-based purchasers could just as 
easily be ‘third sector’ (Crampton, 1999) organisations including Maori 
primary care providers, rather than, say, based on IPAs.  The likelihood is that 
they would compete periodically for the market rather than in the market (say 
every five to ten years), in order to obtain a purchasing franchise for a defined &RQFOXVLRQV RQ WKH 2SWLRQV
$ 5HYLHZ RI 2SWLRQV IRU +HDOWK DQG ’LVDELOLW\ 6XSSRUW 3XUFKDVLQJ LQ 1HZ =HDODQG 3DJH ￿￿￿
SHULRG￿ IRU DQ DUHD RU D SRSXODWLRQ VXE￿JURXS￿ 3XUFKDVHUV ZRXOG DVVXPH PRVW￿
EXW QRW DOO RI WKH ILQDQFLDO ULVN DQG ZRXOG QRW EH FRPSHWLQJ RQ DQ RQJRLQJ
EDVLV￿ ,Q WKLV ZD\￿ LW VKRXOG EH SRVVLEOH WR UHGXFH WKH ULVN RI ·FUHDP
VNLPPLQJ￿ DQG XQGHU￿VHUYLFH DQG WDNH VRPH SUHVVXUH RII WKH V\VWHP RI ULVN
DGMXVWPHQW￿ 7KH VWURQJHU WKH ILQDQFLDO LQFHQWLYHV RSHUDWLQJ RQ WKH SXUFKDVLQJ
RUJDQLVDWLRQ DQG RQ LQGLYLGXDO FOLQLFLDQV￿ WKH JUHDWHU WKHVH ULVNV￿ WKH JUHDWHU
WKH QHHG IRU UHJXODWLRQ DQG WKH JUHDWHU FRVW RI VXFK UHJXODWLRQ￿
,QHYLWDEO\ WKHUH DUH GUDZEDFNV FRPSDUHG ZLWK WKH VWDWXV TXR DV ZHOO DV
DGYDQWDJHV￿ 7KH DGYHQW RI ￿￿ RU ￿￿ ￿SRVVLEO\ PRUH￿ VXE￿SXUFKDVHUV FRXOG
LQFUHDVH WUDQVDFWLRQV FRVWV LQ WKH V\VWHP DV ZHOO DV WKH PRQLWRULQJ FRVWV
LQFXUUHG E\ WKH +)$ RU 0LQLVWU\ RI +HDOWK￿ VLQFH DQ DGGLWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQDO
OD\HU ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ DGGHG￿ (DFK SXUFKDVHU FRXOG EHFRPH D YRFDO FULWLF RI
WKH OHYHO RI JRYHUQPHQW IXQGLQJ￿ WKHUHE\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH SROLWLFDO SUHVVXUH WR
UDLVH VSHQGLQJ￿ ,W LV FHUWDLQO\ SRVVLEOH WKDW FOLQLFDOO\￿OHG RUJDQLVDWLRQV ZRXOG
EH OHVV ZLOOLQJ DQG SRWHQWLDOO\ OHVV DEOH WR PDQDJH ZLWKLQ DQ DOORFDWHG EXGJHW
WKDQ D QDWLRQDO SXUFKDVHU￿ $W WKH VDPH WLPH￿ LW ZRXOG SUREDEO\ EHFRPH PRUH
GLIILFXOW IRU FHQWUDO JRYHUQPHQW WR LPSRVH QDWLRQDO VWUDWHJLHV RQ D ODUJHU
QXPEHU RI SXUFKDVLQJ ERGLHV HDFK RI ZKLFK ZRXOG KDYH VWURQJ FOLQLFDO LQSXW￿
0RUH￿ VPDOOHU SXUFKDVLQJ ERGLHV ZRXOG VSUHDG WKH DYDLODEOH WHFKQLFDO
SXUFKDVLQJ H[SHUWLVH PRUH WKLQO\￿ /RFDO SULPDU\ FDUH￿EDVHG PRQRSROLHV PLJKW
PDNH LQDSSURSULDWH GHFLVLRQV DERXW VSHFLDOLVW VHUYLFHV DQG LQYHVW LQ WKHLU RZQ
VHUYLFHV RXW RI VHOI￿LQWHUHVW￿
+RZHYHU￿ VHHQ LQ WKH OLJKW RI WKH GHEDWH EHWZHHQ SURSRQHQWV RI VRPH IRUP RI
LQWHUQDO PDUNHW DQG SURSRQHQWV RI UH￿LQWHJUDWLRQ RI SXUFKDVH DQG VXSSO\ RI
VHUYLFHV￿ WKH GHYROYHG￿ SULPDU\ FDUH￿EDVHG DSSURDFK WR SXUFKDVLQJ KDV WKH
DWWUDFWLRQ RI RIIHULQJ VRPH JDLQV WR ERWK VLGHV RI WKH DUJXPHQW￿ 7KLV LV
EHFDXVH￿ XQGHU LW￿ SXUFKDVLQJ IXQFWLRQV ZRXOG EH EHLQJ GHYROYHG WR
RUJDQLVDWLRQV ZKLFK DOVR KDYH D SURYLGLQJ UROH￿ WKHUHE\ UHXQLWLQJ SXUFKDVH DQG
SURYLVLRQ￿ DOEHLW SUREDEO\ DW D PRUH ORFDO OHYHO WKDQ LI YHUWLFDOO\ LQWHJUDWHG
WHUULWRULDO KHDOWK VHUYLFHV ZHUH SXW LQ SODFH￿ $W WKH VDPH WLPH￿ WKH SXUFKDVHU￿
SURYLGHU VHSDUDWLRQ DQG FRQWUDFWV ZRXOG EH PDLQWDLQHG IRU VHUYLFHV VXFK DV
WKRVH RI SXEOLF KRVSLWDOV ZKHUH WKH SULPDU\ FDUH RUJDQLVDWLRQ ZRXOG EH LQ D
VWURQJ SRVLWLRQ WR MXGJH WKH TXDOLW\ DQG DSSURSULDWHQHVV RI FDUH DQG￿ LI LW
MXGJHG EHQHILFLDO￿ WR VXEVWLWXWH LWV RZQ RU RWKHU DPEXODWRU\ VHUYLFHV IRU WKRVH
RI WKH KRVSLWDOV￿ 7KH SULPDU\ FDUH￿ EDVHG PRGHO ZRXOG DOVR IDFLOLWDWH D
GLDORJXH EHWZHHQ WZR JURXSV RI FOLQLFLDQV VLQFH WKH QHJRWLDWLRQ RI FRQWUDFWV
FRXOG WDNH SODFH EHWZHHQ SURIHVVLRQDOO\￿OHG￿ RU LQIOXHQFHG￿ SXUFKDVHU
RUJDQLVDWLRQV DQG SURYLGHUV￿
)LQDOO\￿ LQWHJUDWHG FDSLWDWHG EXGJHWV ZRXOG DOORZ WKH SULPDU\ FDUH￿EDVHG
RUJDQLVDWLRQ WR PDNH PRUH IOH[LEOH XVH RI DOO WKH SXEOLF ILQDQFH IRU KHDOWK
VHUYLFHV DYDLODEOH WR D GHILQHG SRSXODWLRQ￿ 7KH RUJDQLVDWLRQ FRXOG￿ DV D UHVXOW￿
UHGXFH WKH FXUUHQW HOLJLELOLW\ IRU￿ DQG OHYHOV RI￿ FR￿SD\PHQWV IRU SULPDU\ FDUH
VHUYLFHV DQG LQFUHDVH WKH DPRXQW RI VHUYLFH SURYLGHG IUHH DW WKH SRLQW RI XVH￿
+RZHYHU￿ LQ RUGHU WR GR VR￿ WKH SXUFKDVHU ZRXOG QHHG WR FKDQJH WKH ZD\ LQ
ZKLFK *3V DQG RWKHUV DUH UHPXQHUDWHG￿Conclusions on the Options 
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Vertical Integration 
Given that the high expectations of the internal market have not been realised, 
it is scarcely surprising that the case for reverting to a more vertically 
integrated system with purchase/planning and provider management functions 
largely located in the same organisation has been articulated.  It is argued that 
vertical integration would also reduce the costs of managing the health system 
that have been inflated by attempting to adopt a commercial model of 
contracting.  In the New Zealand context, calls for re-integration generally 
focus on the relations between the national purchaser (the HFA) and the HHSs.  
The change would presumably lead to a series of geographically based, 
equitably funded health services’ organisations across the country responsible 
for planning and delivery of all or most hospital, community health and 
disability support services.  However, there is no reason, in principle, why a 
greater emphasis on locally elected purchaser organisations could not be 
introduced while maintaining a purchaser-provider split.  This would be 
accompanied by the absorption of the HFA’s remaining functions into the 
Ministry of Health.  The Ministry would also be responsible for defining and 
managing the performance objectives of the new local health services’ 
structures on behalf of the Ministry of Health.  Some proponents of vertical 
integration include a change in the governance of local health services’ bodies 
away from ministerial appointees towards boards with either some or all 
members locally elected.  This is a reaction to the emphasis placed by the 
architects of the internal market on generic managerial skills and experience at 
CHE/HHS board level, rather than local representation.  The model has 
something in common with the way in which Boards of Trustees manage 
publicly funded schools.  The difference is that school Boards are far more 
numerous and each administers a relatively modest budget compared with a 
local health authority.   
While re-integration in these terms is feasible, it is difficult to see how the 
purchaser-provider separation could be undone in respect of DSS (at least in 
the short term) when so much of the provision is in the private sector.  Thus 
the health system would still need to retain a capacity to purchase DSS and 
would not, in practice, be able to remove all parts of the purchaser-provider 
separation.  It seems highly unlikely that any government would choose to buy 
out private providers of DSS.   
Furthermore, it is unclear what vertical integration between the purchaser and 
HHSs would mean for the relationship between GPs and other primary care 
providers (eg, Maori providers) and the wider health system.  To justify the 
upheaval of another major reorganisation of the health system, it would be 
important to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the abolition of the 
internal market to re-negotiate these relationships, so that all the publicly 
funded and subsidised services in each area could be more closely co-
ordinated than is currently the case.  This approach would provide a link 
between the model of purchasing based on primary care, discussed above, and 
a more vertically integrated system.  It would possibly necessitate a 
contractual relationship between primary care providers and the new territorial 
organisations. Conclusions on the Options 
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However, the history of previous attempts to align GPs’ activities more closely 
with the wider health system, including efforts to alter their method of 
reimbursement in order to encourage changes in the nature of the services 
which they offer and to develop links with local public bodies in health, is not 
auspicious.  In the late 1980s, the former AHBs tried to take wider 
responsibility for the health services in their areas, including those of GPs 
(GMS), and were rebuffed.  The GPs refused to work with them, principally 
because of a general fear of external bureaucratic control, but, particularly, 
because the AHBs included locally elected board members, which smacked of 
local government control.  Although it is undoubtedly the case that 
circumstances have changed since the 1980s and GPs are more interested in 
partnership and collective working, they are still wary of direct external control.  
Control by local politicians is unlikely to be popular, which is a reason for 
thinking carefully about any proposal to re-introduce locally elected 
representation into the governance arrangements for vertically integrated 
health services’ organisations.  Citizens’ juries and deliberative polls may offer 
a more constructive way of increasing public participation in local decision 
making, but without setting up conflicts of accountability between the Minister 
of Health and the local population (see above). 
Other drawbacks of vertical integration in the shape of a series of local health 
services include a potential increase in the costs of managing the health 
system.  The precise increase would depend on the number of local services 
created.  Like the primary care-based option, discussed above, this approach 
would spread purchasing expertise more thinly than the status quo and 
increase the number of bodies within the health system with an interest in 
arguing for increased funding and criticising the allocation of resources 
between areas. 
Furthermore, locally elected territorial health authorities/services are likely to 
confuse central and local accountability and generate increased conflict with 
central government, since locally elected members will tend to identify with the 
needs of their area rather than with the running of the system as a whole.  As 
long as health services remain centrally financed, upward accountability to 
Parliament cannot be avoided, but sits uneasily with locally elected boards 
controlling health services. 
In addition to more complex and potentially conflicting accountabilities, it is 
unclear what greater incentives territorial health organisations would face to 
challenge inherited patterns of service delivery in order to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of local services than the current national 
purchaser (the HFA).  Indeed, if they were also directly responsible for the 
public provider organisations, they might find it more difficult to alter the 
inherited pattern of resource use.  As now, the only sanction which government 
could use in the event of poor purchaser performance would be to remove 
board members and replace them with more effective individuals or to take 
direct control of the local health services.  This would be more politically 
hazardous in the case of locally elected health authority members. Conclusions on the Options 
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The option of abolishing the Crown Company status of the HHSs and 
incorporating them in some sort of local/district health service system, while 
abolishing the HFA and re-shaping the role of the Ministry of Health is further 
likely to impose a very significant upheaval on the publicly funded system.  
After all, the current arrangements for purchasing through the HFA are only 
two years old and are only now bedding down.  It could be counter-productive 
in such circumstances to launch ‘root-and-branch’ changes to the system.  
Evidence from the recent past suggests that relatively simple structural 
solutions which largely ignore the content of health services and the motivation 
of key players are unlikely to deliver their anticipated benefits.  This leaves a 
final option – to take opportunities within the purchaser-provider system to 
make improvements.   
General Issues Relevant to Improving the Status Quo 
As well as further experiments with tendering devolved purchasing to new sorts 
of organisations, there are opportunities to make the HFA’s purchasing more 
economical, flexible and effective.  It is highly likely that a number of the 
changes discussed below would emerge over time as the national purchaser 
matures. 
The main avenues that should be actively considered are to: 
• remove the historic ‘ring fences’ which protect certain budgets within Vote: 
Health, such as DSS, from any re-allocation.  These are incompatible with 
mature purchasing organisations and would particularly hamper devolved 
purchasers.  The logic, hitherto, has been that the RHAs and latterly the 
HFA have to demonstrate the ability to manage Vote: Health effectively 
within the current ‘ring fences’ before their removal can be contemplated.  
This was primarily to reduce the risk to the Crown by preventing 
purchasers managing the budget as a whole rather than managing smaller, 
fixed amounts.  ‘Ring fences’ also simplify upward accountability for the 
use of specific bundles of resources.  However, additional flexibility may be 
necessary for effective management of Vote: Health.  In addition, devolved 
purchasers are likely to function best if they can take a budget which 
incorporates Personal Health, GMS subsidies and DSS, perhaps with 
pharmaceutical and laboratory subsidies and make purchasing decisions 
based on all the resources available to their populations.  A decision would 
need to be taken as to whether to remove the earmarking of specific funds 
for waiting list surgery as part of this change of policy, despite its strategic 
importance in improving the ‘shop window’ of the publicly financed health 
system.  Under a new approach, the HFA would negotiate new groups of 
services or classes of outputs in relation to its purchasing strategy and 
against which its purchasing could be assessed by the Ministry of Health, 
thereby maintaining accountability, but not tying it to out-dated divisions of 
the Vote; 
• shift purchasing towards programmes of care and bundles of services 
which correspond to the needs of individual patients rather than historic 
divisions between budgets and/or funding sources; Conclusions on the Options 
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• refrain from issuing strategic plans for the health sector which relate to 
particular institutional arrangements (eg, ‘a hospital plan’) rather than the 
requirement to make available particular types and volumes of services.  
The former hamper effective purchasing.  Such a change would signal the 
end of policy goals which focus on the stability of the institutions delivering 
services as much as the services themselves; 
• consider more closely aligning the work of Pharmac with that of the HFA 
and any devolved purchasers to ensure that the scope for substitution 
between pharmaceuticals and other interventions is appropriately factored 
into purchasing decisions.  This is already beginning to happen, but more 
could be done; 
• develop contracts (or hold back some resources in-year) which encourage 
providers to pursue the delivery of evidence-based service protocols or 
‘best practice’ guidelines (eg, for programmes of care) and which reward 
providers, not for the volume of activity generated, but for health and 
functioning improvements in patients/clients.  This too is just beginning 
and could be greatly extended; 
• gradually alter the currency of accountability which is used between the 
Ministry of Health and the HFA to emphasise health outcomes rather than 
exclusively the delivery of contracted outputs; 
• continue and accelerate the move towards longer term contracts for 
appropriate services (eg, for 80% of current funding, with the rest at risk 
from year to year) informed by refined ‘benchmarks’ of cost and quality for 
a wider range of services.  At present, the range of performance measures 
is narrow and most are financial.  Few have any direct bearing on the 
health services experienced by patients or the measures of performance 
that would engage clinicians in meaningful discussion about how to 
improve services.  Longer term contracts per se are less important than the 
relationships and plans for the future which need to lie behind them 
(Dawson and Goddard, 1999).  However, in a contractual environment, 
longer term contracts may be a means of signalling the commitment to a 
different form of relationship between purchaser and provider and appear 
to have the support of the sector; 
• for resources not devoted to longer term contracts, consider developing a 
‘spot market’ for elective surgery based on services-facilities splits and 
direct physician contracting (see below) in order to increase the 
responsiveness and efficiency of HHSs as providers of waiting list surgery; 
• experiment with splitting some contracts into contracts for services and 
contracts with facilities for acute hospital services in order to focus 
contractual incentives directly on groups of clinicians delivering services.  
This may also allow greater contestability in service provision since ‘out of 
area’ clinicians could be invited to bid to use facilities.  In turn, this might 
improve the position of purchasers vis-à-vis monopoly hospital providers; 
• negotiate contracts on a rolling basis so that not all contracts require re-
negotiation or oversight at the same time each year (or at longer intervals), 
thereby allowing greater attention to be given to the relationships with 
providers and the terms of each contract; and Conclusions on the Options 
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• finally, now that private insurers are heavily involved in the provision of 
health services to those who have suffered workplace accidents, it is 
important that the HFA does not see its purchasing power diminished 
through cost-shifting by workplace accident insurers keen to maintain their 
profits while keeping premia to employers low.  Given the difficulty, in 
many cases, of attributing precise causes to many chronic conditions, the 
risk of this occurring is heightened.  The increased paper work for 
providers, such as GPs which is associated with work place accident claims 
may also encourage them to reclassify a certain amount of work, putting 
unwarranted pressure on Vote: Health.  Monitoring trends in activity and 
claims in categories of service potentially prone to cost-shifting before and 
after the July 1999 changes to ACC will be essential.  
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Annex: Purchaser Strategies for Risk Selection 
Method  Description 
Service 
Coverage 
Specifying service coverage (eg, excluding pre-conditions; excluding 
/ including specific services that attract low risk individuals); 
denying coverage to individuals or groups (eg, individuals employed 




Contracting with providers in particular ways (eg, not contracting 
with specialists known to specialise in high-risk conditions; 
recruiting new specialists with limited patient following); or 
contracting with providers in particular locations but avoiding others 
who practice in higher-risk localities (eg, inner-city areas) 
Service Quality  Offering poor quality care, under-servicing, making patients wait for 
care or developing more stringent protocols for referring patients to 
specialists for some types of conditions, in order to drive consumers 
to another plan. 
Marketing  Marketing in specific locations or to specific groups to attract good 
risks (eg, in gyms). 
 
Key Approaches to Reducing Risk-Selection 
Strategy  Explanation 
Encouraging 
large risk pools 
Allows risk to be spread across a greater number of people, and 
hence to reduce the effects that a few high cost patients have on 
overall risk.  This should assist in making providers and plans 
indifferent to the utilisation and costs which might be associated 
with particular patients. 
Encouraging large risk pools is particularly important where 
purchasers are responsible for comprehensive coverage.  In New 
Zealand, any policy approach which aimed to encourage large risk 
pools may also limit competition and local responsiveness. 
Compensating 
for risk 
The main approaches to compensating for a higher or lower than 
average risk are: 
§ Risk-rating capitated premiums.  A number of tools have been 
developed to undertake such risk rating. 
§ Using a fee-for-service payment mechanism which includes levels 
of payments adjusted for complexity (as in the DRG approach 
used in secondary care)3 or moving to blended payment systems 
which 
§ combine elements of capitation and fee-for-service.   
                                            
3 A disadvantage of this approach is that it compensates plans directly for what they do, with 
payment levels based on average existing costs, ie.  incorporating any existing inefficiencies within 
them.  ACG and DCG approaches also incorporate current service use information within them, for 
use in adjusting for higher levels of ‘risk’. Annex One 
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Strategy  Explanation 
Limiting risk  The following approaches can be used to limit risk, and hence to 
reduce the incentives to cream-skim: 
§ Establishing separate risk pools (including carve-outs) – may 
present a cost-shifting risk. 
§ Limiting financial risk
4.  In this case, a financial limit may be 
placed on the risk an individual provider or plan is responsible for 
in regards to particular patients. 
§ Establishing separate clinics (eg, those without insurance 
coverage in US can obtain emergency care from state-financed 
and state-owned hospitals). 
Service 
specification 
(ie, a standard 
package/s of 
benefits) 
Prevents plans or providers from specifying or offering services in 
ways that encourage particular groups to enrol or disenrol, or which 
discourage particular groups from enrolling.  Hence, wherever there 
is competition between plans or providers where benefit design can 
influence risk selection, service specification is an important tool for 
reducing at least one avenue for cream-skimming5.  A standard 
package of benefits is often viewed as an essential element of 










                                            
4 Sometimes known as an outlier or reinsurance scheme. 
 